SingleParameterMechanism.IsAllocFeasible
defimported Lean
Allocation feasibility: each agent's allocation lies in [0, 1]. Requires Zero R, One R, and LE R (e.g., any linearly ordered field).
Statement
set_option autoImplicit true in set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in variable {I : Type*} [DecidableEq I] {R : Type*} in variable (M : SingleParameterMechanism I R) in def SingleParameterMechanism.IsAllocFeasible [Zero R] [One R] [LE R] : Prop
- Defined in
- EconCSLib, `SingleParameterMechanism.IsAllocFeasible`
- Lean proof
- By xbei (from the file's git history), from github.com/gametheoryinlean/EconCSLib at
1a88f809b538(Copyright (c) 2026 EconCSLib contributors. All rights reserved, Apache-2.0). Compiled here against leanprover/lean4:v4.33.1, Mathlib v4.33.1; written for leanprover/lean4:v4.30.0.SingleParameterMechanism.IsAllocFeasible← SingleParameterMechanism.IsAllocFeasible (EconCSLib/MechanismDesign/Auction/Transfer.lean:174): verbatim
- Verified
- 08 Oct 2026
- Axioms
- none listed
- Built on 2
- SingleParameterMechanismA single-parameter mechanism. Each agent
ihas a single private typeθ_i : R(their "value per unit"). The allocation gives each agent… - MechanismWithTransfersA mechanism with monetary transfers. -
I— agents -T— report/type space of each agent -A— allocation space -P— payment space…
- SingleParameterMechanismA single-parameter mechanism. Each agent
- Used by 11
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingMechanism_isAllocFeasibleThe virtual-surplus-maximizing mechanism is allocation-feasible.
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingAuction_isFeasibleThe constructed auction is feasible.
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.hasIntegrableInterimAllocation_of_isFeasible_of_aestronglyMeasurableFeasibility and a.e. strong measurability imply allocation integrability.
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingAuction_hasIntegrableInterimObjects_of_aestronglyMeasurableOnce the constructed allocation and payment integrands are measurable, boundedness gives interim integrability for the constructed auction.
- KnapsackAuctionA knapsack auction with public weights
w iand total capacityW. The underlying strategic object is aSingleParameterMechanism I U,… - BayesianSingleItemAuction.IsFeasibleFeasibility for a probabilistic single-item auction: * each winning probability lies in
[0,1]* the total allocation probability is at… - KnapsackAuction.IsFeasibleFeasibility for a knapsack auction: * each agent's allocation lies in
[0,1]* the weighted allocation satisfies the total capacity bound - BayesianSingleItemAuction.interimAllocProb_le_one_of_isFeasibleFeasible auctions have interim allocation probabilities at most
1. - BayesianSingleItemAuction.interimAllocProb_nonneg_of_isFeasibleFeasible auctions have nonnegative interim allocation probabilities.
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.IsFeasible.isSingleItemAllocationRuleAuction feasibility gives allocation-rule feasibility.
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.withPayment_isAllocFeasible_of_isSingleItemAllocationRuleA feasible single-item allocation rule satisfies
IsAllocFeasiblewith any payment rule.
Lean source view module on GitHub
set_option autoImplicit true in set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in variable {I : Type*} [DecidableEq I] {R : Type*} in variable (M : SingleParameterMechanism I R) in /-- Allocation feasibility: each agent's allocation lies in `[0, 1]`. Requires `Zero R`, `One R`, and `LE R` (e.g., any linearly ordered field). -/ def SingleParameterMechanism.IsAllocFeasible [Zero R] [One R] [LE R] : Prop := ∀ (b : I → R) (i : I), 0 ≤ M.allocationRule b i ∧ M.allocationRule b i ≤ 1