BayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingAuction_hasIntegrableInterimObjects_of_aestronglyMeasurable
theoremverifiedformalizationimported Lean
Once the constructed allocation and payment integrands are measurable, boundedness gives interim integrability for the constructed auction.
Statement
set_option autoImplicit true in set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in open BayesianSingleItemAuction in open scoped BigOperators in open MeasureTheory in variable {I : Type*} in theorem BayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingAuction_hasIntegrableInterimObjects_of_aestronglyMeasurable [Fintype I] [Nontrivial I] [DecidableEq I] [LinearOrder I] (A : BayesianSingleItemAuction I) (halloc_meas : ∀ i z_i, AEStronglyMeasurable (fun t => A.virtualSurplusMaximizingAuction.interimAllocationIntegrand i z_i t) (A.opponentPrior i)) (hpay_meas : ∀ i z_i, AEStronglyMeasurable (fun t => A.virtualSurplusMaximizingAuction.interimPaymentIntegrand i z_i t) (A.opponentPrior i)) : A.virtualSurplusMaximizingAuction.HasIntegrableInterimObjects
- Formalizes
- EconCSLib, `BayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingAuction_hasIntegrableInterimObjects_of_aestronglyMeasurable`
- Lean proof
- By xbei (from the file's git history), from github.com/gametheoryinlean/EconCSLib at
1a88f809b538(Copyright (c) 2026 EconCSLib contributors. All rights reserved, Apache-2.0). Compiled here against leanprover/lean4:v4.33.1, Mathlib v4.33.1; written for leanprover/lean4:v4.30.0.BayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingAuction_hasIntegrableInterimObjects_of_aestronglyMeasurable← BayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingAuction_hasIntegrableInterimObjects_of_aestronglyMeasurable (EconCSLib/MechanismDesign/Auction/OptimalSingleItem.lean:1317): verbatim
- Verified
- 08 Oct 2026
- Axioms
Classical.choiceQuot.soundpropext- Built on 41
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingAuction_toSingleParameterMechanismBayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingAuction_toSingleParameterMechanism
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.hasIntegrableInterimObjects_of_aestronglyMeasurable_of_boundA.e. strong measurability and bounds imply interim integrability.
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingAllocationRuleAllocates to the highest positive virtual value, otherwise withholds the item.
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.productPrior_isProbabilityMeasureBayesianSingleItemAuction.productPrior_isProbabilityMeasure
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.HasIntegrableInterimObjectsAllocation and payment integrability.
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingAuction_isFeasibleThe constructed auction is feasible.
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingPaymentRule_eqBayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingPaymentRule_eq
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingAuction_paymentRuleBayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingAuction_paymentRule
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingAuction_toDirectBayesianMechanismWithTransfersBayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingAuction_toDirectBayesianMechanismWithTransfers
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingAuction_interimPaymentIntegrand_boundFor each fixed report, the constructed Myerson payment integrand is bounded uniformly over opponent profiles.
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingMechanism_eq_withMyersonPaymentBayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingMechanism_eq_withMyersonPayment
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingMechanism_paymentRuleBayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingMechanism_paymentRule
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingAuction_allocationRuleBayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingAuction_allocationRule
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.opponentProductPrior_isProbabilityMeasureBayesianSingleItemAuction.opponentProductPrior_isProbabilityMeasure
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingMechanismThe virtual-surplus allocation rule paired with its Myerson payment.
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.instCoeDirectBayesianMechanismWithTransfersRealForallBayesianSingleItemAuction.instCoeDirectBayesianMechanismWithTransfersRealForall
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.profileSplitMeasurableEquiv_apply_sndBayesianSingleItemAuction.profileSplitMeasurableEquiv_apply_snd
- SingleParameterMechanism.withMyersonPaymentThe single-parameter mechanism obtained by equipping an allocation rule with its canonical Myerson payment rule.
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.profileSplitMeasurableEquiv_symm_applyBayesianSingleItemAuction.profileSplitMeasurableEquiv_symm_apply
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.expectedSellerRevenueInEnvironment_selfBayesianSingleItemAuction.expectedSellerRevenueInEnvironment_self
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingMechanism_allocationRuleBayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingMechanism_allocationRule
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingAuction_opponentPriorBayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingAuction_opponentPrior
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.interimPaymentIntegrandPayment integrand for interim payment.
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.interimAllocationIntegrandAllocation integrand for interim probability.
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.profileSplitMeasurableEquiv_apply_fstBayesianSingleItemAuction.profileSplitMeasurableEquiv_apply_fst
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingAuction_priorBayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingAuction_prior
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingAuctionThe Bayesian auction using the virtual-surplus mechanism and the original priors.
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.RespectsSingleItemCapacityThe allocation rule respects the single-item probability budget.
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingAuction_typeDataBayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingAuction_typeData
- BayesianSingleItemAuctionA direct Bayesian single-item auction with scalar private types and probabilistic allocation. The allocation rule returns a function…
- OpponentTypeProfileOpponent type profiles for real-valued auction types.
- MechanismWithTransfersA mechanism with monetary transfers. -
I— agents -T— report/type space of each agent -A— allocation space -P— payment space… - SingleParameterMechanismA single-parameter mechanism. Each agent
ihas a single private typeθ_i : R(their "value per unit"). The allocation gives each agent… - BayesianSingleItemAuction.reportProfileThe reported type profile obtained by combining
zᵢwith an opponent profilet₋ᵢ. - SingleParameterMechanism.IsAllocFeasibleAllocation feasibility: each agent's allocation lies in
[0, 1]. RequiresZero R,One R, andLE R(e.g., any linearly ordered field). - BayesianSingleItemAuction.profileInsert_selfThe inserted coordinate is the inserted value.
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.profileInsert_of_neOther coordinates come from the opponent profile.
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.reportProfile_selfThe inserted coordinate is
zᵢ. - BayesianSingleItemAuction.reportProfile_of_neOther coordinates come from the opponent profile.
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.update_reportProfile_selfUpdating coordinate
ireplaces the inserted report. - BayesianSingleItemAuction.instIsProbabilityMeasureOpponentTypeProfileOpponentPriorBayesianSingleItemAuction.instIsProbabilityMeasureOpponentTypeProfileOpponentPrior
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set_option autoImplicit true inset_option relaxedAutoImplicit true inopen BayesianSingleItemAuction inopen scoped BigOperators inopen MeasureTheory invariable {I : Type*} in/-- Once the constructed allocation and payment integrands are measurable, boundedness gives interim integrability for the constructed auction. -/theorem BayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingAuction_hasIntegrableInterimObjects_of_aestronglyMeasurable [Fintype I] [Nontrivial I] [DecidableEq I] [LinearOrder I] (A : BayesianSingleItemAuction I) (halloc_meas : ∀ i z_i, AEStronglyMeasurable (fun t => A.virtualSurplusMaximizingAuction.interimAllocationIntegrand i z_i t) (A.opponentPrior i)) (hpay_meas : ∀ i z_i, AEStronglyMeasurable (fun t => A.virtualSurplusMaximizingAuction.interimPaymentIntegrand i z_i t) (A.opponentPrior i)) : A.virtualSurplusMaximizingAuction.HasIntegrableInterimObjects := A.virtualSurplusMaximizingAuction |>.hasIntegrableInterimObjects_of_aestronglyMeasurable_of_bound (by simpa [virtualSurplusMaximizingAuction_opponentPrior] using halloc_meas) (by simpa [virtualSurplusMaximizingAuction_opponentPrior] using hpay_meas) (by intro i z_i refine ⟨1, Filter.Eventually.of_forall ?_⟩ intro t have hx := A.virtualSurplusMaximizingAuction_isFeasible.1 (reportProfile i z_i t) i have hnonneg : 0 ≤ A.virtualSurplusMaximizingAuction.interimAllocationIntegrand i z_i t := by simpa [interimAllocationIntegrand] using hx.1 have hle : A.virtualSurplusMaximizingAuction.interimAllocationIntegrand i z_i t ≤ 1 := by simpa [interimAllocationIntegrand] using hx.2 rw [Real.norm_eq_abs, abs_of_nonneg hnonneg] exact hle) (by intro i z_i exact ⟨2 * ‖z_i‖, A.virtualSurplusMaximizingAuction_interimPaymentIntegrand_bound i z_i⟩)