EconCSLib.StrategicGame.IsOrdinalPotential.isNash_iff_localMax
theoremverifiedformalizationimported Lean
Nash ↔ local maximizer of ordinal potential.
Statement
set_option autoImplicit true in set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in open EconCSLib.StrategicGame in variable {N U : Type*} [DecidableEq N] in open EconCSLib.StrategicGame in variable [Field U] [LinearOrder U] [IsStrictOrderedRing U] in variable {G : EconCSLib.StrategicGame N U} in set_option linter.unusedSectionVars false in theorem EconCSLib.StrategicGame.IsOrdinalPotential.isNash_iff_localMax {Φ : G.Profile → U} (hΦ : IsOrdinalPotential G Φ) {σ : G.Profile} : IsNashEquilibrium G σ ↔ ∀ i (s' : G.strategy i), Φ σ ≥ Φ (EconCSLib.StrategicGame.deviate σ i s')
- Formalizes
- EconCSLib, `StrategicGame.IsOrdinalPotential.isNash_iff_localMax`
- Lean proof
- By xbei (from the file's git history), from github.com/gametheoryinlean/EconCSLib at
1a88f809b538(Copyright (c) 2026 EconCSLib contributors. All rights reserved, Apache-2.0). Compiled here against leanprover/lean4:v4.33.1, Mathlib v4.33.1; written for leanprover/lean4:v4.30.0.EconCSLib.StrategicGame.IsOrdinalPotential.isNash_iff_localMax← StrategicGame.IsOrdinalPotential.isNash_iff_localMax (EconCSLib/GameTheory/StrategicGame/PotentialGame.lean:79): adapted
What was changed in
EconCSLib.StrategicGame.IsOrdinalPotential.isNash_iff_localMax--- EconCSLib/GameTheory/StrategicGame/PotentialGame.lean:79 (StrategicGame.IsOrdinalPotential.isNash_iff_localMax) +++ as compiled here @@ -1,6 +1,13 @@ -/-- Nash ↔ local maximizer of ordinal potential. -/ -theorem IsOrdinalPotential.isNash_iff_localMax {Φ : G.Profile → U} +set_option autoImplicit true in +set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in +open EconCSLib.StrategicGame in +variable {N U : Type*} [DecidableEq N] in +open EconCSLib.StrategicGame in +variable [Field U] [LinearOrder U] [IsStrictOrderedRing U] in +variable {G : EconCSLib.StrategicGame N U} in +set_option linter.unusedSectionVars false in +theorem EconCSLib.StrategicGame.IsOrdinalPotential.isNash_iff_localMax {Φ : G.Profile → U} (hΦ : IsOrdinalPotential G Φ) {σ : G.Profile} : IsNashEquilibrium G σ ↔ - ∀ i (s' : G.strategy i), Φ σ ≥ Φ (deviate σ i s') := by + ∀ i (s' : G.strategy i), Φ σ ≥ Φ (EconCSLib.StrategicGame.deviate σ i s') := by constructor @@ -10,5 +17,5 @@ push_neg at h - -- h: Φ(deviate) > Φ(σ), so by ordinal potential: payoff(deviate) > payoff(σ) + -- h: Φ(EconCSLib.StrategicGame.deviate) > Φ(σ), so by ordinal potential: payoff(EconCSLib.StrategicGame.deviate) > payoff(σ) have := (hΦ i σ s').mpr h - -- But Nash says payoff(deviate) ≤ payoff(σ) + -- But Nash says payoff(EconCSLib.StrategicGame.deviate) ≤ payoff(σ) exact absurd this (not_lt.mpr (hN i s')) @@ -18,5 +25,5 @@ push_neg at h - -- h: payoff(deviate) > payoff(σ), so by ordinal potential: Φ(deviate) > Φ(σ) + -- h: payoff(EconCSLib.StrategicGame.deviate) > payoff(σ), so by ordinal potential: Φ(EconCSLib.StrategicGame.deviate) > Φ(σ) have := (hΦ i σ s').mp h - -- But local max says Φ(deviate) ≤ Φ(σ) + -- But local max says Φ(EconCSLib.StrategicGame.deviate) ≤ Φ(σ) exact absurd this (not_lt.mpr (hmax i s')) - Verified
- 08 Oct 2026
- Axioms
Quot.soundpropext- Built on 8
- IsNashEquilibriumA profile
σis a pure Nash equilibrium of gameGif every player is playing a best response: no player can profitably deviate. - EconCSLib.StrategicGameA strategic game (normal-form game) with players
Nand utilities inU. The structure records only the bare data: strategy spaces and a… - EconCSLib.StrategicGame.ProfileThe type of strategy profiles for game
G: each player picks a strategy. This is a dependent function∀ i, G.strategy i. The profile… - EconCSLib.StrategicGame.IsOrdinalPotentialAn ordinal potential function: a unilateral deviation improves payoff iff it increases Φ.
- EconCSLib.StrategicGame.deviateUnilateral deviation in a game-bound profile: player
iswitches tos', while all other players keep their current strategies. - EconCSLib.StrategicGame.Profile.deviate_selfDeviating to the same strategy is the identity.
- EconCSLib.StrategicGame.Profile.deviate_sameAt the deviated player, the updated profile returns the new strategy.
- EconCSLib.StrategicGame.Profile.deviate_of_neAt every other player, the updated profile is unchanged.
- IsNashEquilibriumA profile
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set_option autoImplicit true inset_option relaxedAutoImplicit true inopen EconCSLib.StrategicGame invariable {N U : Type*} [DecidableEq N] inopen EconCSLib.StrategicGame invariable [Field U] [LinearOrder U] [IsStrictOrderedRing U] invariable {G : EconCSLib.StrategicGame N U} inset_option linter.unusedSectionVars false in/-- Nash ↔ local maximizer of ordinal potential. -/theorem EconCSLib.StrategicGame.IsOrdinalPotential.isNash_iff_localMax {Φ : G.Profile → U} (hΦ : IsOrdinalPotential G Φ) {σ : G.Profile} : IsNashEquilibrium G σ ↔ ∀ i (s' : G.strategy i), Φ σ ≥ Φ (EconCSLib.StrategicGame.deviate σ i s') := by constructor · -- Nash → local max: if payoff doesn't improve, Φ doesn't improve intro hN i s' by_contra h push_neg at h -- h: Φ(EconCSLib.StrategicGame.deviate) > Φ(σ), so by ordinal potential: payoff(EconCSLib.StrategicGame.deviate) > payoff(σ) have := (hΦ i σ s').mpr h -- But Nash says payoff(EconCSLib.StrategicGame.deviate) ≤ payoff(σ) exact absurd this (not_lt.mpr (hN i s')) · -- Local max → Nash: if Φ doesn't improve, payoff doesn't improve intro hmax i s' by_contra h push_neg at h -- h: payoff(EconCSLib.StrategicGame.deviate) > payoff(σ), so by ordinal potential: Φ(EconCSLib.StrategicGame.deviate) > Φ(σ) have := (hΦ i σ s').mp h -- But local max says Φ(EconCSLib.StrategicGame.deviate) ≤ Φ(σ) exact absurd this (not_lt.mpr (hmax i s'))