AFTD Auto-Formalizing Theoretical Domains

SingleParameterMechanism.IsAllocFeasible

defimported Lean

Allocation feasibility: each agent's allocation lies in [0, 1]. Requires Zero R, One R, and LE R (e.g., any linearly ordered field).

Statement

set_option autoImplicit true in
set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in
variable {I : Type*} [DecidableEq I] {R : Type*} in
variable (M : SingleParameterMechanism I R) in
def SingleParameterMechanism.IsAllocFeasible [Zero R] [One R] [LE R] : Prop
Defined in
EconCSLib, `SingleParameterMechanism.IsAllocFeasible`
Lean proof
By xbei (from the file's git history), from github.com/gametheoryinlean/EconCSLib at 1a88f809b538 (Copyright (c) 2026 EconCSLib contributors. All rights reserved, Apache-2.0). Compiled here against leanprover/lean4:v4.33.1, Mathlib v4.33.1; written for leanprover/lean4:v4.30.0.
Verified
08 Oct 2026
Axioms
none listed
Built on 2
  • SingleParameterMechanismA single-parameter mechanism. Each agent i has a single private type θ_i : R (their "value per unit"). The allocation gives each agent…
  • MechanismWithTransfersA mechanism with monetary transfers. - I — agents - T — report/type space of each agent - A — allocation space - P — payment space…
Used by 11

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set_option autoImplicit true in
set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in
variable {I : Type*} [DecidableEq I] {R : Type*} in
variable (M : SingleParameterMechanism I R) in
/-- Allocation feasibility: each agent's allocation lies in `[0, 1]`. Requires `Zero R`, `One R`, and `LE R` (e.g., any linearly ordered field). -/
def SingleParameterMechanism.IsAllocFeasible [Zero R] [One R] [LE R] : Prop :=
  ∀ (b : I → R) (i : I), 0 ≤ M.allocationRule b i ∧ M.allocationRule b i ≤ 1
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