AFTD Auto-Formalizing Theoretical Domains

MatchingMarket

structureimported Lean

A two-sided matching market. M and W are the two sides (e.g., men and women, hospitals and residents). Each agent has a preference over agents on the other side plus the option of being unmatched (none).

Statement

set_option autoImplicit true in
set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in
structure MatchingMarket (M W : Type*)
Defined in
EconCSLib, `MatchingMarket`
Lean proof
By xbei (from the file's git history), from github.com/gametheoryinlean/EconCSLib at 1a88f809b538 (Copyright (c) 2026 EconCSLib contributors. All rights reserved, Apache-2.0). Compiled here against leanprover/lean4:v4.33.1, Mathlib v4.33.1; written for leanprover/lean4:v4.30.0.
Verified
08 Oct 2026
Axioms
none listed
Built on 2
  • instCoeFunPrefForallForallPropinstCoeFunPrefForallForallProp
  • PrefA bundled weak preference relation. Use this interface when several agents may rank the same outcome type differently. Use…
Used by 16

Lean source view module on GitHub

set_option autoImplicit true in
set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in
/-- A two-sided matching market. `M` and `W` are the two sides (e.g., men and women, hospitals and residents). Each agent has a preference over agents on the other side plus the option of being unmatched (`none`). -/
structure MatchingMarket (M W : Type*) where
  /-- Each agent on side `M` has a preference over `Option W`. -/
  prefM : M → Pref (Option W)
  /-- Each agent on side `W` has a preference over `Option M`. -/
  prefW : W → Pref (Option M)
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