BayesianSingleItemAuction.RespectsSingleItemCapacity
defimported Lean
The allocation rule respects the single-item probability budget.
Statement
set_option autoImplicit true in set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in open MeasureTheory in variable {I : Type*} in def BayesianSingleItemAuction.RespectsSingleItemCapacity [Fintype I] (A : BayesianSingleItemAuction I) : Prop
- Defined in
- EconCSLib, `BayesianSingleItemAuction.RespectsSingleItemCapacity`
- Lean proof
- By xbei (from the file's git history), from github.com/gametheoryinlean/EconCSLib at
1a88f809b538(Copyright (c) 2026 EconCSLib contributors. All rights reserved, Apache-2.0). Compiled here against leanprover/lean4:v4.33.1, Mathlib v4.33.1; written for leanprover/lean4:v4.30.0.BayesianSingleItemAuction.RespectsSingleItemCapacity← BayesianSingleItemAuction.RespectsSingleItemCapacity (EconCSLib/MechanismDesign/Auction/BayesianSingleItem.lean:160): verbatim
- Verified
- 08 Oct 2026
- Axioms
- none listed
- Built on 7
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.instCoeDirectBayesianMechanismWithTransfersRealForallBayesianSingleItemAuction.instCoeDirectBayesianMechanismWithTransfersRealForall
- BayesianSingleItemAuctionA direct Bayesian single-item auction with scalar private types and probabilistic allocation. The allocation rule returns a function…
- MechanismWithTransfersA mechanism with monetary transfers. -
I— agents -T— report/type space of each agent -A— allocation space -P— payment space… - SingleParameterMechanismA single-parameter mechanism. Each agent
ihas a single private typeθ_i : R(their "value per unit"). The allocation gives each agent… - BayesianSingleItemAuction.profileInsert_selfThe inserted coordinate is the inserted value.
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.profileInsert_of_neOther coordinates come from the opponent profile.
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.instIsProbabilityMeasureOpponentTypeProfileOpponentPriorBayesianSingleItemAuction.instIsProbabilityMeasureOpponentTypeProfileOpponentPrior
- Used by 7
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingAuction_isFeasibleThe constructed auction is feasible.
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.hasIntegrableInterimAllocation_of_isFeasible_of_aestronglyMeasurableFeasibility and a.e. strong measurability imply allocation integrability.
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingAuction_hasIntegrableInterimObjects_of_aestronglyMeasurableOnce the constructed allocation and payment integrands are measurable, boundedness gives interim integrability for the constructed auction.
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.IsFeasibleFeasibility for a probabilistic single-item auction: * each winning probability lies in
[0,1]* the total allocation probability is at… - BayesianSingleItemAuction.interimAllocProb_le_one_of_isFeasibleFeasible auctions have interim allocation probabilities at most
1. - BayesianSingleItemAuction.interimAllocProb_nonneg_of_isFeasibleFeasible auctions have nonnegative interim allocation probabilities.
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.IsFeasible.isSingleItemAllocationRuleAuction feasibility gives allocation-rule feasibility.
Lean source view module on GitHub
set_option autoImplicit true in set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in open MeasureTheory in variable {I : Type*} in /-- The allocation rule respects the single-item probability budget. -/ def BayesianSingleItemAuction.RespectsSingleItemCapacity [Fintype I] (A : BayesianSingleItemAuction I) : Prop := ∀ t : ∀ _ : I, ℝ, (∑ i, A.allocationRule t i) ≤ 1