MatrixGame.support_complementarity_row
theoremverifiedformalizationimported Lean
Support complementarity (row). For an optimal pair (xx, yy), every row i with positive probability under xx is a best response to yy, i.e., A.Ei i yy = A.value.
Statement
set_option autoImplicit true in set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in open MatrixGame in open Finset BigOperators in set_option linter.unusedSectionVars false in universe u in variable {I J : Type u} [Fintype I] [Fintype J] [Nonempty I] [Nonempty J] in variable (A : MatrixGame I J ℝ) in theorem MatrixGame.support_complementarity_row [DecidableEq I] (xx : stdSimplex ℝ I) (yy : stdSimplex ℝ J) (hxx : xx ∈ A.optimalRowStrategies) (hyy : yy ∈ A.optimalColumnStrategies) {i : I} (hi : 0 < xx.val i) : A.Ei i yy = A.value
- Formalizes
- EconCSLib, `MatrixGame.support_complementarity_row`
- Lean proof
- By xbei (from the file's git history), from github.com/gametheoryinlean/EconCSLib at
1a88f809b538(Copyright (c) 2026 EconCSLib contributors. All rights reserved, Apache-2.0). Compiled here against leanprover/lean4:v4.33.1, Mathlib v4.33.1; written for leanprover/lean4:v4.30.0.MatrixGame.support_complementarity_row← MatrixGame.support_complementarity_row (EconCSLib/GameTheory/StrategicGame/ZeroSum/MatrixGameNash.lean:238): verbatim
- Verified
- 08 Oct 2026
- Axioms
Classical.choiceQuot.soundpropext- Built on 12
- MatrixGame.mem_optimalColumnStrategies_iff_E_leA column strategy is optimal iff against every mixed row it caps payoff at the value.
- MatrixGameA finite two-player zero-sum matrix game. Player I chooses row
i : I, Player II chooses columnj : J. Payoff to Player I isg i j… - MatrixGame.optimalRowStrategiesThe set of optimal row strategies: mixed strategies that achieve the maximin value.
- MatrixGame.optimalColumnStrategiesThe set of optimal column strategies: mixed strategies that achieve the minimax value.
- MatrixGame.EiExpected payoff when pure row
ifaces Player II's mixed strategyy. - MatrixGame.valueThe value of a matrix game (
sSup-based; needs order completeness). Equal to both maximin and minimax by the minimax theorem… - MatrixGame.EExpected payoff when Player I uses mixed strategy
xand Player II usesy. - MatrixGame.mem_optimalRowStrategies_iff_E_geA row strategy is optimal iff against every mixed column it secures the value.
- stdSimplex.purePoint-mass simplex element at
i₀. - wsumWeighted sum of
fwith weights from a simplex elementx. Thinabbrevover Mathlib's finite dot product⬝ᵥ: definitionally equal,… - wsum_pure_applyWeighted sum at a point mass evaluates the chosen coordinate.
- stdSimplex.pure_applystdSimplex.pure_apply
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set_option autoImplicit true inset_option relaxedAutoImplicit true inopen MatrixGame inopen Finset BigOperators inset_option linter.unusedSectionVars false inuniverse u invariable {I J : Type u} [Fintype I] [Fintype J] [Nonempty I] [Nonempty J] invariable (A : MatrixGame I J ℝ) in/-- **Support complementarity (row).** For an optimal pair `(xx, yy)`, every row `i` with positive probability under `xx` is a best response to `yy`, i.e., `A.Ei i yy = A.value`. -/theorem MatrixGame.support_complementarity_row [DecidableEq I] (xx : stdSimplex ℝ I) (yy : stdSimplex ℝ J) (hxx : xx ∈ A.optimalRowStrategies) (hyy : yy ∈ A.optimalColumnStrategies) {i : I} (hi : 0 < xx.val i) : A.Ei i yy = A.value := by have hE_eq : A.E xx yy = A.value := by have h1 := (A.mem_optimalRowStrategies_iff_E_ge xx).mp hxx yy have h2 := (A.mem_optimalColumnStrategies_iff_E_le yy).mp hyy xx linarith have hi_le : ∀ i', A.Ei i' yy ≤ A.value := by intro i' have h := (A.mem_optimalColumnStrategies_iff_E_le yy).mp hyy (stdSimplex.pure i') have heq : A.E (stdSimplex.pure i') yy = A.Ei i' yy := by show wsum (stdSimplex.pure i') (fun i'' => wsum yy (A.g i'')) = wsum yy (A.g i') rw [wsum_pure_apply] linarith [heq] have hsum_one : (∑ i', xx.val i') = 1 := xx.property.2 have hsum_zero : (∑ i', xx.val i' * (A.value - A.Ei i' yy)) = 0 := by have hexpand : (∑ i', xx.val i' * (A.value - A.Ei i' yy)) = (∑ i', xx.val i') * A.value - (∑ i', xx.val i' * A.Ei i' yy) := by rw [Finset.sum_mul, ← Finset.sum_sub_distrib] apply Finset.sum_congr rfl; intro i' _; ring rw [hexpand, hsum_one, one_mul] show A.value - A.E xx yy = 0 linarith have hnonneg : ∀ i' ∈ Finset.univ, 0 ≤ xx.val i' * (A.value - A.Ei i' yy) := by intro i' _ exact mul_nonneg (xx.property.1 i') (sub_nonneg.mpr (hi_le i')) have hzero : xx.val i * (A.value - A.Ei i yy) = 0 := (Finset.sum_eq_zero_iff_of_nonneg hnonneg).mp hsum_zero i (Finset.mem_univ i) rcases mul_eq_zero.mp hzero with h | h · linarith · linarith