SocialChoice.Voting.Resolute
defimported Lean
A voting rule is resolute if it always returns exactly one winner.
Statement
set_option autoImplicit true in set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in open Finset in variable {N A : Type*} in def SocialChoice.Voting.Resolute [Fintype N] [Fintype A] (f : VotingRule N A) : Prop
- Defined in
- EconCSLib, `SocialChoice.Voting.Resolute`
- Lean proof
- By xbei (from the file's git history), from github.com/gametheoryinlean/EconCSLib at
1a88f809b538(Copyright (c) 2026 EconCSLib contributors. All rights reserved, Apache-2.0). Compiled here against leanprover/lean4:v4.33.1, Mathlib v4.33.1; written for leanprover/lean4:v4.30.0.SocialChoice.Voting.Resolute← SocialChoice.Voting.Resolute (EconCSLib/SocialChoice/Voting/Basic.lean:216): verbatim
- Verified
- 08 Oct 2026
- Axioms
- none listed
- Built on 2
- SocialChoice.Voting.ProfileA voting profile assigns each voter a strict linear order over alternatives.
- SocialChoice.Voting.VotingRuleA set-valued voting rule on fixed finite voter and candidate types.
- Used by 4
- SocialChoice.Voting.strategyproof_insert_preserves_choiceSocialChoice.Voting.strategyproof_insert_preserves_choice
- SocialChoice.Voting.ResoluteStrategyproofnessStrategyproofness for resolute rules: changing one ballot cannot produce a strictly better unique winner for the deviating voter.
- SocialChoice.Voting.strategyproof_monotonicStrategy-proofness implies monotonicity for finite voter sets. [MSZ 21.35]
- SocialChoice.Voting.resolute_eq_singleton_of_memSocialChoice.Voting.resolute_eq_singleton_of_mem
Lean source view module on GitHub
set_option autoImplicit true in set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in open Finset in variable {N A : Type*} in /-- A voting rule is resolute if it always returns exactly one winner. -/ def SocialChoice.Voting.Resolute [Fintype N] [Fintype A] (f : VotingRule N A) : Prop := ∀ P : Profile N A, Finset.card (f P) = 1