GS.stableMeet_ge_right
theoremverifiedformalizationimported Lean
GS.stableMeet_ge_right
Statement
set_option autoImplicit true in set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in open GS in variable {n : ℕ} (w m : Preferences n) in variable {w m} in variable (μ ν : Matching (Fin n) (Fin n)) (hμ : Matching.IsStable (MatchingMarket.ofEquivData w m) μ) (hν : Matching.IsStable (MatchingMarket.ofEquivData w m) ν) in lemma GS.stableMeet_ge_right (j : Fin n) : (m.prefs j).idxOf (wPartner ν hν j) ≤ (m.prefs j).idxOf ((meetEquiv μ ν hμ hν).symm j)
- Formalizes
- EconCSLib, `GS.stableMeet_ge_right`
- Lean proof
- By xbei (from the file's git history), from github.com/gametheoryinlean/EconCSLib at
1a88f809b538(Copyright (c) 2026 EconCSLib contributors. All rights reserved, Apache-2.0). Compiled here against leanprover/lean4:v4.33.1, Mathlib v4.33.1; written for leanprover/lean4:v4.30.0.GS.stableMeet_ge_right← GS.stableMeet_ge_right (EconCSLib/MarketDesign/Matching/Lattice.lean:493): verbatim
- Verified
- 08 Oct 2026
- Axioms
Classical.choiceQuot.soundpropext- Built on 14
- Matching.IsStableA matching is stable if it has no blocking pair. [MSZ 22.5]
- GS.stableMeet_matchMGS.stableMeet_matchM
- GS.stableMeet_matchWGS.stableMeet_matchW
- MatchingA matching is a partial bijection between
MandW.matchM iis the partner ofi ∈ M(ornoneif unmatched).matchW jis the… - GS.matchM_mPartnerGS.matchM_mPartner
- instCoeFunPrefForallForallPropinstCoeFunPrefForallForallProp
- GS.meetMan_mem_womenGS.meetMan_mem_women
- GS.matchW_wPartnerGS.matchW_wPartner
- GS.meetManWoman
i's more-preferred man acrossμandν. - GS.wPartnerThe woman partnered to man
junder a stable matchingμ(total, since a stable matching of the balanced market is perfect). - GS.PreferencesList-based preferences:
prefs iis a full permutation ofFin n, ordered from most to least preferred. - GS.meetMan_worse_leftGS.meetMan_worse_left
- GS.meetEquivThe meet man-assignment packaged as an equivalence.
- MatchingMarket.ofEquivDataBuild a
MatchingMarket (Fin n) (Fin n)from list-based preference data.some j ≻ some kiffjappears earlier in the list;noneis…
- Used by 1
- GS.StableMatching.instLatticeConway–Knuth lattice. The stable matchings of a one-to-one market form a lattice under the men-preference order: the join gives every…
Lean source view module on GitHub
Choose a tactic — a marked line — to see the goals Lean had before and after it, as in Lean’s infoview. Step with ← → or j k.
set_option autoImplicit true inset_option relaxedAutoImplicit true inopen GS invariable {n : ℕ} (w m : Preferences n) invariable {w m} invariable (μ ν : Matching (Fin n) (Fin n)) (hμ : Matching.IsStable (MatchingMarket.ofEquivData w m) μ) (hν : Matching.IsStable (MatchingMarket.ofEquivData w m) ν) inlemma GS.stableMeet_ge_right (j : Fin n) : (m.prefs j).idxOf (wPartner ν hν j) ≤ (m.prefs j).idxOf ((meetEquiv μ ν hμ hν).symm j) := by have h : meetMan μ ν hμ hν ((meetEquiv μ ν hμ hν).symm j) = j := (meetEquiv μ ν hμ hν).apply_symm_apply j rcases meetMan_mem_women μ ν hμ hν h with hm | hn · exact meetMan_worse_left μ ν hμ hν h hm · exact le_of_eq (congrArg (fun x => (m.prefs j).idxOf x) hn)