AFTD Auto-Formalizing Theoretical Domains

Weekly report · 2026-W40 · 28 Sep – 4 Oct 2026

Voting games rigidity, persuasion constants, and limits of strategic stopping rules

Short version: 2 minFull report: 11 min中文版

The week in one minute

This week settled questions across game theory, fair division, and voting. In voting games, swing tables were proved to determine weighted systems uniquely. In Bayesian persuasion, the optimal receiver-utility ratio was fixed at 3/2. In chore division, the worst-case cost of fair allocations was shown to stay strictly below one-half for two people. In strategic games, uniqueness of equilibria failed for publication choice, and static stopping rules failed to remain robust against disguised rewards. Four open implications among discrete fairness criteria were also resolved.

  • 8 Proved
  • 9 Disproved
  • 6 Partial
  • 1 Formalized
  • 5 still open

Lean accepted 175 new theorems this week, drawn from 18 papers and 8 topics. Of these, 51 are new here, 3 correct a published claim, 30 formalize a published result and 91 are helper lemmas. 17 statements posed this week are not yet proved. The reading covered 3 new papers. This report covers 24 results in 8 fields.

The story of the week

A weighted voting game is completely known from its swing table

In a voting committee where members cast weighted votes to pass a bill, standard measures of political power do not inspect the weights directly. Instead, they record swings: how often a member turns a losing coalition into a winning one.

This raises a natural question: could two fundamentally different weighted voting systems look identical to every standard power measure? It was conjectured that this is impossible, and that a weighted voting game is uniquely identified by its swing table among all simple voting games.

The conjecture is now proved. Any weighted voting system is completely determined by how many swings each voter possesses at each coalition size.

The argument links swing counts to classical threshold logic. Summing the swings of all voters reconstructs the total count of winning coalitions of each size. Combining this with individual swing counts recovers the exact number of winning coalitions containing each voter. A classical 1961 theorem on threshold functions then guarantees that these counts pin down the weighted rule uniquely.

At a glance

ResultOutcomePaper
General Equilibrium & Cooperative Games
Weighted voting games are uniquely determined by their swing tableProvedarXiv:2607.07013
Banzhaf veto distortion at strict majority is at least 5/3Partial—
Mechanism Design & Auctions
The receiver-utility constant in bit-string persuasion is 3/2ProvedarXiv:2606.22226
Static thresholds cannot achieve 1/2-robustness under strategic reward signalingDisprovedarXiv:2409.18269
Sybil-proof, safe procurement mechanisms exist without winner-take-all equilibriaProvedarXiv:2603.27779
Quasi-arithmetic pooling score can fail concavity without convex exposureDisprovedarXiv:2102.07081
Fair Division
MXS does not imply EEF1 for additive goodsDisprovedarXiv:2502.02815
APS fails to imply PROP1, and pairwise MMS fails to imply MMSDisprovedarXiv:2502.02815
MXS implies PROP1 for submodular valuationsProvedarXiv:2502.02815
The cost of EF1 for two agents with chores is strictly below 1/2DisprovedarXiv:2410.15738
Envy-free multigraph orientations require subsidies exceeding n − 2PartialarXiv:2502.13671
Connected EF1 allocations of chores can fail Pareto optimalityDisprovedarXiv:2609.32545
Weighted PROPX and Pareto optimality conflict near equal shares for choresPartialarXiv:2608.16130
PROPm orientations exist for graphs with out-degree at most twoPartialarXiv:2602.18098
Leximin-optimal EF1 allocations can fail Pareto optimalityProved—
Equilibria in Games
The Publication Choice Problem can have multiple pure-strategy equilibriaDisprovedarXiv:2511.13678
Social Choice Theory
Monroe voting rules satisfy Droop proportional representation axiomsProvedarXiv:2508.00811
Droop-FJR does not imply BFJR in temporal votingDisprovedarXiv:2505.22513
Geometric Plackett–Luce choice model has linear entropyProved—
Quota and population monotonicity conflict at a common house sizeProvedarXiv:2608.02759
Matching & Market Design
Hollow-Shell market has at most ⌊(n−1)²/4⌋ blocking pairsPartialarXiv:2609.17418
Deferred acceptance is safely manipulable with knowledge of three agentsDisprovedarXiv:2502.18805
Elementary Number Theory
Weakly consecutive sequences of prime-power length begin or end with 1PartialarXiv:2401.09497
Combinatorial Games
Catch-Up draws for N up to 11 and parity theorems are formalizedFormalized—

General Equilibrium & Cooperative Games

Swing tables determine weighted voting games. Veto distortion under strict majority reached 5/3.

Proved

Weighted voting games are uniquely determined by their swing table

Knowing how often each voter turns a losing coalition into a winning one uniquely identifies any weighted voting rule.

Before

Whether swing tables uniquely identify weighted voting games was open.

Now

A weighted simple game is uniquely determined by its swing table among all simple games. Unweighted collisions exist on five players.

Why it matters
Settles the swing-rigidity conjecture on power indices.
The idea
Swings reconstruct winning coalition counts, reducing the claim to Chow's theorem.
13 supporting theorems

Partial

Banzhaf veto distortion at strict majority is at least 5/3

Power measures can distort weights enough to grant an unintended veto under strict majority.

Before

Veto distortion at quota 1/2 was known to be at least 6/5.

Now

Veto distortion is at least 5/3 for target weights (3/10, 7/10, 0) with weights (1/2, 1/2, 0).

Why it matters
Improves the lower bound on veto distortion.
The idea
A three-player target distribution forces equal weights on two players.

Mechanism Design & Auctions

Persuasion constant was fixed at 3/2. Static thresholds fail for strategic signaling. Sybil-proof procurement avoids monopoly. Concavity fails for forecast pooling without convex exposure.

Proved

The receiver-utility constant in bit-string persuasion is 3/2

A receiver can gain at most 3/2 times their initial utility from sender advice.

Before

Receiver utility was bounded by 3/2 times prior utility, with lower bound 39/31.

Now

The optimal constant is 3/2, approached by slice priors on 2m + 1 states.

Why it matters
Determines the exact worst-case alignment constant in Bayesian persuasion.
The idea
Pairwise coordinatewise disjunction schemes match subset counting bounds.
4 supporting theorems

Disproved

Static thresholds cannot achieve 1/2-robustness under strategic reward signaling

Fixed thresholds cannot guarantee half of optimal reward when agents disguise prizes strategically.

Before

Whether static stopping thresholds achieve 1/2-robustness under strategic signaling was open.

Now

No static threshold is 1/2-robust. Payoff is at most 721/150 < OPT/2, ratio 450625/930234 ≈ 0.4844.

Why it matters
Rules out static thresholds for robust prophet inequalities with signaling.
The idea
A four-player signaling game bounds searcher payoff below OPT/2.
3 supporting theorems
  • spx_searcher_payoff_leIn the four-player instance, for every static threshold T, every S >= 2 and every equilibrium, the searcher's expected payoff is at most…
  • spx_searcher_payoff_at_nineWith threshold T = 9, every equilibrium of the four-player instance gives the searcher exactly 721/150.
  • spi_two_point_equilibrium_existsExistence of equilibrium (Proposition 3.1 for two-point rewards): for every static threshold and S >= 2 signals, all players using the…

Proved

Sybil-proof, safe procurement mechanisms exist without winner-take-all equilibria

Auctions immune to fake identities can safely share work among multiple providers without losses.

Before

Known Sybil-proof and safe procurement auctions awarded all work to a single winner.

Now

The stake-share mechanism is Sybil-proof, ex-post safe, and admits non-winner-take-all pure equilibria.

Why it matters
Proves that identity-proof procurement does not force monopoly outcomes.
The idea
Splitting work and bonuses proportionally to stakes maintains safety and non-monopoly.
6 supporting theorems

Disproved

Quasi-arithmetic pooling score can fail concavity without convex exposure

Averaging expert forecasts can fail concavity when scoring rules lack curvature.

Before

Concavity of quasi-arithmetic pooling was open without convex exposure.

Now

Without convex exposure, concavity fails by 23/1024 for the cubic Tsallis rule.

Why it matters
Shows that convex exposure is necessary for score concavity.
The idea
A two-expert three-outcome counterexample breaks concavity along weights.
1 supporting theorem

Fair Division

Four fairness implications were resolved. Two-agent chore EF1 cost is below 1/2. Orientations and connectivity limits were established.

Disproved

MXS does not imply EEF1 for additive goods

Fair partition shares do not prevent strong envy after removing one item.

Before

Whether MXS implies EEF1 was open for additive goods with equal entitlements.

Now

MXS does not imply EEF1 for three agents sharing twelve additive goods.

Why it matters
Settles open problem 1 from arXiv:2502.02815.
The idea
Identical valuations force an allocation with unavoidable envy.

Disproved

APS fails to imply PROP1, and pairwise MMS fails to imply MMS

Pricing or pairwise fair shares can fail standard proportionality or group fairness.

Before

Whether APS implies PROP1 and pairwise MMS implies MMS were open.

Now

Both fail: two agents with three goods refute APS, and three agents refute PMMS.

Why it matters
Refutes open problems 2 and 4 from arXiv:2502.02815.
The idea
Budgets exclude top goods, and partition matroids yield balanced pairs missing MMS.
2 supporting theorems
  • pmms_fair_not_imp_mms_fairOpen problem 4 of arXiv:2502.02815 has a negative answer: for submodular goods with binary marginals and equal entitlements, pairwise MMS…
  • capped_count_marginalFor S inside T and j outside T, the capped count S -> min(#{x in S : p x}, c) has a marginal value at T at most its marginal value at S,…

Proved

MXS implies PROP1 for submodular valuations

Fair partition shares guarantee that nobody feels shortchanged by more than one item.

Before

Whether MXS implies PROP1 was open for submodular valuations with equal entitlements.

Now

Every MXS-fair allocation is PROP1-fair for monotone submodular valuations with equal entitlements.

Why it matters
Resolves open problem 3 from arXiv:2502.02815.
The idea
Positive marginal items from an EFX certificate contradict submodularity bounds.
4 supporting theorems
  • submod_union_marginal_leFor a monotone submodular set function and S inside T, adding a set U gains at most as much on top of T as on top of S.
  • submod_biUnion_le_sumA monotone submodular set function with v(empty) = 0 is subadditive over a finite family of sets.
  • submod_add_items_leFor a submodular set function, if every item of G lies outside A and adds at most delta >= 0 to A, then adding G to any superset W of A…
  • submod_zero_marginalsFor a monotone submodular set function, items whose marginal value over X is zero add nothing on top of any superset of X.

Disproved

The cost of EF1 for two agents with chores is strictly below 1/2

Fair chore allocation between two people increases overall cost by at most 3 − 2√2 ≈ 0.172.

Before

The cost of EF1 for chores was claimed to be at least 1 − 1/n.

Now

The cost of EF1 lies in [1/6, 3 − 2√2] for two agents, refuting 1 − 1/n.

Why it matters
Corrects the published general lower bound on the cost of EF1.
The idea
Reallocating chores by cost ratio adds at most 3 − 2√2 to cost.
7 supporting theorems

Partial

Envy-free multigraph orientations require subsidies exceeding n − 2

Fairly directing shared network links needs larger cash subsidies when multiple links connect nodes.

Before

Whether subsidies of n − 2 suffice for multigraph orientations was open.

Now

Orientations can need subsidies of at least 3/2 for three agents and 13/5 for four.

Why it matters
Shows multigraphs need strictly larger subsidies than simple graphs.
The idea
Parallel edges force orientations that retain envy above n − 2.
2 supporting theorems

Disproved

Connected EF1 allocations of chores can fail Pareto optimality

Splitting chores along a line fairly up to one task can force wasted effort.

Before

Whether connected EF1 chore allocations on a path can be Pareto optimal was open.

Now

For three agents and five chores, all 12 connected EF1 allocations are Pareto-dominated.

Why it matters
Resolves the open question in arXiv:2609.32545 negatively.
The idea
All 12 connected EF1 allocations are dominated by three cost profiles.

Partial

Weighted PROPX and Pareto optimality conflict near equal shares for chores

Fair division of chores according to target shares cannot avoid inefficiency near equal shares.

Before

PROPX and Pareto optimality for chores were known to conflict at shares (3/10, 7/10).

Now

Incompatibility holds at shares (2/5, 3/5), (9/20, 11/20), and (3/7, 4/7) with integer costs.

Why it matters
Extends the chore incompatibility close to equal shares.
The idea
All weighted PROPX allocations in these instances are Pareto-dominated.
3 supporting theorems

Partial

PROPm orientations exist for graphs with out-degree at most two

Network resources can be shared fairly when links can be directed with low out-degree.

Before

Whether PROPm multigraph orientations always exist was open.

Now

PROPm orientations exist when the underlying simple graph has an orientation with out-degree at most 2.

Why it matters
Gives the first degree-based existence condition for PROPm multigraph orientations.
The idea
EFX splits on parallel edges bound accumulated loss by two cuts.
1 supporting theorem

Proved

Leximin-optimal EF1 allocations can fail Pareto optimality

Picking the fairest allocation among approximately envy-free options can produce an inefficient outcome.

Before

Whether leximin-optimal EF1 allocations must be Pareto optimal was open.

Now

The unique leximin EF1 allocation for four agents and six goods is Pareto-dominated.

Why it matters
Confirms that leximin optimization within EF1 fails to guarantee efficiency.
The idea
Swapping two goods Pareto-dominates the unique leximin EF1 split.

Equilibria in Games

Publication choice equilibrium uniqueness failed for binary and many types.

Disproved

The Publication Choice Problem can have multiple pure-strategy equilibria

When researchers choose submission venues strategically, multiple stable outcomes can exist.

Before

Binary-type problems were claimed to have a unique pure-strategy equilibrium.

Now

Binary-type and three-type instances with two venues admit three distinct pure equilibria.

Why it matters
Disproves Theorem 4.1 and Conjecture 4.2 of arXiv:2511.13678.
The idea
A degree-9 equilibrium polynomial has three distinct roots via intermediate values.
3 supporting theorems

Social Choice Theory

Monroe rules satisfy Droop representation. Temporal Droop-FJR separates from BFJR. Apportionment and entropy results were proved.

Proved

Monroe voting rules satisfy Droop proportional representation axioms

Classic committee voting rules guarantee fair representation to cohesive voter groups.

Before

Monroe was known to satisfy Droop-JR only when committee size divides voter count.

Now

Monroe satisfies Droop-JR universally. When k + 1 divides n, Droop Monroe satisfies Droop-PJR+.

Why it matters
Settles open representation entries in arXiv:2508.00811.
The idea
Unsatisfied voter groups exceeding Droop quotas allow score-increasing swaps.
11 supporting theorems
  • monroe_exists_heavyCounting step: if (W, π) is Hare-valid and |S| > n/(k+1), then some c ∈ W satisfies |π⁻¹(c)| < min(|π⁻¹(c)|, |S|) + |π⁻¹(c) ∩ S|.
  • assignment_exchangeGeneric exchange step: for an assignment π of voters to β, a set S of voters each satisfied by c′ but not by π, and the renaming c ↦ c′…
  • monroe_exchangeExchange step: replacing c ∈ W by c ∉ W approved by all of S (no member of S being satisfied by π) yields a Hare-valid assignment whose…
  • monroe_load_comp_permPrecomposing an assignment with a permutation of the voters does not change how many voters each candidate receives.
  • monroe_ceil_le_floor_succ⌈n/k⌉ ≤ ⌊n/k⌋ + 1, written (n + k - 1)/k ≤ n/k + 1, for all natural n, k.
  • monroe_perm_swap_finsetsFor disjoint finite sets P, Q of equal size there is a permutation sending P into Q, Q into P, and fixing everything else.
  • droop_monroe_satisfies_droop_pjr_plusIf k + 1 divides n, every committee selected by the Droop Monroe rule satisfies Droop-PJR+. This settles the PJR+ entry for Droop Monroe…
  • droop_monroe_unsatisfied_groupLemma 2 of arXiv:2508.00811: if (k+1) divides n and π is an optimal Droop-valid assignment for W, no group of more than n/(k+1) voters,…
  • droop_monroe_tie_violates_droop_ejr_plus_fjrWith ties, the Droop Monroe rule can output a committee violating Droop-EJR+ and Droop-FJR even when k + 1 divides n: n = 3, k = 2,…
  • droop_monroe_exchangeExchange step for Droop assignments: swapping c₀ ∈ W for c ∉ W approved by all of S (no member of S satisfied) gives a Droop-valid…
  • droop_monroe_score_leA Droop-valid assignment scores at most n - ⌊n/(k+1)⌋, since the dummy voters are unsatisfied.

Disproved

Droop-FJR does not imply BFJR in temporal voting

Fair representation in each round does not guarantee balanced representation over time.

Before

Whether Droop-FJR implies BFJR in temporal voting was open.

Now

Droop-FJR does not imply BFJR in a four-voter six-round instance.

Why it matters
Answers the question in Appendix A.3 of arXiv:2505.22513 negatively.
The idea
Electing one candidate each round satisfies Droop-FJR but breaches temporal balance.
3 supporting theorems
  • tfjr_countIn the counterexample, every nonempty group either contains voter 2 or 3, or has a member who approves nothing in at least ⌈(|T|+1)|S|/4⌉…
  • tfjr_avoidAny two rounds out of six miss some round among 0-2 and some round among 3-5 (checked by decide).
  • tfjr_droop_le⌈(t+1)s/n⌉ - 1 ≤ t whenever s ≤ n.

Proved

Geometric Plackett–Luce choice model has linear entropy

The randomness of rankings under geometric preferences grows only linearly with candidate count.

Before

Entropy O(m) was conjectured for all geometric decay parameters in (0, 1).

Now

Entropy is at most C(φ)·m with C(φ) = log(1/(1 − φ)) + log(1/φ)·φ/(1 − φ)².

Why it matters
Proves the average-case sorting conjecture from AAAI 2021.
The idea
Bounded entropy at each choice step sums linearly by the chain rule.

Proved

Quota and population monotonicity conflict at a common house size

Fair legislative seat allocation cannot simultaneously match population shares and prevent paradoxes.

Before

Quota and population monotonicity were known incompatible across differing house sizes.

Now

Incompatibility holds at a fixed house size of 8 across twelve population profiles.

Why it matters
Strengthens the four-state apportionment impossibility to a single house size.
The idea
A pruned search eliminates all 13,824 quota-compliant assignments.

Matching & Market Design

Hollow-Shell blocking pairs were bounded by ⌊(n−1)²/4⌋. Safe manipulation was demonstrated with three known agents.

Partial

Hollow-Shell market has at most ⌊(n−1)²/4⌋ blocking pairs

Circular marriage markets with conflicting preferences produce at most a quadratic number of unstable pairs.

Before

The Shield-Core conjecture claimed maximum blocking pairs equal ⌊(n−1)²/4⌋.

Now

Every matching in the Hollow-Shell market C_n has at most ⌊(n−1)²/4⌋ blocking pairs.

Why it matters
Settles the upper half of the Shield-Core conjecture from arXiv:2609.17418.
The idea
Cutting circular arcs bounds nested blocking pairs by k(n − 1 − k) ≤ ⌊(n−1)²/4⌋.
7 supporting theorems
  • perm_nesting_boundFor a permutation s of {0, ..., n-1} with k positions a such that s(a) < a: the number of pairs (a, b) with a < b and s(b) < s(a) and a, b…
  • perm_cross_inv_sumFor a permutation s of {0, ..., n-1}, let A be the positions a with s(a) < a. The number of pairs (a, b) with a in A, b not in A, b < a…
  • perm_card_left_gt_leFor a permutation s of {0, ..., n-1} and a position x with x <= s(x), the number of i < x with s(i) > s(x) is at most the number of j > x…
  • perm_inv_left_addFor a permutation s of {0, ..., n-1} and a position g, the number of x < g with s(x) > s(g), plus s(g), equals the number of x > g with…
  • perm_gap_sumFor a permutation s of {0, ..., n-1}, the number of pairs (a, b) with s(b) < a < b, plus the number of positions b with s(b) < b, plus the…
  • perm_card_val_ltFor a permutation s of {0, ..., n-1} and c in {0, ..., n-1}, exactly c elements x have s(x) < c.
  • cyclic_offset_eq_iteFor i, j in {0, ..., n-1}, the cyclic offset (j - i) mod n equals j - i when i <= j and j + n - i otherwise.

Disproved

Deferred acceptance is safely manipulable with knowledge of three agents

In matching markets, a participant knowing three others' preferences can safely cheat.

Before

It was conjectured that safe manipulation requires knowing at least five agents.

Now

In a 3×3 market, an agent knowing three agents safely manipulates deferred acceptance.

Why it matters
Disproves the conjecture in arXiv:2502.18805 that safe manipulation requires five agents.
The idea
An explicit 3×3 profile yields profitable manipulation without risk of worse matches.

Elementary Number Theory

Weakly consecutive sequences of prime-power length begin or end with 1.

Partial

Weakly consecutive sequences of prime-power length begin or end with 1

Permutations with repeating divisibility patterns must place 1 at an end for prime powers.

Before

Every weakly consecutive sequence was conjectured to begin or end with 1.

Now

The conjecture holds for prime powers: end terms must divide length and be coprime.

Why it matters
Proves the prime-power case of Conjecture 5.2 in arXiv:2401.09497.
The idea
Residue counting forces 1 to an end position when length is a prime power.
8 supporting theorems

Combinatorial Games

Catch-Up draws for N up to 11 and parity results were formalized.

Formalized

Catch-Up draws for N up to 11 and parity theorems are formalized

Calculations determining when an alternating-lead number game ends in a tie were checked.

Before

Catch-Up was computed up to N = 20, observing draws only for even triangular sums.

What is checked

Lean checks that odd sums yield no draws, and verifies draws on {1, …, N} for N = 3, 4, 7, 8, 11.

Why it matters
Formally checks the computations and parity characterization of Catch-Up.
The idea
A pruned search proven equivalent to minimax checks outcomes in the kernel.
15 supporting theorems
  • catch_up_value_icc_threeThe game value of Catch-Up played on the interval Finset.Icc 1 3 is CatchUpOutcome.draw.
  • catch_up_value_icc_fourCatch-Up on {1, 2, 3, 4} is a draw under optimal play (the case N = 4 of the Catch-Up conjecture), evaluated by the Lean kernel.
  • catch_up_value_icc_sevenCatch-Up on {1, ..., 7} is a draw under optimal play (the case N = 7 of the Catch-Up conjecture), evaluated by the Lean kernel.
  • catch_up_value_icc_eightCatch-Up on {1, ..., 8} is a draw under optimal play (the case N = 8 of the Catch-Up conjecture), evaluated by the Lean kernel.
  • catch_up_value_ne_draw_of_odd_sumFor any finite set S of natural numbers whose sum is odd, the game value catch_up_value S is not a draw.
  • catch_up_value_icc_ne_draw_of_odd_triangularFor any natural number N such that N(N+1)/2 is odd, catch_up_value (Finset.Icc 1 N) ≠ CatchUpOutcome.draw.
  • catch_up_value_pairFor any natural numbers x < y, the game value of Catch-Up played on the two-element set {x, y} is CatchUpOutcome.win.
  • catch_up_value_icc_twoThe game value of Catch-Up played on the interval Finset.Icc 1 2 = {1, 2} is CatchUpOutcome.win.
  • catch_up_value_triple_win_of_sum_ltFor any natural numbers x < y < z such that x + y < z, the game value of Catch-Up played on the three-element set {x, y, z} is…
  • catch_up_value_triple_win_of_sum_gtFor any natural numbers x < y < z such that x + y > z, the game value of Catch-Up played on the three-element set {x, y, z} is…
  • catch_up_value_triple_drawFor any natural numbers x < y < z such that x + y = z, the game value of Catch-Up played on the three-element set {x, y, z} is…
  • catch_up_value_aux_singletonIn a Catch-Up position with a single remaining piece x, current score s_me, and opponent score s_opp, the game value for the mover is win…
  • catch_up_value_aux_emptyIn a Catch-Up position with an empty set of remaining pieces, the game value for the mover is a win if the mover's score is strictly…
  • catch_up_value_aux_loss_of_sum_ltIn a Catch-Up position, if the mover's score plus the sum of all remaining numbers is strictly less than the opponent's score, then the…
  • catch_up_value_aux_ne_draw_of_odd_sumIn Catch-Up, if the sum of remaining piece values and player scores is odd, the mover cannot achieve a draw.

Still open

Terms

APS
AnyPrice share: the value an agent can secure against every price vector summing to 1, buying any bundle within its entitlement.
BFJR
BFJR: a temporal representation axiom, stronger than Droop-FJR
EEF1
Epistemic EF1: for each agent, the items it does not hold can be redistributed among the others so that the agent is EF1 towards all of them.
EF1
Envy-free up to one item: any envy disappears once some single item is removed (a good from the envied bundle, or a chore from the envious agent's own).
EFX
Envy-free up to any item: envy disappears whichever single item is removed (any good from the envied bundle, or any chore from the envious agent's own).
EJR
Extended justified representation: in a group of ℓ·n/k voters who agree on ℓ candidates, some single member approves at least ℓ committee members.
FJR
Fully justified representation: a strengthening of EJR to groups that only partly agree, each member approving enough of a common set of candidates.
JR
Justified representation: every group of at least n/k voters approving a common candidate has a member who approves some committee member. Droop versions use n/(k + 1) in place of n/k.
MMS
Maximin share: the best value an agent can guarantee by splitting all items into n bundles and receiving the worst one.
MXS
Minimum EFX share: the least value an agent receives in any allocation in which it is EFX towards every other agent.
OPT
The optimum: the best value achievable, used as the benchmark.
PJR
Proportional justified representation: a group of ℓ·n/k voters who agree on ℓ candidates approves, between its members, at least ℓ committee members.
PJR+
PJR+: like PJR, but triggered by any unelected candidate the whole group approves, which makes it checkable in polynomial time.
PMMS
Pairwise maximin share: for every two agents, re-splitting their combined items into two bundles could not give either one a better worst bundle.
PROP1
Proportional up to one item: proportionality holds once a single item is added to the agent's bundle (goods) or removed from it (chores).
PROPm
Proportional up to the maximin item: an agent's bundle, plus the largest of the least valuable items in the other agents' bundles, reaches its proportional share.
PROPX
Proportional up to any item: for chores, removing any single chore from an agent's bundle brings its cost down to its proportional share.

Written by a model (gemini-3.8-flash) from the week's Lean-verified results. Every declaration named here was checked by Lean; this summary is a reading aid and is not itself machine-checked.