Matching.IsIndividuallyRational
defimported Lean
A matching is individually rational if every matched agent strictly prefers their partner to being unmatched.
Statement
set_option autoImplicit true in set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in variable {M W : Type*} in def Matching.IsIndividuallyRational (market : MatchingMarket M W) (μ : Matching M W) : Prop
- Defined in
- EconCSLib, `Matching.IsIndividuallyRational`
- Lean proof
- By xbei (from the file's git history), from github.com/gametheoryinlean/EconCSLib at
1a88f809b538(Copyright (c) 2026 EconCSLib contributors. All rights reserved, Apache-2.0). Compiled here against leanprover/lean4:v4.33.1, Mathlib v4.33.1; written for leanprover/lean4:v4.30.0.Matching.IsIndividuallyRational← Matching.IsIndividuallyRational (EconCSLib/MarketDesign/Matching/Basic.lean:84): verbatim
- Verified
- 08 Oct 2026
- Axioms
- none listed
- Built on 5
- strictStrict preference derived from a weak preference relation.
- MatchingA matching is a partial bijection between
MandW.matchM iis the partner ofi ∈ M(ornoneif unmatched).matchW jis the… - instCoeFunPrefForallForallPropinstCoeFunPrefForallForallProp
- MatchingMarketA two-sided matching market.
MandWare the two sides (e.g., men and women, hospitals and residents). Each agent has a preference… - PrefA bundled weak preference relation. Use this interface when several agents may rank the same outcome type differently. Use…
Lean source view module on GitHub
set_option autoImplicit true in set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in variable {M W : Type*} in /-- A matching is individually rational if every matched agent strictly prefers their partner to being unmatched. -/ def Matching.IsIndividuallyRational (market : MatchingMarket M W) (μ : Matching M W) : Prop := (∀ m : M, ∀ w : W, μ.matchM m = some w → strict (market.prefM m) (some w) none) ∧ (∀ w : W, ∀ m : M, μ.matchW w = some m → strict (market.prefW w) (some m) none)