AFTD Auto-Formalizing Theoretical Domains

GS.stableMeet_ge_left

theoremverifiedformalizationimported Lean

GS.stableMeet_ge_left

Statement

set_option autoImplicit true in
set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in
open GS in
variable {n : ℕ} (w m : Preferences n) in
variable {w m} in
variable (μ ν : Matching (Fin n) (Fin n))
  (hμ : Matching.IsStable (MatchingMarket.ofEquivData w m) μ)
  (hν : Matching.IsStable (MatchingMarket.ofEquivData w m) ν) in
lemma GS.stableMeet_ge_left (j : Fin n) :
    (m.prefs j).idxOf (wPartner μ hμ j) ≤ (m.prefs j).idxOf ((meetEquiv μ ν hμ hν).symm j)
Formalizes
EconCSLib, `GS.stableMeet_ge_left`
Lean proof
By xbei (from the file's git history), from github.com/gametheoryinlean/EconCSLib at 1a88f809b538 (Copyright (c) 2026 EconCSLib contributors. All rights reserved, Apache-2.0). Compiled here against leanprover/lean4:v4.33.1, Mathlib v4.33.1; written for leanprover/lean4:v4.30.0.
Verified
08 Oct 2026
Axioms
Classical.choiceQuot.soundpropext
Built on 14
Used by 1
  • GS.StableMatching.instLatticeConway–Knuth lattice. The stable matchings of a one-to-one market form a lattice under the men-preference order: the join gives every…

Lean source view module on GitHub

set_option autoImplicit true inset_option relaxedAutoImplicit true inopen GS invariable {n : ℕ} (w m : Preferences n) invariable {w m} invariable (μ ν : Matching (Fin n) (Fin n))  (hμ : Matching.IsStable (MatchingMarket.ofEquivData w m) μ)  (hν : Matching.IsStable (MatchingMarket.ofEquivData w m) ν) inlemma GS.stableMeet_ge_left (j : Fin n) :    (m.prefs j).idxOf (wPartner μ hμ j) ≤ (m.prefs j).idxOf ((meetEquiv μ ν hμ hν).symm j) := by  have h : meetMan μ ν hμ hν ((meetEquiv μ ν hμ hν).symm j) = j :=    (meetEquiv μ ν hμ hν).apply_symm_apply j  rcases meetMan_mem_women μ ν hμ hν h with hm | hn  · exact le_of_eq (congrArg (fun x => (m.prefs j).idxOf x) hm)  · exact meetMan_worse_right μ ν hμ hν h hn
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