BayesianSingleItemAuction.IsFeasible
defimported Lean
Feasibility for a probabilistic single-item auction: * each winning probability lies in [0,1] * the total allocation probability is at most 1
Statement
set_option autoImplicit true in set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in open BayesianSingleItemAuction in open MeasureTheory in variable {I : Type*} in def BayesianSingleItemAuction.IsFeasible [Fintype I] (A : BayesianSingleItemAuction I) : Prop
- Defined in
- EconCSLib, `BayesianSingleItemAuction.IsFeasible`
- Lean proof
- By xbei (from the file's git history), from github.com/gametheoryinlean/EconCSLib at
1a88f809b538(Copyright (c) 2026 EconCSLib contributors. All rights reserved, Apache-2.0). Compiled here against leanprover/lean4:v4.33.1, Mathlib v4.33.1; written for leanprover/lean4:v4.30.0.BayesianSingleItemAuction.IsFeasible← BayesianSingleItemAuction.IsFeasible (EconCSLib/MechanismDesign/Auction/BayesianSingleItem.lean:167): verbatim
- Verified
- 08 Oct 2026
- Axioms
- none listed
- Built on 7
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.instCoeDirectBayesianMechanismWithTransfersRealForallBayesianSingleItemAuction.instCoeDirectBayesianMechanismWithTransfersRealForall
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.RespectsSingleItemCapacityThe allocation rule respects the single-item probability budget.
- BayesianSingleItemAuctionA direct Bayesian single-item auction with scalar private types and probabilistic allocation. The allocation rule returns a function…
- SingleParameterMechanism.IsAllocFeasibleAllocation feasibility: each agent's allocation lies in
[0, 1]. RequiresZero R,One R, andLE R(e.g., any linearly ordered field). - BayesianSingleItemAuction.profileInsert_selfThe inserted coordinate is the inserted value.
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.profileInsert_of_neOther coordinates come from the opponent profile.
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.instIsProbabilityMeasureOpponentTypeProfileOpponentPriorBayesianSingleItemAuction.instIsProbabilityMeasureOpponentTypeProfileOpponentPrior
- Used by 26
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.IsRegularMyersonOptimalICIRAuctionRegular Myerson optimality among feasible IC/IR mechanisms.
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.RegularMyersonICIRAnalyticAssumptions.candidate_interim_virtual_surplus_density_integrableBayesianSingleItemAuction.RegularMyersonICIRAnalyticAssumptions.candidate_interim_virtual_surplus_density_integrable
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.isRevenueUpperBounded_of_isRevenueComparableBayesianSingleItemAuction.isRevenueUpperBounded_of_isRevenueComparable
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.IsRegularMyersonOptimalICIRAuction.isFeasibleBayesianSingleItemAuction.IsRegularMyersonOptimalICIRAuction.isFeasible
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingAuction_isFeasibleThe constructed auction is feasible.
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.hasIntegrableInterimAllocation_of_isFeasible_of_aestronglyMeasurableFeasibility and a.e. strong measurability imply allocation integrability.
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.RegularMyersonICIRAnalyticAssumptions.candidate_allocation_survival_integrableBayesianSingleItemAuction.RegularMyersonICIRAnalyticAssumptions.candidate_allocation_survival_integrable
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.interimAllocProb_mem_Icc_of_isFeasibleFeasible interim allocation probabilities lie in
[0, 1]. - BayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingAuction_isRevenueComparableBayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingAuction_isRevenueComparable
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.interimAllocProb_le_one_of_isFeasibleFeasible auctions have interim allocation probabilities at most
1. - BayesianSingleItemAuction.IsRegularMyersonOptimalICIRAuction.isIncentiveCompatibleBayesianSingleItemAuction.IsRegularMyersonOptimalICIRAuction.isIncentiveCompatible
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.expectedSellerRevenueInEnvironment_le_virtualSurplusMaximizingAuction_of_revenueUpperBoundedBayesianSingleItemAuction.expectedSellerRevenueInEnvironment_le_virtualSurplusMaximizingAuction_of_revenueUpperBounded
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.expectedSellerRevenueInEnvironment_le_virtualSurplusMaximizingAuctionBayesianSingleItemAuction.expectedSellerRevenueInEnvironment_le_virtualSurplusMaximizingAuction
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.isRevenueComparable_of_myersonPaymentIdentity_of_isDSIC_of_isZeroNormalizedBayesianSingleItemAuction.isRevenueComparable_of_myersonPaymentIdentity_of_isDSIC_of_isZeroNormalized
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.RegularMyersonICIRAnalyticAssumptionsAnalytic assumptions for MSZ 12.59.
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.hasNonnegativeInterimAllocationIntegralOnSupport_of_isFeasibleFeasibility gives nonnegative envelope increments on the support.
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.interimAllocProb_nonneg_of_isFeasibleFeasible auctions have nonnegative interim allocation probabilities.
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.IsFeasible.isSingleItemAllocationRuleAuction feasibility gives allocation-rule feasibility.
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.IsRevenueComparableFeasible candidates with revenue equal to virtual surplus.
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.expectedVirtualSurplus_le_virtualSurplusMaximizingAuction_of_isFeasibleBayesianSingleItemAuction.expectedVirtualSurplus_le_virtualSurplusMaximizingAuction_of_isFeasible
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.IsRegularMyersonOptimalICIRAuction.isIndividuallyRationalOnSupportBayesianSingleItemAuction.IsRegularMyersonOptimalICIRAuction.isIndividuallyRationalOnSupport
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.IsRevenueUpperBoundedFeasible candidates with revenue bounded by virtual surplus.
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.IsRegularMyersonOptimalICIRAuction.isExpectedSellerRevenueOptimalBayesianSingleItemAuction.IsRegularMyersonOptimalICIRAuction.isExpectedSellerRevenueOptimal
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.IsFeasibleICIRIntegrableFeasible IC/IR candidates with integrable virtual surplus.
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.IsRegularMyersonOptimalICIRAuction.isVirtualSurplusOptimalAllocationRuleBayesianSingleItemAuction.IsRegularMyersonOptimalICIRAuction.isVirtualSurplusOptimalAllocationRule
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.RegularMyersonICIRAnalyticAssumptions.candidate_envelope_analyticBayesianSingleItemAuction.RegularMyersonICIRAnalyticAssumptions.candidate_envelope_analytic
Lean source view module on GitHub
set_option autoImplicit true in set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in open BayesianSingleItemAuction in open MeasureTheory in variable {I : Type*} in /-- Feasibility for a probabilistic single-item auction: * each winning probability lies in `[0,1]` * the total allocation probability is at most `1` -/ def BayesianSingleItemAuction.IsFeasible [Fintype I] (A : BayesianSingleItemAuction I) : Prop := A.IsAllocFeasible ∧ A.RespectsSingleItemCapacity