EconCSLib.StrategicGame.IsExactPotential.maximizer_is_nash
theoremverifiedformalizationimported Lean
A profile maximizing an exact potential is a Nash equilibrium.
Statement
set_option autoImplicit true in set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in open EconCSLib.StrategicGame in variable {N U : Type*} [DecidableEq N] in open EconCSLib.StrategicGame in variable [Field U] [LinearOrder U] [IsStrictOrderedRing U] in variable {G : EconCSLib.StrategicGame N U} in set_option linter.unusedSectionVars false in theorem EconCSLib.StrategicGame.IsExactPotential.maximizer_is_nash {Φ : G.Profile → U} (hΦ : IsExactPotential G Φ) {σ : G.Profile} (hmax : ∀ τ : G.Profile, Φ σ ≥ Φ τ) : IsNashEquilibrium G σ
- Formalizes
- EconCSLib, `StrategicGame.IsExactPotential.maximizer_is_nash`
- Lean proof
- By xbei (from the file's git history), from github.com/gametheoryinlean/EconCSLib at
1a88f809b538(Copyright (c) 2026 EconCSLib contributors. All rights reserved, Apache-2.0). Compiled here against leanprover/lean4:v4.33.1, Mathlib v4.33.1; written for leanprover/lean4:v4.30.0.EconCSLib.StrategicGame.IsExactPotential.maximizer_is_nash← StrategicGame.IsExactPotential.maximizer_is_nash (EconCSLib/GameTheory/StrategicGame/PotentialGame.lean:64): adapted
What was changed in
EconCSLib.StrategicGame.IsExactPotential.maximizer_is_nash--- EconCSLib/GameTheory/StrategicGame/PotentialGame.lean:64 (StrategicGame.IsExactPotential.maximizer_is_nash) +++ as compiled here @@ -1,3 +1,10 @@ -/-- A profile maximizing an exact potential is a Nash equilibrium. -/ -theorem IsExactPotential.maximizer_is_nash {Φ : G.Profile → U} +set_option autoImplicit true in +set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in +open EconCSLib.StrategicGame in +variable {N U : Type*} [DecidableEq N] in +open EconCSLib.StrategicGame in +variable [Field U] [LinearOrder U] [IsStrictOrderedRing U] in +variable {G : EconCSLib.StrategicGame N U} in +set_option linter.unusedSectionVars false in +theorem EconCSLib.StrategicGame.IsExactPotential.maximizer_is_nash {Φ : G.Profile → U} (hΦ : IsExactPotential G Φ) {σ : G.Profile} @@ -6,3 +13,3 @@ intro i s' - -- Need: payoff(deviate σ i s', i) ≤ payoff(σ, i) + -- Need: payoff(EconCSLib.StrategicGame.deviate σ i s', i) ≤ payoff(σ, i) -- By exact potential: payoff(dev) - payoff(σ) = Φ(dev) - Φ(σ) @@ -11,3 +18,3 @@ -- hmax : Φ(σ) ≥ Φ(dev), i.e., Φ(dev) - Φ(σ) ≤ 0 - have hle : Φ (deviate σ i s') - Φ σ ≤ 0 := sub_nonpos.mpr (hmax _) + have hle : Φ (EconCSLib.StrategicGame.deviate σ i s') - Φ σ ≤ 0 := sub_nonpos.mpr (hmax _) -- So payoff(dev) - payoff(σ) ≤ 0, i.e., payoff(dev) ≤ payoff(σ) - Verified
- 08 Oct 2026
- Axioms
Classical.choiceQuot.soundpropext- Built on 8
- IsNashEquilibriumA profile
σis a pure Nash equilibrium of gameGif every player is playing a best response: no player can profitably deviate. - EconCSLib.StrategicGameA strategic game (normal-form game) with players
Nand utilities inU. The structure records only the bare data: strategy spaces and a… - EconCSLib.StrategicGame.ProfileThe type of strategy profiles for game
G: each player picks a strategy. This is a dependent function∀ i, G.strategy i. The profile… - EconCSLib.StrategicGame.IsExactPotentialAn exact potential function: the change in
Φequals the change in the deviating player's payoff. - EconCSLib.StrategicGame.deviateUnilateral deviation in a game-bound profile: player
iswitches tos', while all other players keep their current strategies. - EconCSLib.StrategicGame.Profile.deviate_selfDeviating to the same strategy is the identity.
- EconCSLib.StrategicGame.Profile.deviate_sameAt the deviated player, the updated profile returns the new strategy.
- EconCSLib.StrategicGame.Profile.deviate_of_neAt every other player, the updated profile is unchanged.
- IsNashEquilibriumA profile
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set_option autoImplicit true inset_option relaxedAutoImplicit true inopen EconCSLib.StrategicGame invariable {N U : Type*} [DecidableEq N] inopen EconCSLib.StrategicGame invariable [Field U] [LinearOrder U] [IsStrictOrderedRing U] invariable {G : EconCSLib.StrategicGame N U} inset_option linter.unusedSectionVars false in/-- A profile maximizing an exact potential is a Nash equilibrium. -/theorem EconCSLib.StrategicGame.IsExactPotential.maximizer_is_nash {Φ : G.Profile → U} (hΦ : IsExactPotential G Φ) {σ : G.Profile} (hmax : ∀ τ : G.Profile, Φ σ ≥ Φ τ) : IsNashEquilibrium G σ := by intro i s' -- Need: payoff(EconCSLib.StrategicGame.deviate σ i s', i) ≤ payoff(σ, i) -- By exact potential: payoff(dev) - payoff(σ) = Φ(dev) - Φ(σ) have h := hΦ i σ s' -- h : payoff(dev) - payoff(σ) = Φ(dev) - Φ(σ) -- hmax : Φ(σ) ≥ Φ(dev), i.e., Φ(dev) - Φ(σ) ≤ 0 have hle : Φ (EconCSLib.StrategicGame.deviate σ i s') - Φ σ ≤ 0 := sub_nonpos.mpr (hmax _) -- So payoff(dev) - payoff(σ) ≤ 0, i.e., payoff(dev) ≤ payoff(σ) linarith