AFTD Auto-Formalizing Theoretical Domains

Matching.IsIndividuallyRational

defimported Lean

A matching is individually rational if every matched agent strictly prefers their partner to being unmatched.

Statement

set_option autoImplicit true in
set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in
variable {M W : Type*} in
def Matching.IsIndividuallyRational (market : MatchingMarket M W) (μ : Matching M W) : Prop
Defined in
EconCSLib, `Matching.IsIndividuallyRational`
Lean proof
By xbei (from the file's git history), from github.com/gametheoryinlean/EconCSLib at 1a88f809b538 (Copyright (c) 2026 EconCSLib contributors. All rights reserved, Apache-2.0). Compiled here against leanprover/lean4:v4.33.1, Mathlib v4.33.1; written for leanprover/lean4:v4.30.0.
Verified
08 Oct 2026
Axioms
none listed
Built on 5
  • strictStrict preference derived from a weak preference relation.
  • MatchingA matching is a partial bijection between M and W. matchM i is the partner of i ∈ M (or none if unmatched). matchW j is the…
  • instCoeFunPrefForallForallPropinstCoeFunPrefForallForallProp
  • MatchingMarketA two-sided matching market. M and W are the two sides (e.g., men and women, hospitals and residents). Each agent has a preference…
  • PrefA bundled weak preference relation. Use this interface when several agents may rank the same outcome type differently. Use…

Lean source view module on GitHub

set_option autoImplicit true in
set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in
variable {M W : Type*} in
/-- A matching is individually rational if every matched agent strictly prefers their partner to being unmatched. -/
def Matching.IsIndividuallyRational (market : MatchingMarket M W) (μ : Matching M W) : Prop :=
  (∀ m : M, ∀ w : W, μ.matchM m = some w → strict (market.prefM m) (some w) none) ∧
  (∀ w : W, ∀ m : M, μ.matchW w = some m → strict (market.prefW w) (some m) none)
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