Pref
structureimported Lean
A bundled weak preference relation. Use this interface when several agents may rank the same outcome type differently. Use [TotalPreorder A] when the outcome type carries one relevant ambient preference order.
Statement
set_option autoImplicit true in set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in structure Pref (A : Type*)
- Defined in
- EconCSLib, `Pref`
- Lean proof
- By xbei (from the file's git history), from github.com/gametheoryinlean/EconCSLib at
1a88f809b538(Copyright (c) 2026 EconCSLib contributors. All rights reserved, Apache-2.0). Compiled here against leanprover/lean4:v4.33.1, Mathlib v4.33.1; written for leanprover/lean4:v4.30.0.Pref← Pref (EconCSLib/Foundation/Preference.lean:144): verbatim
- Verified
- 08 Oct 2026
- Axioms
- none listed
- Built on 1
- IsPreferenceA weak preference relation is admissible if it is reflexive, transitive, and total.
- Used by 37
- SocialChoice.FairDivision.InstanceA fully general fair-division instance. This allows preferences over complete allocations, so it can express externalities or other global…
- SocialChoice.Voting.iia_strictSocialChoice.Voting.iia_strict
- GS.prefM_strictGS.prefM_strict
- SocialChoice.FairDivision.CardinalInstance.UtilityRepresentsSharePrefAn ordinal share instance is represented by a cardinal instance when its weak share preferences agree with the utility-induced weak order.
- GS.stableMeet_isStableThe meet of two stable matchings is stable.
- SocialChoice.FairDivision.ShareInstance.toInstanceLift a no-externality fair-division instance to a fully general allocation-preference instance by comparing allocations pointwise through…
- SocialChoice.Voting.SWF.IIAIndependence of irrelevant alternatives for SWFs.
- Matching.IsBlockingA pair
(m, w)is a blocking pair for matchingμif bothmandwstrictly prefer each other to their current partners. [MSZ 22.5] - SocialChoice.FairDivision.ShareInstanceA no-externality fair-division instance where each agent ranks only the share they personally receive.
- GS.daStep_NoAchievableRejectionInductive step (KEY LEMMA).
NoAchievableRejectionis preserved by onedaStep. Also threadsHoldInv(for the old-holder index… - Matching.IsIndividuallyRationalA matching is individually rational if every matched agent strictly prefers their partner to being unmatched.
- SocialChoice.Voting.decisive_spread_forwardSocialChoice.Voting.decisive_spread_forward
- Pref.ofLinearOrderBundle an explicit linear order as a preference.
- instCoeFunPrefForallForallPropinstCoeFunPrefForallForallProp
- SocialChoice.FairDivision.CardinalInstance.inducedSharePrefThe share preference induced by a cardinal utility, using the convention that higher utility means weakly better.
- GS.opposed_preferencesOpposed preferences. Let
μbe a stable matching. If manjis matched to womanwjunder another matchingνand **strictly… - GS.stableJoin_isStableThe join of two stable matchings is stable.
- SocialChoice.FairDivision.Divisible.InstanceAn ordinal divisible-goods instance. The cake is represented by the ambient measurable space
Ω, and shares are subsets ofΩ. - SocialChoice.Voting.SWF.UnanimityUnanimity/Pareto for SWFs: unanimous strict preference forces social strict preference.
- SocialChoice.Voting.SWFA social welfare function maps strict profiles to a weak social preference.
- MatchingMarketA two-sided matching market.
MandWare the two sides (e.g., men and women, hospitals and residents). Each agent has a preference… - SocialChoice.Voting.decisive_for_reflSocialChoice.Voting.decisive_for_refl
- Pref.ofTotalPreorderBundle an explicit total preorder as a preference.
- GS.opposed_preferences_womenDual of
opposed_preferences: if womanistrictly prefers manmito hercandidate-manmi', thenmistrictly prefers his… - SocialChoice.FairDivision.Indivisible.InstanceAn ordinal indivisible-goods instance.
allGoodsis the finite set of goods to allocate. Each agent ranks bundles of goods, represented… - SocialChoice.InstanceA generic social-choice instance consists of feasible alternatives together with each agent's preference over the alternative space.
- MatchingMarket.ofEquivDataBuild a
MatchingMarket (Fin n) (Fin n)from list-based preference data.some j ≻ some kiffjappears earlier in the list;noneis… - PrefProfileA preference profile assigns each agent a bundled preference.
- galeShapley_isStableGale-Shapley stability: the DA output has no blocking pair. The statement is in the *market* frame (
IsBlocking … (i : M) (j : W)).… - Pref.indifferent
p.indiff a b: outcomesaandbare indifferent under preferencep. - SocialChoice.Voting.IsDecisiveForA coalition is decisive for
aoverbif unanimous strict support inside the coalition forces the social strict preferencea ≻ b. - GS.stable_matching_perfectIn the balanced full-preference one-to-one market, every stable matching is perfect: every woman and every man is matched. This is the…
- SocialChoice.Voting.SWF.DictatorialA SWF is dictatorial if one voter always determines every strict social comparison.
- SocialChoice.Voting.singleton_unanimity_dictatorialSocialChoice.Voting.singleton_unanimity_dictatorial
- Pref.lt
p.lt a b: outcomeais strictly preferred tobunder preferencep. - GS.prefW_strictGS.prefW_strict
- SocialChoice.Voting.IsWeaklyDecisiveForWeak decisiveness tests a coalition against a complement unanimously supporting the opposite strict ranking.
Lean source view module on GitHub
set_option autoImplicit true in set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in /-- A bundled weak preference relation. Use this interface when several agents may rank the same outcome type differently. Use `[TotalPreorder A]` when the outcome type carries one relevant ambient preference order. -/ structure Pref (A : Type*) where rel : A → A → Prop prop : IsPreference rel