AFTD Auto-Formalizing Theoretical Domains

SingleParameterMechanism.IsDSIC

defimported Lean

Dominant-strategy incentive compatibility in the single-parameter, quasi-linear setting. Truthful reporting θᵢ is weakly dominant for every agent under utility θᵢ * xᵢ(b) - pᵢ(b).

Statement

set_option autoImplicit true in
set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in
variable {I : Type*} [DecidableEq I] {R : Type*} in
variable (M : SingleParameterMechanism I R) in
def SingleParameterMechanism.IsDSIC [Mul R] [Sub R] [Preorder R] : Prop
Defined in
EconCSLib, `SingleParameterMechanism.IsDSIC`
Lean proof
By xbei (from the file's git history), from github.com/gametheoryinlean/EconCSLib at 1a88f809b538 (Copyright (c) 2026 EconCSLib contributors. All rights reserved, Apache-2.0). Compiled here against leanprover/lean4:v4.33.1, Mathlib v4.33.1; written for leanprover/lean4:v4.30.0.
Verified
08 Oct 2026
Axioms
none listed
Built on 5
Used by 19

Lean source view module on GitHub

set_option autoImplicit true in
set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in
variable {I : Type*} [DecidableEq I] {R : Type*} in
variable (M : SingleParameterMechanism I R) in
/-- Dominant-strategy incentive compatibility in the single-parameter, quasi-linear setting. Truthful reporting `θᵢ` is weakly dominant for every agent under utility `θᵢ * xᵢ(b) - pᵢ(b)`. -/
def SingleParameterMechanism.IsDSIC [Mul R] [Sub R] [Preorder R] : Prop :=
  ({ allocationRule := M.allocationRule
     paymentRule := M.paymentRule } :
    MechanismWithTransfers I (fun _ => R) (I → R) R).isDSIC
      (fun a pay types i => types i * a i - pay i)
See it in the graphDiscuss this resultChallenge it