AFTD Auto-Formalizing Theoretical Domains

GameTree.IsSubgamePerfect.toNE

theoremverifiedformalizationimported Lean

SPE ⇒ NE: every subgame-perfect equilibrium is a Nash equilibrium (at any fixed root game).

Statement

set_option autoImplicit true in
set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in
open GameTree in
variable {N U : Type*} [TotalPreorder U] in
theorem GameTree.IsSubgamePerfect.toNE {σ : Strategy N U} (hspe : IsSubgamePerfect σ)
    (g : GameTree N U) : GameTree.IsNashEquilibrium σ g
Formalizes
EconCSLib, `GameTree.IsSubgamePerfect.toNE`
Lean proof
By xbei (from the file's git history), from github.com/gametheoryinlean/EconCSLib at 1a88f809b538 (Copyright (c) 2026 EconCSLib contributors. All rights reserved, Apache-2.0). Compiled here against leanprover/lean4:v4.33.1, Mathlib v4.33.1; written for leanprover/lean4:v4.30.0.
What was changed in GameTree.IsSubgamePerfect.toNE
--- EconCSLib/GameTheory/ExtensiveGame/GameTreeNE.lean:81 (GameTree.IsSubgamePerfect.toNE)
+++ as compiled here
@@ -1,5 +1,7 @@
-/-- **SPE ⇒ NE**: every subgame-perfect equilibrium is a Nash equilibrium
-    (at any fixed root game). -/
-theorem IsSubgamePerfect.toNE {σ : Strategy N U} (hspe : IsSubgamePerfect σ)
-    (g : GameTree N U) : IsNashEquilibrium σ g :=
+set_option autoImplicit true in
+set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in
+open GameTree in
+variable {N U : Type*} [TotalPreorder U] in
+theorem GameTree.IsSubgamePerfect.toNE {σ : Strategy N U} (hspe : IsSubgamePerfect σ)
+    (g : GameTree N U) : GameTree.IsNashEquilibrium σ g :=
   fun i σ' hiv => hspe g i σ' hiv
Verified
08 Oct 2026
Axioms
Classical.choiceQuot.soundpropext
Built on 13
  • GameTree.outcome_LeafGameTree.outcome_Leaf
  • GameTree.outcome_NodeGameTree.outcome_Node
  • GameTree.IsSubgamePerfectA strategy is subgame-perfect (SPE) if, at every subtree, no player can strictly improve their payoff by a unilateral deviation —…
  • GameTree.IVariantTwo strategies are i-variants if they agree on all nodes NOT owned by i. I.e., σ' is obtained from σ by changing only player i's…
  • GameTree.IsNashEquilibriumNash equilibrium: no single player can improve their outcome at the root game by unilateral deviation. Weaker than IsSubgamePerfect,…
  • TotalPreorderA total preorder: a preorder where ≤ is total (complete). This is weaker than LinearOrder — it does NOT require antisymmetry or…
  • GameTree.StrategyA pure strategy for the entire game tree: at every possible node context (mover, head, tail), specify one child (bundled with its…
  • GameTreeA finite extensive-form game of perfect information, without chance. * Leaf payoff — a terminal state with a payoff vector N → U. *…
  • GameTree.childrenThe full child list at a Node, as a guaranteed non-empty list.
  • GameTree.value_LeafGameTree.value_Leaf
  • GameTree.value_NodeGameTree.value_Node
  • GameTree.valueList_nilGameTree.valueList_nil
  • GameTree.valueList_consGameTree.valueList_cons
Used by 1
  • GameTree.Kuhn_exists_NEKuhn's theorem, NE form: every finite perfect-information game without chance has a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium.

Lean source view module on GitHub

set_option autoImplicit true in
set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in
open GameTree in
variable {N U : Type*} [TotalPreorder U] in
/-- **SPE ⇒ NE**: every subgame-perfect equilibrium is a Nash equilibrium (at any fixed root game). -/
theorem GameTree.IsSubgamePerfect.toNE {σ : Strategy N U} (hspe : IsSubgamePerfect σ)
    (g : GameTree N U) : GameTree.IsNashEquilibrium σ g :=
  fun i σ' hiv => hspe g i σ' hiv
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