AFTD Auto-Formalizing Theoretical Domains

BayesianSingleItemAuction.RegularMyersonICIRAnalyticAssumptions

structureimported Lean

Analytic assumptions for MSZ 12.59.

Statement

set_option autoImplicit true in
set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in
open BayesianSingleItemAuction in
open scoped BigOperators in
open MeasureTheory in
variable {I : Type*} in
structure BayesianSingleItemAuction.RegularMyersonICIRAnalyticAssumptions
    [Fintype I] [Nontrivial I] [DecidableEq I] [LinearOrder I]
    (A : BayesianSingleItemAuction I) : Prop
Defined in
EconCSLib, `BayesianSingleItemAuction.RegularMyersonICIRAnalyticAssumptions`
Lean proof
By xbei (from the file's git history), from github.com/gametheoryinlean/EconCSLib at 1a88f809b538 (Copyright (c) 2026 EconCSLib contributors. All rights reserved, Apache-2.0). Compiled here against leanprover/lean4:v4.33.1, Mathlib v4.33.1; written for leanprover/lean4:v4.30.0.
Verified
08 Oct 2026
Axioms
none listed
Built on 37
Used by 4

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set_option autoImplicit true in
set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in
open BayesianSingleItemAuction in
open scoped BigOperators in
open MeasureTheory in
variable {I : Type*} in
/-- Analytic assumptions for MSZ 12.59. -/
structure BayesianSingleItemAuction.RegularMyersonICIRAnalyticAssumptions
    [Fintype I] [Nontrivial I] [DecidableEq I] [LinearOrder I]
    (A : BayesianSingleItemAuction I) : Prop where
  independent_type_priors :
    A.HasIndependentTypePriors
  envelope_environment :
    A.EnvelopeVirtualSurplusEnvironmentAssumptions
  candidate_payment_profileSplit_integrable :
    ∀ B : BayesianSingleItemAuction I,
      B.IsFeasible →
        B.IsIncentiveCompatible →
          B.IsIndividuallyRationalOnSupport →
            ∀ i : I,
              Integrable
                (fun p : ℝ × OpponentTypeProfile I i =>
                  B.paymentRule (reportProfile i p.1 p.2) i)
                ((A.typeMeasure i).prod (B.opponentPrior i))
  candidate_virtual_surplus_profileSplit_integrable :
    ∀ B : BayesianSingleItemAuction I,
      B.IsFeasible →
        B.IsIncentiveCompatible →
          B.IsIndividuallyRationalOnSupport →
            ∀ i : I,
              Integrable
                (fun p : ℝ × OpponentTypeProfile I i =>
                  B.allocationRule (reportProfile i p.1 p.2) i * A.virtualValue i p.1)
                ((A.typeMeasure i).prod (B.opponentPrior i))
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