SingleParameterMechanism.payment_formula_of_zeroNormalized_and_isDSIC
theoremverifiedformalizationimported Lean
Myerson Lemma (c): the unique zero-normalized DSIC payment rule from (b) is given by the explicit formula bᵢ xᵢ(b) - ∫₀^{bᵢ} xᵢ(z, b₋ᵢ) dz.
Statement
set_option autoImplicit true in set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in open SingleParameterMechanism in variable {I : Type*} in theorem SingleParameterMechanism.payment_formula_of_zeroNormalized_and_isDSIC [DecidableEq I] {x p : (I → ℝ) → I → ℝ} (hp : ZeroNormalized p ∧ ({ allocationRule := x, paymentRule := p } : SingleParameterMechanism I ℝ).IsDSIC) (b : I → ℝ) (i : I) : p b i = b i * x b i - ∫ z in 0..b i, x (Function.update b i z) i
- Formalizes
- EconCSLib, `SingleParameterMechanism.payment_formula_of_zeroNormalized_and_isDSIC`
- Lean proof
- By xbei (from the file's git history), from github.com/gametheoryinlean/EconCSLib at
1a88f809b538(Copyright (c) 2026 EconCSLib contributors. All rights reserved, Apache-2.0). Compiled here against leanprover/lean4:v4.33.1, Mathlib v4.33.1; written for leanprover/lean4:v4.30.0.SingleParameterMechanism.payment_formula_of_zeroNormalized_and_isDSIC← SingleParameterMechanism.payment_formula_of_zeroNormalized_and_isDSIC (EconCSLib/MechanismDesign/Auction/Myerson.lean:412): verbatim
- Verified
- 08 Oct 2026
- Axioms
Classical.choiceQuot.soundpropext- Built on 8
- SingleParameterMechanism.IsDSICDominant-strategy incentive compatibility in the single-parameter, quasi-linear setting. Truthful reporting
θᵢis weakly dominant for… - SingleParameterMechanism.payment_formula_of_isDSIC_of_zeroNormalizedExplicit payment identity used in Myerson's Lemma: for a DSIC single-parameter mechanism with zero-normalized payments, the payment rule…
- SingleParameterMechanism.ZeroNormalizedZero normalization for payment rules: reporting
0yields payment0, holding the other reports fixed. - SingleParameterMechanismA single-parameter mechanism. Each agent
ihas a single private typeθ_i : R(their "value per unit"). The allocation gives each agent… - MechanismWithTransfersA mechanism with monetary transfers. -
I— agents -T— report/type space of each agent -A— allocation space -P— payment space… - EconCSLib.StrategicGame.Profile.deviate_selfDeviating to the same strategy is the identity.
- EconCSLib.StrategicGame.Profile.deviate_sameAt the deviated player, the updated profile returns the new strategy.
- EconCSLib.StrategicGame.Profile.deviate_of_neAt every other player, the updated profile is unchanged.
- SingleParameterMechanism.IsDSICDominant-strategy incentive compatibility in the single-parameter, quasi-linear setting. Truthful reporting
Lean source view module on GitHub
set_option autoImplicit true in set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in open SingleParameterMechanism in variable {I : Type*} in /-- Myerson Lemma `(c)`: the unique zero-normalized DSIC payment rule from `(b)` is given by the explicit formula `bᵢ xᵢ(b) - ∫₀^{bᵢ} xᵢ(z, b₋ᵢ) dz`. -/ theorem SingleParameterMechanism.payment_formula_of_zeroNormalized_and_isDSIC [DecidableEq I] {x p : (I → ℝ) → I → ℝ} (hp : ZeroNormalized p ∧ ({ allocationRule := x, paymentRule := p } : SingleParameterMechanism I ℝ).IsDSIC) (b : I → ℝ) (i : I) : p b i = b i * x b i - ∫ z in 0..b i, x (Function.update b i z) i := payment_formula_of_isDSIC_of_zeroNormalized hp.2 hp.1 b i