GameTree.IsSubgamePerfect.toNE
theoremverifiedformalizationimported Lean
SPE ⇒ NE: every subgame-perfect equilibrium is a Nash equilibrium (at any fixed root game).
Statement
set_option autoImplicit true in set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in open GameTree in variable {N U : Type*} [TotalPreorder U] in theorem GameTree.IsSubgamePerfect.toNE {σ : Strategy N U} (hspe : IsSubgamePerfect σ) (g : GameTree N U) : GameTree.IsNashEquilibrium σ g
- Formalizes
- EconCSLib, `GameTree.IsSubgamePerfect.toNE`
- Lean proof
- By xbei (from the file's git history), from github.com/gametheoryinlean/EconCSLib at
1a88f809b538(Copyright (c) 2026 EconCSLib contributors. All rights reserved, Apache-2.0). Compiled here against leanprover/lean4:v4.33.1, Mathlib v4.33.1; written for leanprover/lean4:v4.30.0.GameTree.IsSubgamePerfect.toNE← GameTree.IsSubgamePerfect.toNE (EconCSLib/GameTheory/ExtensiveGame/GameTreeNE.lean:81): adapted
What was changed in
GameTree.IsSubgamePerfect.toNE--- EconCSLib/GameTheory/ExtensiveGame/GameTreeNE.lean:81 (GameTree.IsSubgamePerfect.toNE) +++ as compiled here @@ -1,5 +1,7 @@ -/-- **SPE ⇒ NE**: every subgame-perfect equilibrium is a Nash equilibrium - (at any fixed root game). -/ -theorem IsSubgamePerfect.toNE {σ : Strategy N U} (hspe : IsSubgamePerfect σ) - (g : GameTree N U) : IsNashEquilibrium σ g := +set_option autoImplicit true in +set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in +open GameTree in +variable {N U : Type*} [TotalPreorder U] in +theorem GameTree.IsSubgamePerfect.toNE {σ : Strategy N U} (hspe : IsSubgamePerfect σ) + (g : GameTree N U) : GameTree.IsNashEquilibrium σ g := fun i σ' hiv => hspe g i σ' hiv - Verified
- 08 Oct 2026
- Axioms
Classical.choiceQuot.soundpropext- Built on 13
- GameTree.outcome_LeafGameTree.outcome_Leaf
- GameTree.outcome_NodeGameTree.outcome_Node
- GameTree.IsSubgamePerfectA strategy is subgame-perfect (SPE) if, at every subtree, no player can strictly improve their payoff by a unilateral deviation —…
- GameTree.IVariantTwo strategies are
i-variants if they agree on all nodes NOT owned byi. I.e.,σ'is obtained fromσby changing only playeri's… - GameTree.IsNashEquilibriumNash equilibrium: no single player can improve their outcome at the root game by unilateral deviation. Weaker than
IsSubgamePerfect,… - TotalPreorderA total preorder: a preorder where
≤is total (complete). This is weaker thanLinearOrder— it does NOT require antisymmetry or… - GameTree.StrategyA pure strategy for the entire game tree: at every possible node context
(mover, head, tail), specify one child (bundled with its… - GameTreeA finite extensive-form game of perfect information, without chance. *
Leaf payoff— a terminal state with a payoff vectorN → U. *… - GameTree.childrenThe full child list at a
Node, as a guaranteed non-empty list. - GameTree.value_LeafGameTree.value_Leaf
- GameTree.value_NodeGameTree.value_Node
- GameTree.valueList_nilGameTree.valueList_nil
- GameTree.valueList_consGameTree.valueList_cons
- Used by 1
- GameTree.Kuhn_exists_NEKuhn's theorem, NE form: every finite perfect-information game without chance has a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium.
Lean source view module on GitHub
set_option autoImplicit true in set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in open GameTree in variable {N U : Type*} [TotalPreorder U] in /-- **SPE ⇒ NE**: every subgame-perfect equilibrium is a Nash equilibrium (at any fixed root game). -/ theorem GameTree.IsSubgamePerfect.toNE {σ : Strategy N U} (hspe : IsSubgamePerfect σ) (g : GameTree N U) : GameTree.IsNashEquilibrium σ g := fun i σ' hiv => hspe g i σ' hiv