SocialChoice.Voting.SimpleLift
defimported Lean
Q is obtained from P by weakly raising a: anything below a in P remains below a in Q, and anything above a in Q was already above a in P.
Statement
set_option autoImplicit true in set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in open Finset in variable {N A : Type*} in variable [Fintype N] [Fintype A] in def SocialChoice.Voting.SimpleLift (Q P : Profile N A) (a : A) : Prop
- Defined in
- EconCSLib, `SocialChoice.Voting.SimpleLift`
- Lean proof
- By xbei (from the file's git history), from github.com/gametheoryinlean/EconCSLib at
1a88f809b538(Copyright (c) 2026 EconCSLib contributors. All rights reserved, Apache-2.0). Compiled here against leanprover/lean4:v4.33.1, Mathlib v4.33.1; written for leanprover/lean4:v4.30.0.SocialChoice.Voting.SimpleLift← SocialChoice.Voting.SimpleLift (EconCSLib/SocialChoice/Voting/Basic.lean:301): verbatim
- Verified
- 08 Oct 2026
- Axioms
- none listed
- Built on 3
- SocialChoice.Voting.BallotPrefers_ballotFromInjectiveSocialChoice.Voting.BallotPrefers_ballotFromInjective
- SocialChoice.Voting.PrefersVoter
istrictly prefersatobin profileP. - SocialChoice.Voting.ProfileA voting profile assigns each voter a strict linear order over alternatives.
- Used by 3
- SocialChoice.Voting.MonotonicityMonotonicity: raising a selected alternative cannot make it unselected.
- SocialChoice.Voting.strategyproof_insert_preserves_choiceSocialChoice.Voting.strategyproof_insert_preserves_choice
- SocialChoice.Voting.strategyproof_monotonicStrategy-proofness implies monotonicity for finite voter sets. [MSZ 21.35]
Lean source view module on GitHub
set_option autoImplicit true in set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in open Finset in variable {N A : Type*} in variable [Fintype N] [Fintype A] in /-- `Q` is obtained from `P` by weakly raising `a`: anything below `a` in `P` remains below `a` in `Q`, and anything above `a` in `Q` was already above `a` in `P`. -/ def SocialChoice.Voting.SimpleLift (Q P : Profile N A) (a : A) : Prop := ∀ i x, (Prefers P i a x → Prefers Q i a x) ∧ (Prefers Q i x a → Prefers P i x a)