BayesianSingleItemAuction.interimAllocProb_le_one_of_isFeasible
theoremverifiedformalizationimported Lean
Feasible auctions have interim allocation probabilities at most 1.
Statement
set_option autoImplicit true in set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in open BayesianSingleItemAuction in open MeasureTheory in variable {I : Type*} in theorem BayesianSingleItemAuction.interimAllocProb_le_one_of_isFeasible [Fintype I] (A : BayesianSingleItemAuction I) (hfeas : A.IsFeasible) (hint : A.HasIntegrableInterimAllocation) (i : I) (z_i : ℝ) : A.interimAllocProb i z_i ≤ 1
- Formalizes
- EconCSLib, `BayesianSingleItemAuction.interimAllocProb_le_one_of_isFeasible`
- Lean proof
- By xbei (from the file's git history), from github.com/gametheoryinlean/EconCSLib at
1a88f809b538(Copyright (c) 2026 EconCSLib contributors. All rights reserved, Apache-2.0). Compiled here against leanprover/lean4:v4.33.1, Mathlib v4.33.1; written for leanprover/lean4:v4.30.0.BayesianSingleItemAuction.interimAllocProb_le_one_of_isFeasible← BayesianSingleItemAuction.interimAllocProb_le_one_of_isFeasible (EconCSLib/MechanismDesign/Auction/BayesianSingleItem.lean:862): verbatim
- Verified
- 08 Oct 2026
- Axioms
Classical.choiceQuot.soundpropext- Built on 22
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.productPrior_isProbabilityMeasureBayesianSingleItemAuction.productPrior_isProbabilityMeasure
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.interimAllocProbInterim allocation probability
q_i(z_i). - BayesianSingleItemAuction.HasIntegrableInterimAllocationAllocation integrands are integrable.
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.opponentProductPrior_isProbabilityMeasureBayesianSingleItemAuction.opponentProductPrior_isProbabilityMeasure
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.instCoeDirectBayesianMechanismWithTransfersRealForallBayesianSingleItemAuction.instCoeDirectBayesianMechanismWithTransfersRealForall
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.IsFeasibleFeasibility for a probabilistic single-item auction: * each winning probability lies in
[0,1]* the total allocation probability is at… - BayesianSingleItemAuction.profileSplitMeasurableEquiv_apply_sndBayesianSingleItemAuction.profileSplitMeasurableEquiv_apply_snd
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.profileSplitMeasurableEquiv_symm_applyBayesianSingleItemAuction.profileSplitMeasurableEquiv_symm_apply
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.profileSplitMeasurableEquiv_apply_fstBayesianSingleItemAuction.profileSplitMeasurableEquiv_apply_fst
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.RespectsSingleItemCapacityThe allocation rule respects the single-item probability budget.
- BayesianSingleItemAuctionA direct Bayesian single-item auction with scalar private types and probabilistic allocation. The allocation rule returns a function…
- OpponentTypeProfileOpponent type profiles for real-valued auction types.
- MechanismWithTransfersA mechanism with monetary transfers. -
I— agents -T— report/type space of each agent -A— allocation space -P— payment space… - SingleParameterMechanismA single-parameter mechanism. Each agent
ihas a single private typeθ_i : R(their "value per unit"). The allocation gives each agent… - BayesianSingleItemAuction.reportProfileThe reported type profile obtained by combining
zᵢwith an opponent profilet₋ᵢ. - BayesianSingleItemAuction.instIsProbabilityMeasureOpponentTypeProfileOpponentPriorBayesianSingleItemAuction.instIsProbabilityMeasureOpponentTypeProfileOpponentPrior
- SingleParameterMechanism.IsAllocFeasibleAllocation feasibility: each agent's allocation lies in
[0, 1]. RequiresZero R,One R, andLE R(e.g., any linearly ordered field). - BayesianSingleItemAuction.profileInsert_selfThe inserted coordinate is the inserted value.
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.profileInsert_of_neOther coordinates come from the opponent profile.
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.reportProfile_selfThe inserted coordinate is
zᵢ. - BayesianSingleItemAuction.reportProfile_of_neOther coordinates come from the opponent profile.
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.update_reportProfile_selfUpdating coordinate
ireplaces the inserted report.
- Used by 1
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.interimAllocProb_mem_Icc_of_isFeasibleFeasible interim allocation probabilities lie in
[0, 1].
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.interimAllocProb_mem_Icc_of_isFeasibleFeasible interim allocation probabilities lie in
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set_option autoImplicit true inset_option relaxedAutoImplicit true inopen BayesianSingleItemAuction inopen MeasureTheory invariable {I : Type*} in/-- Feasible auctions have interim allocation probabilities at most `1`. -/theorem BayesianSingleItemAuction.interimAllocProb_le_one_of_isFeasible [Fintype I] (A : BayesianSingleItemAuction I) (hfeas : A.IsFeasible) (hint : A.HasIntegrableInterimAllocation) (i : I) (z_i : ℝ) : A.interimAllocProb i z_i ≤ 1 := by have hle : A.interimAllocProb i z_i ≤ ∫ _ : OpponentTypeProfile I i, (1 : ℝ) ∂A.opponentPrior i := by exact integral_mono (hint i z_i) (integrable_const (1 : ℝ)) fun t => (hfeas.1 (reportProfile i z_i t) i).2 simpa using hle