SingleParameterMechanism.IsImplementable
defimported Lean
An allocation rule is implementable if there exists some payment rule such that the resulting single-parameter mechanism is DSIC.
Statement
set_option autoImplicit true in set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in open SingleParameterMechanism in variable {I : Type*} [DecidableEq I] {R : Type*} in variable (M : SingleParameterMechanism I R) in def SingleParameterMechanism.IsImplementable [Mul R] [Sub R] [Preorder R] (x : (I → R) → I → R) : Prop
- Defined in
- EconCSLib, `SingleParameterMechanism.IsImplementable`
- Lean proof
- By xbei (from the file's git history), from github.com/gametheoryinlean/EconCSLib at
1a88f809b538(Copyright (c) 2026 EconCSLib contributors. All rights reserved, Apache-2.0). Compiled here against leanprover/lean4:v4.33.1, Mathlib v4.33.1; written for leanprover/lean4:v4.30.0.SingleParameterMechanism.IsImplementable← SingleParameterMechanism.IsImplementable (EconCSLib/MechanismDesign/Auction/Transfer.lean:238): verbatim
- Verified
- 08 Oct 2026
- Axioms
- none listed
- Built on 6
- SingleParameterMechanism.IsDSICDominant-strategy incentive compatibility in the single-parameter, quasi-linear setting. Truthful reporting
θᵢis weakly dominant for… - SingleParameterMechanismA single-parameter mechanism. Each agent
ihas a single private typeθ_i : R(their "value per unit"). The allocation gives each agent… - MechanismWithTransfersA mechanism with monetary transfers. -
I— agents -T— report/type space of each agent -A— allocation space -P— payment space… - EconCSLib.StrategicGame.Profile.deviate_selfDeviating to the same strategy is the identity.
- EconCSLib.StrategicGame.Profile.deviate_sameAt the deviated player, the updated profile returns the new strategy.
- EconCSLib.StrategicGame.Profile.deviate_of_neAt every other player, the updated profile is unchanged.
- SingleParameterMechanism.IsDSICDominant-strategy incentive compatibility in the single-parameter, quasi-linear setting. Truthful reporting
- Used by 3
- SingleParameterMechanism.isImplementable_of_isMonotoneMyerson Lemma, Property 2, reformulated: an allocation rule is implementable if it is monotone.
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingAllocationRule_isImplementable_of_isRegularBayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingAllocationRule_isImplementable_of_isRegular
- SingleParameterMechanism.isImplementable_iff_isMonotoneMyerson Lemma
(a): an allocation rule is implementable if and only if it is monotone.
Lean source view module on GitHub
set_option autoImplicit true in set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in open SingleParameterMechanism in variable {I : Type*} [DecidableEq I] {R : Type*} in variable (M : SingleParameterMechanism I R) in /-- An allocation rule is implementable if there exists some payment rule such that the resulting single-parameter mechanism is DSIC. -/ def SingleParameterMechanism.IsImplementable [Mul R] [Sub R] [Preorder R] (x : (I → R) → I → R) : Prop := ∃ p : (I → R) → I → R, ( { allocationRule := x paymentRule := p } : SingleParameterMechanism I R).IsDSIC