SingleParameterMechanism.isImplementable_of_isMonotone
theoremverifiedformalizationimported Lean
Myerson Lemma, Property 2, reformulated: an allocation rule is implementable if it is monotone.
Statement
set_option autoImplicit true in set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in open SingleParameterMechanism in variable {I : Type*} in theorem SingleParameterMechanism.isImplementable_of_isMonotone [DecidableEq I] {x : (I → ℝ) → I → ℝ} (hx : IsMonotone ({ allocationRule := x, paymentRule := myersonPayment x } : SingleParameterMechanism I ℝ)) : IsImplementable x
- Formalizes
- EconCSLib, `SingleParameterMechanism.isImplementable_of_isMonotone`
- Lean proof
- By xbei (from the file's git history), from github.com/gametheoryinlean/EconCSLib at
1a88f809b538(Copyright (c) 2026 EconCSLib contributors. All rights reserved, Apache-2.0). Compiled here against leanprover/lean4:v4.33.1, Mathlib v4.33.1; written for leanprover/lean4:v4.30.0.SingleParameterMechanism.isImplementable_of_isMonotone← SingleParameterMechanism.isImplementable_of_isMonotone (EconCSLib/MechanismDesign/Auction/Myerson.lean:225): verbatim
- Verified
- 08 Oct 2026
- Axioms
Classical.choiceQuot.soundpropext- Built on 11
- SingleParameterMechanism.withMyersonPayment_isDSIC_of_isMonotoneMyerson Lemma, Property 2: a monotone allocation rule is DSIC when paired with the canonical Myerson payment rule.
- SingleParameterMechanism.IsDSICDominant-strategy incentive compatibility in the single-parameter, quasi-linear setting. Truthful reporting
θᵢis weakly dominant for… - SingleParameterMechanism.withMyersonPaymentThe single-parameter mechanism obtained by equipping an allocation rule with its canonical Myerson payment rule.
- SingleParameterMechanism.IsImplementableAn allocation rule is implementable if there exists some payment rule such that the resulting single-parameter mechanism is DSIC.
- SingleParameterMechanism.IsMonotoneMonotonicity of the allocation rule. Agent
i's allocation is non-decreasing ini's reported type, holding all other reports fixed.… - SingleParameterMechanismA single-parameter mechanism. Each agent
ihas a single private typeθ_i : R(their "value per unit"). The allocation gives each agent… - MechanismWithTransfersA mechanism with monetary transfers. -
I— agents -T— report/type space of each agent -A— allocation space -P— payment space… - SingleParameterMechanism.myersonPaymentThe canonical Myerson payment formula associated with an allocation rule
x. Holding all other bids fixed, agentipays… - EconCSLib.StrategicGame.Profile.deviate_selfDeviating to the same strategy is the identity.
- EconCSLib.StrategicGame.Profile.deviate_sameAt the deviated player, the updated profile returns the new strategy.
- EconCSLib.StrategicGame.Profile.deviate_of_neAt every other player, the updated profile is unchanged.
- Used by 2
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingAllocationRule_isImplementable_of_isRegularBayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingAllocationRule_isImplementable_of_isRegular
- SingleParameterMechanism.isImplementable_iff_isMonotoneMyerson Lemma
(a): an allocation rule is implementable if and only if it is monotone.
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set_option autoImplicit true inset_option relaxedAutoImplicit true inopen SingleParameterMechanism invariable {I : Type*} in/-- Myerson Lemma, Property 2, reformulated: an allocation rule is implementable if it is monotone. -/theorem SingleParameterMechanism.isImplementable_of_isMonotone [DecidableEq I] {x : (I → ℝ) → I → ℝ} (hx : IsMonotone ({ allocationRule := x, paymentRule := myersonPayment x } : SingleParameterMechanism I ℝ)) : IsImplementable x := by refine ⟨myersonPayment x, ?_⟩ simpa [withMyersonPayment] using withMyersonPayment_isDSIC_of_isMonotone hx