MultipleParameterMechanism.VCGMechanism_truthful_profile_quasiLinearUtility_nonneg
theoremverifiedformalizationimported Lean
The same nonnegative-utility result for the fully truthful report profile.
Statement
set_option autoImplicit true in set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in open MultipleParameterMechanism in open scoped BigOperators in variable {I A : Type*} [Fintype I] [Fintype A] [Nonempty A] in variable [DecidableEq I] in theorem MultipleParameterMechanism.VCGMechanism_truthful_profile_quasiLinearUtility_nonneg (v : ∀ _ : I, Valuation A ℝ) (hnonneg : ∀ i : I, ∀ a : A, 0 ≤ v i a) (i : I) : 0 ≤ MechanismWithTransfers.quasiLinearUtility VCGTransferMechanism valueOfAllocation id id v v i
- Formalizes
- EconCSLib, `MultipleParameterMechanism.VCGMechanism_truthful_profile_quasiLinearUtility_nonneg`
- Lean proof
- By xbei (from the file's git history), from github.com/gametheoryinlean/EconCSLib at
1a88f809b538(Copyright (c) 2026 EconCSLib contributors. All rights reserved, Apache-2.0). Compiled here against leanprover/lean4:v4.33.1, Mathlib v4.33.1; written for leanprover/lean4:v4.30.0.MultipleParameterMechanism.VCGMechanism_truthful_profile_quasiLinearUtility_nonneg← MultipleParameterMechanism.VCGMechanism_truthful_profile_quasiLinearUtility_nonneg (EconCSLib/MechanismDesign/Auction/VCG.lean:243): verbatim
- Verified
- 08 Oct 2026
- Axioms
Classical.choiceQuot.soundpropext- Built on 7
- MultipleParameterMechanism.VCGMechanism_truthful_quasiLinearUtility_nonnegIf agent
ireports truthfully in the VCG mechanism, then their quasi-linear utility is nonnegative against arbitrary reports by the… - MultipleParameterMechanism.VCGTransferMechanismThe underlying transfer mechanism of
VCGMechanism. This is the object to which the generic definitions inTransfer.lean, such as… - MultipleParameterMechanism.ValuationThe valuation/type space of an agent in a multiple-parameter mechanism.
- MechanismWithTransfers.quasiLinearUtilityQuasi-linear utility induced by: - a valuation function on allocations - an embedding of payments into utility space - subtraction in the…
- MultipleParameterMechanism.valueOfAllocationThe value extractor used by the generic quasi-linear transfer definitions: agent
ievaluates allocationaby applying their valuation… - MultipleParameterMechanismA multiple-parameter mechanism with transfers. Here
Ais the type of feasible allocations andVis the codomain of valuations. Agent… - MechanismWithTransfersA mechanism with monetary transfers. -
I— agents -T— report/type space of each agent -A— allocation space -P— payment space…
- MultipleParameterMechanism.VCGMechanism_truthful_quasiLinearUtility_nonnegIf agent
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set_option autoImplicit true inset_option relaxedAutoImplicit true inopen MultipleParameterMechanism inopen scoped BigOperators invariable {I A : Type*} [Fintype I] [Fintype A] [Nonempty A] invariable [DecidableEq I] in/-- The same nonnegative-utility result for the fully truthful report profile. -/theorem MultipleParameterMechanism.VCGMechanism_truthful_profile_quasiLinearUtility_nonneg (v : ∀ _ : I, Valuation A ℝ) (hnonneg : ∀ i : I, ∀ a : A, 0 ≤ v i a) (i : I) : 0 ≤ MechanismWithTransfers.quasiLinearUtility VCGTransferMechanism valueOfAllocation id id v v i := by simpa [Function.update_eq_self] using VCGMechanism_truthful_quasiLinearUtility_nonneg (v := v) hnonneg i v