Auction.ReserveSecondPrice.clearingPrice_eq_max_reserve_excluding_of_allocation_eq_some
theoremverifiedformalizationimported Lean
When bidder i receives the item, the clearing price is the maximum of the reserve and the highest bid excluding i.
Statement
set_option autoImplicit true in set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in variable {I : Type*} [Fintype I] [Nontrivial I] [DecidableEq I] in variable {U : Type*} [AddCommGroup U] [LinearOrder U] [IsOrderedAddMonoid U] in omit [AddCommGroup U] [IsOrderedAddMonoid U] in lemma Auction.ReserveSecondPrice.clearingPrice_eq_max_reserve_excluding_of_allocation_eq_some {reserve : U} {b : I → U} {i : I} (halloc : allocation reserve b = some i) : clearingPrice reserve b = max reserve (Auction.maxBidExcluding b i)
- Formalizes
- EconCSLib, `Auction.ReserveSecondPrice.clearingPrice_eq_max_reserve_excluding_of_allocation_eq_some`
- Lean proof
- By xbei (from the file's git history), from github.com/gametheoryinlean/EconCSLib at
1a88f809b538(Copyright (c) 2026 EconCSLib contributors. All rights reserved, Apache-2.0). Compiled here against leanprover/lean4:v4.33.1, Mathlib v4.33.1; written for leanprover/lean4:v4.30.0.Auction.ReserveSecondPrice.clearingPrice_eq_max_reserve_excluding_of_allocation_eq_some← Auction.ReserveSecondPrice.clearingPrice_eq_max_reserve_excluding_of_allocation_eq_some (EconCSLib/MechanismDesign/Auction/ReserveVickrey.lean:167): verbatim
- Verified
- 08 Oct 2026
- Axioms
Classical.choiceQuot.soundpropext- Built on 6
- Auction.maxBidExcludingThe highest bid excluding bidder
i. - Auction.ReserveSecondPrice.allocationThe item is sold exactly when the winning bid meets the reserve.
- Auction.ReserveSecondPrice.clearingPriceThe price paid by the winner: the maximum of the reserve and the second price.
- Auction.SecondPrice.secondPriceThe second price: the highest bid among all bidders other than the winner.
- Auction.SecondPrice.winnerThe winner of the second-price auction: the bidder with the highest bid. Uses
Auction.argmaxBidfrom… - Auction.ReserveSecondPrice.winner_eq_of_allocation_eq_someIf bidder
iis allocated the item, theniis the second-price winner.
- Auction.maxBidExcludingThe highest bid excluding bidder
- Used by 1
- Auction.ReserveSecondPrice.valuation_is_dominantTruthful bidding dominates any other bid in the reserve second-price auction.
Lean source view module on GitHub
Choose a tactic — a marked line — to see the goals Lean had before and after it, as in Lean’s infoview. Step with ← → or j k.
set_option autoImplicit true inset_option relaxedAutoImplicit true invariable {I : Type*} [Fintype I] [Nontrivial I] [DecidableEq I] invariable {U : Type*} [AddCommGroup U] [LinearOrder U] [IsOrderedAddMonoid U] inomit [AddCommGroup U] [IsOrderedAddMonoid U] in/-- When bidder `i` receives the item, the clearing price is the maximum of the reserve and the highest bid excluding `i`. -/lemma Auction.ReserveSecondPrice.clearingPrice_eq_max_reserve_excluding_of_allocation_eq_some {reserve : U} {b : I → U} {i : I} (halloc : allocation reserve b = some i) : clearingPrice reserve b = max reserve (Auction.maxBidExcluding b i) := by have hwinner : SecondPrice.winner b = i := winner_eq_of_allocation_eq_some halloc simp [clearingPrice, SecondPrice.secondPrice, hwinner]