MultipleParameterMechanism.VCGTransferMechanism
defimported Lean
The underlying transfer mechanism of VCGMechanism. This is the object to which the generic definitions in Transfer.lean, such as isQuasiLinearDSIC and isQuasiLinearExPostIR, are applied.
Statement
set_option autoImplicit true in set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in open MultipleParameterMechanism in open scoped BigOperators in variable {I A : Type*} [Fintype I] [Fintype A] [Nonempty A] in variable [DecidableEq I] in noncomputable def MultipleParameterMechanism.VCGTransferMechanism : MechanismWithTransfers I (fun _ => Valuation A ℝ) A ℝ
- Defined in
- EconCSLib, `MultipleParameterMechanism.VCGTransferMechanism`
- Lean proof
- By xbei (from the file's git history), from github.com/gametheoryinlean/EconCSLib at
1a88f809b538(Copyright (c) 2026 EconCSLib contributors. All rights reserved, Apache-2.0). Compiled here against leanprover/lean4:v4.33.1, Mathlib v4.33.1; written for leanprover/lean4:v4.30.0.MultipleParameterMechanism.VCGTransferMechanism← MultipleParameterMechanism.VCGTransferMechanism (EconCSLib/MechanismDesign/Auction/VCG.lean:185): verbatim
- Verified
- 08 Oct 2026
- Axioms
- none listed
- Built on 4
- MultipleParameterMechanism.VCGMechanismThe finite-allocation VCG mechanism induced by welfare maximization and Clarke-pivot payments.
- MechanismWithTransfersA mechanism with monetary transfers. -
I— agents -T— report/type space of each agent -A— allocation space -P— payment space… - MultipleParameterMechanism.ValuationThe valuation/type space of an agent in a multiple-parameter mechanism.
- MultipleParameterMechanismA multiple-parameter mechanism with transfers. Here
Ais the type of feasible allocations andVis the codomain of valuations. Agent…
- Used by 4
- MultipleParameterMechanism.VCGMechanism_truthful_quasiLinearUtility_nonnegIf agent
ireports truthfully in the VCG mechanism, then their quasi-linear utility is nonnegative against arbitrary reports by the… - MultipleParameterMechanism.VCGMechanism_quasiLinearUtility_eq_socialWelfare_sub_maxWelfareWithoutVCG utility can be rewritten as total welfare under the profile that uses agent
i's true valuation and keeps all other reports fixed,… - MultipleParameterMechanism.VCGMechanism_truthful_profile_quasiLinearUtility_nonnegThe same nonnegative-utility result for the fully truthful report profile.
- MultipleParameterMechanism.VCGMechanism_isExPostIR_of_all_nonnegativeVCG satisfies the
MechanismWithTransfers.isExPostIRpredicate under the ambient assumption that every valuation in the unrestricted type…
- MultipleParameterMechanism.VCGMechanism_truthful_quasiLinearUtility_nonnegIf agent
Lean source view module on GitHub
set_option autoImplicit true in set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in open MultipleParameterMechanism in open scoped BigOperators in variable {I A : Type*} [Fintype I] [Fintype A] [Nonempty A] in variable [DecidableEq I] in /-- The underlying transfer mechanism of `VCGMechanism`. This is the object to which the generic definitions in `Transfer.lean`, such as `isQuasiLinearDSIC` and `isQuasiLinearExPostIR`, are applied. -/ noncomputable def MultipleParameterMechanism.VCGTransferMechanism : MechanismWithTransfers I (fun _ => Valuation A ℝ) A ℝ where allocationRule := (VCGMechanism : MultipleParameterMechanism I A ℝ ℝ).allocationRule paymentRule := (VCGMechanism : MultipleParameterMechanism I A ℝ ℝ).paymentRule