IsWeaklyDominant
defimported Lean
Strategy s is weakly dominant for player i.
Statement
set_option autoImplicit true in set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in variable {N U : Type*} [DecidableEq N] [Preorder U] in open EconCSLib.StrategicGame in def IsWeaklyDominant (G : EconCSLib.StrategicGame N U) (i : N) (s : G.strategy i) : Prop
- Defined in
- EconCSLib, `IsWeaklyDominant`
- Lean proof
- By xbei (from the file's git history), from github.com/gametheoryinlean/EconCSLib at
1a88f809b538(Copyright (c) 2026 EconCSLib contributors. All rights reserved, Apache-2.0). Compiled here against leanprover/lean4:v4.33.1, Mathlib v4.33.1; written for leanprover/lean4:v4.30.0.IsWeaklyDominant← IsWeaklyDominant (EconCSLib/GameTheory/StrategicGame/Dominance.lean:37): adapted
What was changed in
IsWeaklyDominant--- EconCSLib/GameTheory/StrategicGame/Dominance.lean:37 (IsWeaklyDominant) +++ as compiled here @@ -1,3 +1,6 @@ -/-- Strategy `s` is weakly dominant for player `i`. -/ -def IsWeaklyDominant (G : StrategicGame N U) (i : N) (s : G.strategy i) : Prop := +set_option autoImplicit true in +set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in +variable {N U : Type*} [DecidableEq N] [Preorder U] in +open EconCSLib.StrategicGame in +def IsWeaklyDominant (G : EconCSLib.StrategicGame N U) (i : N) (s : G.strategy i) : Prop := ∀ s' : G.strategy i, WeaklyDominates G i s s' - Verified
- 08 Oct 2026
- Axioms
- none listed
- Built on 5
- WeaklyDominatesStrategy
sweakly dominates strategys'for playeri. - EconCSLib.StrategicGameA strategic game (normal-form game) with players
Nand utilities inU. The structure records only the bare data: strategy spaces and a… - EconCSLib.StrategicGame.Profile.deviate_selfDeviating to the same strategy is the identity.
- EconCSLib.StrategicGame.Profile.deviate_sameAt the deviated player, the updated profile returns the new strategy.
- EconCSLib.StrategicGame.Profile.deviate_of_neAt every other player, the updated profile is unchanged.
- WeaklyDominatesStrategy
- Used by 7
- IsWeaklyDominant.isBestResponseT2: A weakly dominant strategy is a best response to any profile where player
iplays it. - Mechanism.IsDSICDominant-strategy incentive compatibility (DSIC). A mechanism is DSIC with respect to a utility function if for every true type profile…
- SingleParameterMechanism.isMonotone_of_isDSICMyerson Lemma, Property 1: every DSIC single-parameter mechanism has a monotone allocation rule.
- IsStrictlyDominant.isWeaklyDominantA strictly dominant strategy is weakly dominant.
- MechanismWithTransfers.isDSICDSIC for a mechanism with transfers, relative to an externally supplied utility rule.
- IsNashEquilibrium.of_dominantT3: If every player has a weakly dominant strategy and
σassigns each player their dominant strategy, thenσis a Nash equilibrium. - Auction.FirstPrice.no_dominant_strategyNo dominant strategy exists in first-price auctions. For any bidder
iand any bidbi, there exists a profile where biddingbiis…
- IsWeaklyDominant.isBestResponseT2: A weakly dominant strategy is a best response to any profile where player
Lean source view module on GitHub
set_option autoImplicit true in set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in variable {N U : Type*} [DecidableEq N] [Preorder U] in open EconCSLib.StrategicGame in /-- Strategy `s` is weakly dominant for player `i`. -/ def IsWeaklyDominant (G : EconCSLib.StrategicGame N U) (i : N) (s : G.strategy i) : Prop := ∀ s' : G.strategy i, WeaklyDominates G i s s'