SingleParameterMechanism.IsDSIC
defimported Lean
Dominant-strategy incentive compatibility in the single-parameter, quasi-linear setting. Truthful reporting θᵢ is weakly dominant for every agent under utility θᵢ * xᵢ(b) - pᵢ(b).
Statement
set_option autoImplicit true in set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in variable {I : Type*} [DecidableEq I] {R : Type*} in variable (M : SingleParameterMechanism I R) in def SingleParameterMechanism.IsDSIC [Mul R] [Sub R] [Preorder R] : Prop
- Defined in
- EconCSLib, `SingleParameterMechanism.IsDSIC`
- Lean proof
- By xbei (from the file's git history), from github.com/gametheoryinlean/EconCSLib at
1a88f809b538(Copyright (c) 2026 EconCSLib contributors. All rights reserved, Apache-2.0). Compiled here against leanprover/lean4:v4.33.1, Mathlib v4.33.1; written for leanprover/lean4:v4.30.0.SingleParameterMechanism.IsDSIC← SingleParameterMechanism.IsDSIC (EconCSLib/MechanismDesign/Auction/Transfer.lean:230): verbatim
- Verified
- 08 Oct 2026
- Axioms
- none listed
- Built on 5
- MechanismWithTransfers.isDSICDSIC for a mechanism with transfers, relative to an externally supplied utility rule.
- SingleParameterMechanismA single-parameter mechanism. Each agent
ihas a single private typeθ_i : R(their "value per unit"). The allocation gives each agent… - EconCSLib.StrategicGame.Profile.deviate_selfDeviating to the same strategy is the identity.
- EconCSLib.StrategicGame.Profile.deviate_sameAt the deviated player, the updated profile returns the new strategy.
- EconCSLib.StrategicGame.Profile.deviate_of_neAt every other player, the updated profile is unchanged.
- Used by 19
- SingleParameterMechanism.withMyersonPayment_isDSIC_of_isMonotoneMyerson Lemma, Property 2: a monotone allocation rule is DSIC when paired with the canonical Myerson payment rule.
- SingleParameterMechanism.payment_difference_boundIf two payment rules implement the same allocation rule in DSIC form, then their difference along a one-dimensional deviation is…
- SingleParameterMechanism.payment_eq_myersonPayment_of_isDSIC_of_zeroNormalizedUniqueness of zero-normalized DSIC payment rules: among zero-normalized payment rules, the canonical Myerson payment rule is the unique…
- SingleParameterMechanism.existsUnique_zeroNormalized_payment_of_isMonotoneMyerson Lemma
(b): ifxis monotone, then there is a unique zero-normalized payment rule making(x, p)DSIC. - SingleParameterMechanism.isMonotone_of_isDSICMyerson Lemma, Property 1: every DSIC single-parameter mechanism has a monotone allocation rule.
- SingleParameterMechanism.payment_formula_of_isDSIC_of_zeroNormalizedExplicit payment identity used in Myerson's Lemma: for a DSIC single-parameter mechanism with zero-normalized payments, the payment rule…
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.interimQuasiLinearUtilityIntegrand_le_of_isDSICPointwise DSIC inequality for the interim utility integrand.
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.isRevenueComparable_of_myersonPaymentIdentity_of_isDSIC_of_isZeroNormalizedBayesianSingleItemAuction.isRevenueComparable_of_myersonPaymentIdentity_of_isDSIC_of_isZeroNormalized
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.isIncentiveCompatible_of_isDSICDSIC implies interim IC under interim integrability.
- SingleParameterMechanism.IsImplementableAn allocation rule is implementable if there exists some payment rule such that the resulting single-parameter mechanism is DSIC.
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.paymentRule_eq_myersonPayment_of_isDSIC_of_isZeroNormalizedBayesianSingleItemAuction.paymentRule_eq_myersonPayment_of_isDSIC_of_isZeroNormalized
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.hasExpectedRevenueVirtualSurplusIdentity_of_myersonPaymentIdentity_of_isDSIC_of_isZeroNormalizedBayesianSingleItemAuction.hasExpectedRevenueVirtualSurplusIdentity_of_myersonPaymentIdentity_of_isDSIC_of_isZeroNormalized
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.existsUnique_zeroNormalized_paymentRule_for_virtualSurplusMaximizingAllocationRuleBayesianSingleItemAuction.existsUnique_zeroNormalized_paymentRule_for_virtualSurplusMaximizingAllocationRule
- SingleParameterMechanism.isImplementable_of_isMonotoneMyerson Lemma, Property 2, reformulated: an allocation rule is implementable if it is monotone.
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.paymentRule_eq_virtualSurplusMaximizingPaymentRule_of_isDSIC_of_zeroNormalizedBayesianSingleItemAuction.paymentRule_eq_virtualSurplusMaximizingPaymentRule_of_isDSIC_of_zeroNormalized
- SingleParameterMechanism.isImplementable_iff_isMonotoneMyerson Lemma
(a): an allocation rule is implementable if and only if it is monotone. - BayesianSingleItemAuction.expectedSellerRevenueInEnvironment_eq_myersonPaymentRevenueInEnvironment_of_isDSIC_of_isZeroNormalizedBayesianSingleItemAuction.expectedSellerRevenueInEnvironment_eq_myersonPaymentRevenueInEnvironment_of_isDSIC_of_isZeroNormalized
- SingleParameterMechanism.payment_formula_of_zeroNormalized_and_isDSICMyerson Lemma
(c): the unique zero-normalized DSIC payment rule from(b)is given by the explicit formula… - SingleParameterMechanism.payment_sandwichFor a DSIC single-parameter mechanism, fixing all other bids yields the standard two-sided bound on payment differences.
Lean source view module on GitHub
set_option autoImplicit true in set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in variable {I : Type*} [DecidableEq I] {R : Type*} in variable (M : SingleParameterMechanism I R) in /-- Dominant-strategy incentive compatibility in the single-parameter, quasi-linear setting. Truthful reporting `θᵢ` is weakly dominant for every agent under utility `θᵢ * xᵢ(b) - pᵢ(b)`. -/ def SingleParameterMechanism.IsDSIC [Mul R] [Sub R] [Preorder R] : Prop := ({ allocationRule := M.allocationRule paymentRule := M.paymentRule } : MechanismWithTransfers I (fun _ => R) (I → R) R).isDSIC (fun a pay types i => types i * a i - pay i)