MatrixGame.expectedPayoff_toStrategicGame_zero
theoremverifiedformalizationimported Lean
Bridge lemma: expectedPayoff A.toStrategicGame p 0 = A.E (p 0) (p 1). Reduces both sides to the canonical double sum ∑ i, ∑ j, (p 0)ᵢ · (p 1)ⱼ · A i j.
Statement
set_option autoImplicit true in set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in open Finset BigOperators in set_option linter.unusedSectionVars false in universe u in variable {I J : Type u} [Fintype I] [Fintype J] [Nonempty I] [Nonempty J] in variable (A : MatrixGame I J ℝ) in variable [DecidableEq I] [DecidableEq J] in theorem MatrixGame.expectedPayoff_toStrategicGame_zero {𝕜 : Type} [Field 𝕜] [LinearOrder 𝕜] [IsStrictOrderedRing 𝕜] (A : MatrixGame I J 𝕜) (p : EconCSLib.StrategicGame.MixedProfile A.toStrategicGame) : EconCSLib.StrategicGame.expectedPayoff A.toStrategicGame p 0 = A.E (p 0) (p 1)
- Formalizes
- EconCSLib, `MatrixGame.expectedPayoff_toStrategicGame_zero`
- Lean proof
- By xbei (from the file's git history), from github.com/gametheoryinlean/EconCSLib at
1a88f809b538(Copyright (c) 2026 EconCSLib contributors. All rights reserved, Apache-2.0). Compiled here against leanprover/lean4:v4.33.1, Mathlib v4.33.1; written for leanprover/lean4:v4.30.0.MatrixGame.expectedPayoff_toStrategicGame_zero← MatrixGame.expectedPayoff_toStrategicGame_zero (EconCSLib/GameTheory/StrategicGame/ZeroSum/MatrixGameNash.lean:559): adapted
What was changed in
MatrixGame.expectedPayoff_toStrategicGame_zero--- EconCSLib/GameTheory/StrategicGame/ZeroSum/MatrixGameNash.lean:559 (MatrixGame.expectedPayoff_toStrategicGame_zero) +++ as compiled here @@ -1,12 +1,17 @@ -/-- Bridge lemma: `expectedPayoff A.toStrategicGame p 0 = A.E (p 0) (p 1)`. - Reduces both sides to the canonical double sum - `∑ i, ∑ j, (p 0)ᵢ · (p 1)ⱼ · A i j`. -/ -theorem expectedPayoff_toStrategicGame_zero {𝕜 : Type} +set_option autoImplicit true in +set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in +open Finset BigOperators in +set_option linter.unusedSectionVars false in +universe u in +variable {I J : Type u} [Fintype I] [Fintype J] [Nonempty I] [Nonempty J] in +variable (A : MatrixGame I J ℝ) in +variable [DecidableEq I] [DecidableEq J] in +theorem MatrixGame.expectedPayoff_toStrategicGame_zero {𝕜 : Type} [Field 𝕜] [LinearOrder 𝕜] [IsStrictOrderedRing 𝕜] - (A : MatrixGame I J 𝕜) (p : StrategicGame.MixedProfile A.toStrategicGame) : - StrategicGame.expectedPayoff A.toStrategicGame p 0 + (A : MatrixGame I J 𝕜) (p : EconCSLib.StrategicGame.MixedProfile A.toStrategicGame) : + EconCSLib.StrategicGame.expectedPayoff A.toStrategicGame p 0 = A.E (p 0) (p 1) := by let double : 𝕜 := ∑ i : I, ∑ j : J, (p 0).val i * (p 1).val j * A.g i j - have hLHS : StrategicGame.expectedPayoff A.toStrategicGame p 0 = double := by - unfold StrategicGame.expectedPayoff + have hLHS : EconCSLib.StrategicGame.expectedPayoff A.toStrategicGame p 0 = double := by + unfold EconCSLib.StrategicGame.expectedPayoff rw [show - Verified
- 08 Oct 2026
- Axioms
Classical.choiceQuot.soundpropext- Built on 13
- EconCSLib.StrategicGame.MixedStrategyA mixed strategy for player
i: a probability distribution over pure strategies. Requires[Fintype (G.strategy i)]but NOT[Fintype N]. - EconCSLib.StrategicGame.ProfileThe type of strategy profiles for game
G: each player picks a strategy. This is a dependent function∀ i, G.strategy i. The profile… - MatrixGame.toStrategicGameThe two-player zero-sum strategic game associated with a matrix game. See
MatrixGame.toStrategicGame_isZeroSumfor the proof that this… - MatrixGame.instDecidableEqStrategyFinOfNatNatToStrategicGameMatrixGame.instDecidableEqStrategyFinOfNatNatToStrategicGame
- EconCSLib.StrategicGame.IsZeroSum.decidableStrategicGame.IsZeroSum.decidable
- MatrixGame.EExpected payoff when Player I uses mixed strategy
xand Player II usesy. - MatrixGameA finite two-player zero-sum matrix game. Player I chooses row
i : I, Player II chooses columnj : J. Payoff to Player I isg i j… - EconCSLib.StrategicGame.IsZeroSum.expectedPayoff_add_zeroMixed-strategy version of the zero-sum axiom: expected payoffs sum to
0. - MatrixGame.instNonemptyStrategyFinOfNatNatToStrategicGameMatrixGame.instNonemptyStrategyFinOfNatNatToStrategicGame
- EconCSLib.StrategicGameA strategic game (normal-form game) with players
Nand utilities inU. The structure records only the bare data: strategy spaces and a… - EconCSLib.StrategicGame.expectedPayoffExpected payoff for player
whounder mixed profilep.EU(p, who) = ∑_{σ : Profile} (∏_i p_i(σ_i)) · payoff(σ, who)Requires… - EconCSLib.StrategicGame.MixedProfileA mixed profile: each player has a mixed strategy. No finiteness constraint on
N(player set can be arbitrary). - MatrixGame.instFintypeStrategyFinOfNatNatToStrategicGameMatrixGame.instFintypeStrategyFinOfNatNatToStrategicGame
- EconCSLib.StrategicGame.MixedStrategyA mixed strategy for player
- Used by 1
- MatrixGame.exists_strategic_game_nash_equilibriumThe strategic-game embedding of a finite matrix game admits a mixed Nash equilibrium. Combines…
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set_option autoImplicit true inset_option relaxedAutoImplicit true inopen Finset BigOperators inset_option linter.unusedSectionVars false inuniverse u invariable {I J : Type u} [Fintype I] [Fintype J] [Nonempty I] [Nonempty J] invariable (A : MatrixGame I J ℝ) invariable [DecidableEq I] [DecidableEq J] in/-- Bridge lemma: `expectedPayoff A.toStrategicGame p 0 = A.E (p 0) (p 1)`. Reduces both sides to the canonical double sum `∑ i, ∑ j, (p 0)ᵢ · (p 1)ⱼ · A i j`. -/theorem MatrixGame.expectedPayoff_toStrategicGame_zero {𝕜 : Type} [Field 𝕜] [LinearOrder 𝕜] [IsStrictOrderedRing 𝕜] (A : MatrixGame I J 𝕜) (p : EconCSLib.StrategicGame.MixedProfile A.toStrategicGame) : EconCSLib.StrategicGame.expectedPayoff A.toStrategicGame p 0 = A.E (p 0) (p 1) := by let double : 𝕜 := ∑ i : I, ∑ j : J, (p 0).val i * (p 1).val j * A.g i j have hLHS : EconCSLib.StrategicGame.expectedPayoff A.toStrategicGame p 0 = double := by unfold EconCSLib.StrategicGame.expectedPayoff rw [show (∑ σ : (∀ i : Fin 2, A.toStrategicGame.strategy i), (∏ i : Fin 2, (p i).val (σ i)) * A.toStrategicGame.payoff σ 0) = ∑ ij : I × J, (p 0).val ij.1 * (p 1).val ij.2 * A.g ij.1 ij.2 from ?_] · exact Fintype.sum_prod_type _ · apply Fintype.sum_equiv (piFinTwoEquiv A.toStrategicGame.strategy) intro σ; rw [Fin.prod_univ_two]; rfl have hRHS : A.E (p 0) (p 1) = double := by -- A.E (p 0) (p 1) unfolds to ∑ i, (p 0).val i * (∑ j, (p 1).val j * A.g i j). change (∑ i, (p 0).val i * (∑ j, (p 1).val j * A.g i j)) = double apply Finset.sum_congr rfl; intro i _ rw [Finset.mul_sum] apply Finset.sum_congr rfl; intro j _ ring rw [hLHS, hRHS]