BayesianSingleItemAuction.RegularMyersonICIRAnalyticAssumptions.candidate_allocation_survival_integrable
theoremverifiedformalizationimported Lean
BayesianSingleItemAuction.RegularMyersonICIRAnalyticAssumptions.candidate_allocation_survival_integrable
Statement
set_option autoImplicit true in set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in open BayesianSingleItemAuction in open scoped BigOperators in open MeasureTheory in variable {I : Type*} in theorem BayesianSingleItemAuction.RegularMyersonICIRAnalyticAssumptions.candidate_allocation_survival_integrable [Fintype I] [Nontrivial I] [DecidableEq I] [LinearOrder I] {A : BayesianSingleItemAuction I} (h : A.RegularMyersonICIRAnalyticAssumptions) (B : BayesianSingleItemAuction I) (_hfeas : B.IsFeasible) (hIC : B.IsIncentiveCompatible) (_hIR : B.IsIndividuallyRationalOnSupport) : ∀ i : I, IntervalIntegrable (fun v => B.interimAllocProb i v * (1 - (A.typeData.cdf i).cdf v)) volume 0 (A.typeData.omega i)
- Formalizes
- EconCSLib, `BayesianSingleItemAuction.RegularMyersonICIRAnalyticAssumptions.candidate_allocation_survival_integrable`
- Lean proof
- By xbei (from the file's git history), from github.com/gametheoryinlean/EconCSLib at
1a88f809b538(Copyright (c) 2026 EconCSLib contributors. All rights reserved, Apache-2.0). Compiled here against leanprover/lean4:v4.33.1, Mathlib v4.33.1; written for leanprover/lean4:v4.30.0.BayesianSingleItemAuction.RegularMyersonICIRAnalyticAssumptions.candidate_allocation_survival_integrable← BayesianSingleItemAuction.RegularMyersonICIRAnalyticAssumptions.candidate_allocation_survival_integrable (EconCSLib/MechanismDesign/Auction/OptimalSingleItem.lean:2440): verbatim
- Verified
- 08 Oct 2026
- Axioms
Classical.choiceQuot.soundpropext- Built on 35
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingAuction_toSingleParameterMechanismBayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingAuction_toSingleParameterMechanism
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.IsIndividuallyRationalOnSupportInterim individual rationality on
[0, ωᵢ]. - BayesianSingleItemAuction.productPrior_isProbabilityMeasureBayesianSingleItemAuction.productPrior_isProbabilityMeasure
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.interimAllocProbInterim allocation probability
q_i(z_i). - BayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingPaymentRule_eqBayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingPaymentRule_eq
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingAuction_paymentRuleBayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingAuction_paymentRule
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingAuction_toDirectBayesianMechanismWithTransfersBayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingAuction_toDirectBayesianMechanismWithTransfers
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingMechanism_eq_withMyersonPaymentBayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingMechanism_eq_withMyersonPayment
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingMechanism_paymentRuleBayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingMechanism_paymentRule
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.hasIntervalIntegrableInterimAllocation_of_isIncentiveCompatibleIC gives global interval integrability of
q_i. - BayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingAuction_allocationRuleBayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingAuction_allocationRule
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.opponentProductPrior_isProbabilityMeasureBayesianSingleItemAuction.opponentProductPrior_isProbabilityMeasure
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.instCoeDirectBayesianMechanismWithTransfersRealForallBayesianSingleItemAuction.instCoeDirectBayesianMechanismWithTransfersRealForall
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.IsFeasibleFeasibility for a probabilistic single-item auction: * each winning probability lies in
[0,1]* the total allocation probability is at… - BayesianSingleItemAuction.profileSplitMeasurableEquiv_apply_sndBayesianSingleItemAuction.profileSplitMeasurableEquiv_apply_snd
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.profileSplitMeasurableEquiv_symm_applyBayesianSingleItemAuction.profileSplitMeasurableEquiv_symm_apply
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.expectedSellerRevenueInEnvironment_selfBayesianSingleItemAuction.expectedSellerRevenueInEnvironment_self
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingMechanism_allocationRuleBayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingMechanism_allocationRule
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.IsIncentiveCompatibleInterim incentive compatibility.
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingAuction_opponentPriorBayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingAuction_opponentPrior
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.profileSplitMeasurableEquiv_apply_fstBayesianSingleItemAuction.profileSplitMeasurableEquiv_apply_fst
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.RegularMyersonICIRAnalyticAssumptionsAnalytic assumptions for MSZ 12.59.
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingAuction_priorBayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingAuction_prior
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.EnvelopeVirtualSurplusEnvironmentAssumptionsEnvironment-level analytic assumptions for the envelope/virtual-surplus comparison.
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingAuction_hasSameSellingEnvironmentBayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingAuction_hasSameSellingEnvironment
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingAuction_typeDataBayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingAuction_typeData
- BayesianSingleItemAuctionA direct Bayesian single-item auction with scalar private types and probabilistic allocation. The allocation rule returns a function…
- TypeCDFA scalar type distribution on the interval
[0, ω], recorded by its CDF. - ContinuousTypeProfileAgent-specific continuous private-value data.
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.profileInsert_selfThe inserted coordinate is the inserted value.
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.profileInsert_of_neOther coordinates come from the opponent profile.
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.reportProfile_selfThe inserted coordinate is
zᵢ. - BayesianSingleItemAuction.reportProfile_of_neOther coordinates come from the opponent profile.
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.update_reportProfile_selfUpdating coordinate
ireplaces the inserted report. - BayesianSingleItemAuction.instIsProbabilityMeasureOpponentTypeProfileOpponentPriorBayesianSingleItemAuction.instIsProbabilityMeasureOpponentTypeProfileOpponentPrior
- Used by 1
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.RegularMyersonICIRAnalyticAssumptions.candidate_envelope_analyticBayesianSingleItemAuction.RegularMyersonICIRAnalyticAssumptions.candidate_envelope_analytic
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set_option autoImplicit true inset_option relaxedAutoImplicit true inopen BayesianSingleItemAuction inopen scoped BigOperators inopen MeasureTheory invariable {I : Type*} intheorem BayesianSingleItemAuction.RegularMyersonICIRAnalyticAssumptions.candidate_allocation_survival_integrable [Fintype I] [Nontrivial I] [DecidableEq I] [LinearOrder I] {A : BayesianSingleItemAuction I} (h : A.RegularMyersonICIRAnalyticAssumptions) (B : BayesianSingleItemAuction I) (_hfeas : B.IsFeasible) (hIC : B.IsIncentiveCompatible) (_hIR : B.IsIndividuallyRationalOnSupport) : ∀ i : I, IntervalIntegrable (fun v => B.interimAllocProb i v * (1 - (A.typeData.cdf i).cdf v)) volume 0 (A.typeData.omega i) := by intro i exact (B.hasIntervalIntegrableInterimAllocation_of_isIncentiveCompatible hIC i 0 (A.typeData.omega i)).mul_continuousOn (continuousOn_const.sub (h.envelope_environment.cdf_absolutelyContinuous i).continuousOn)