MatrixGame.support_complementarity_column
theoremverifiedformalizationimported Lean
Support complementarity (column). For an optimal pair (xx, yy), every column j with positive probability under yy is a best response to xx, i.e., A.Ej xx j = A.value.
Statement
set_option autoImplicit true in set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in open MatrixGame in open Finset BigOperators in set_option linter.unusedSectionVars false in universe u in variable {I J : Type u} [Fintype I] [Fintype J] [Nonempty I] [Nonempty J] in variable (A : MatrixGame I J ℝ) in theorem MatrixGame.support_complementarity_column [DecidableEq J] (xx : stdSimplex ℝ I) (yy : stdSimplex ℝ J) (hxx : xx ∈ A.optimalRowStrategies) (hyy : yy ∈ A.optimalColumnStrategies) {j : J} (hj : 0 < yy.val j) : A.Ej xx j = A.value
- Formalizes
- EconCSLib, `MatrixGame.support_complementarity_column`
- Lean proof
- By xbei (from the file's git history), from github.com/gametheoryinlean/EconCSLib at
1a88f809b538(Copyright (c) 2026 EconCSLib contributors. All rights reserved, Apache-2.0). Compiled here against leanprover/lean4:v4.33.1, Mathlib v4.33.1; written for leanprover/lean4:v4.30.0.MatrixGame.support_complementarity_column← MatrixGame.support_complementarity_column (EconCSLib/GameTheory/StrategicGame/ZeroSum/MatrixGameNash.lean:275): verbatim
- Verified
- 08 Oct 2026
- Axioms
Classical.choiceQuot.soundpropext- Built on 13
- MatrixGame.mem_optimalColumnStrategies_iff_E_leA column strategy is optimal iff against every mixed row it caps payoff at the value.
- MatrixGameA finite two-player zero-sum matrix game. Player I chooses row
i : I, Player II chooses columnj : J. Payoff to Player I isg i j… - MatrixGame.optimalRowStrategiesThe set of optimal row strategies: mixed strategies that achieve the maximin value.
- MatrixGame.optimalColumnStrategiesThe set of optimal column strategies: mixed strategies that achieve the minimax value.
- MatrixGame.EjExpected payoff when Player I uses
xagainst pure columnj. - MatrixGame.valueThe value of a matrix game (
sSup-based; needs order completeness). Equal to both maximin and minimax by the minimax theorem… - MatrixGame.EExpected payoff when Player I uses mixed strategy
xand Player II usesy. - MatrixGame.mem_optimalRowStrategies_iff_E_geA row strategy is optimal iff against every mixed column it secures the value.
- stdSimplex.purePoint-mass simplex element at
i₀. - wsumWeighted sum of
fwith weights from a simplex elementx. Thinabbrevover Mathlib's finite dot product⬝ᵥ: definitionally equal,… - wsum_pure_applyWeighted sum at a point mass evaluates the chosen coordinate.
- wsum_wsum_commExchange order of double weighted sums.
- stdSimplex.pure_applystdSimplex.pure_apply
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set_option autoImplicit true inset_option relaxedAutoImplicit true inopen MatrixGame inopen Finset BigOperators inset_option linter.unusedSectionVars false inuniverse u invariable {I J : Type u} [Fintype I] [Fintype J] [Nonempty I] [Nonempty J] invariable (A : MatrixGame I J ℝ) in/-- **Support complementarity (column).** For an optimal pair `(xx, yy)`, every column `j` with positive probability under `yy` is a best response to `xx`, i.e., `A.Ej xx j = A.value`. -/theorem MatrixGame.support_complementarity_column [DecidableEq J] (xx : stdSimplex ℝ I) (yy : stdSimplex ℝ J) (hxx : xx ∈ A.optimalRowStrategies) (hyy : yy ∈ A.optimalColumnStrategies) {j : J} (hj : 0 < yy.val j) : A.Ej xx j = A.value := by have hE_eq : A.E xx yy = A.value := by have h1 := (A.mem_optimalRowStrategies_iff_E_ge xx).mp hxx yy have h2 := (A.mem_optimalColumnStrategies_iff_E_le yy).mp hyy xx linarith have hj_ge : ∀ j', A.value ≤ A.Ej xx j' := by intro j' have h := (A.mem_optimalRowStrategies_iff_E_ge xx).mp hxx (stdSimplex.pure j') have heq : A.E xx (stdSimplex.pure j') = A.Ej xx j' := by show wsum xx (fun i => wsum (stdSimplex.pure j') (A.g i)) = wsum xx (fun i => A.g i j') apply Finset.sum_congr rfl intro i _ show xx.val i * wsum (stdSimplex.pure j') (A.g i) = xx.val i * A.g i j' rw [wsum_pure_apply] linarith [heq] -- Express E xx yy as a column-side weighted sum: ∑ j, yy.val j * Ej xx j. have hE_col : A.E xx yy = ∑ j', yy.val j' * A.Ej xx j' := by show wsum xx (fun i => wsum yy (A.g i)) = ∑ j', yy.val j' * (wsum xx (fun i => A.g i j')) rw [wsum_wsum_comm xx yy A.g] rfl have hsum_one : (∑ j', yy.val j') = 1 := yy.property.2 have hsum_zero : (∑ j', yy.val j' * (A.Ej xx j' - A.value)) = 0 := by have hexpand : (∑ j', yy.val j' * (A.Ej xx j' - A.value)) = (∑ j', yy.val j' * A.Ej xx j') - (∑ j', yy.val j') * A.value := by rw [Finset.sum_mul, ← Finset.sum_sub_distrib] apply Finset.sum_congr rfl; intro j' _; ring rw [hexpand, hsum_one, one_mul, ← hE_col] linarith have hnonneg : ∀ j' ∈ Finset.univ, 0 ≤ yy.val j' * (A.Ej xx j' - A.value) := by intro j' _ exact mul_nonneg (yy.property.1 j') (sub_nonneg.mpr (hj_ge j')) have hzero : yy.val j * (A.Ej xx j - A.value) = 0 := (Finset.sum_eq_zero_iff_of_nonneg hnonneg).mp hsum_zero j (Finset.mem_univ j) rcases mul_eq_zero.mp hzero with h | h · linarith · linarith