BayesianSingleItemAuction.hasExpectedRevenueVirtualSurplusIdentity_of_interim_identities
theoremverifiedformalizationimported Lean
BayesianSingleItemAuction.hasExpectedRevenueVirtualSurplusIdentity_of_interim_identities
Statement
set_option autoImplicit true in set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in open BayesianSingleItemAuction in open scoped BigOperators in open MeasureTheory in variable {I : Type*} in theorem BayesianSingleItemAuction.hasExpectedRevenueVirtualSurplusIdentity_of_interim_identities [Fintype I] (A B : BayesianSingleItemAuction I) (hrev : A.HasExpectedRevenueInterimPaymentIdentity B) (hvs : A.HasExpectedVirtualSurplusInterimIdentity B) (hid : ∀ i : I, (∫ v in 0..A.typeData.omega i, B.interimExpectedPayment i v * A.typeDensity i v) = ∫ v in 0..A.typeData.omega i, B.interimAllocProb i v * A.virtualValue i v * A.typeDensity i v) : A.HasExpectedRevenueVirtualSurplusIdentity B
- Formalizes
- EconCSLib, `BayesianSingleItemAuction.hasExpectedRevenueVirtualSurplusIdentity_of_interim_identities`
- Lean proof
- By xbei (from the file's git history), from github.com/gametheoryinlean/EconCSLib at
1a88f809b538(Copyright (c) 2026 EconCSLib contributors. All rights reserved, Apache-2.0). Compiled here against leanprover/lean4:v4.33.1, Mathlib v4.33.1; written for leanprover/lean4:v4.30.0.BayesianSingleItemAuction.hasExpectedRevenueVirtualSurplusIdentity_of_interim_identities← BayesianSingleItemAuction.hasExpectedRevenueVirtualSurplusIdentity_of_interim_identities (EconCSLib/MechanismDesign/Auction/OptimalSingleItem.lean:2643): verbatim
- Verified
- 08 Oct 2026
- Axioms
Classical.choiceQuot.soundpropext- Built on 40
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingAuction_toSingleParameterMechanismBayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingAuction_toSingleParameterMechanism
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.HasExpectedVirtualSurplusInterimIdentityEx-ante virtual surplus agrees with the interim expression.
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.productPrior_isProbabilityMeasureBayesianSingleItemAuction.productPrior_isProbabilityMeasure
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.HasExpectedRevenueInterimPaymentIdentityEx-ante revenue agrees with the interim-payment expression.
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.expectedVirtualSurplusEx-ante expected virtual surplus under the auction prior.
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.expectedSellerRevenueInEnvironmentExpected seller revenue of
B, evaluated in environmentA. - BayesianSingleItemAuction.interimAllocProbInterim allocation probability
q_i(z_i). - BayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingPaymentRule_eqBayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingPaymentRule_eq
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingAuction_paymentRuleBayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingAuction_paymentRule
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingAuction_toDirectBayesianMechanismWithTransfersBayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingAuction_toDirectBayesianMechanismWithTransfers
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingMechanism_eq_withMyersonPaymentBayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingMechanism_eq_withMyersonPayment
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingMechanism_paymentRuleBayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingMechanism_paymentRule
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingAuction_allocationRuleBayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingAuction_allocationRule
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.opponentProductPrior_isProbabilityMeasureBayesianSingleItemAuction.opponentProductPrior_isProbabilityMeasure
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.instCoeDirectBayesianMechanismWithTransfersRealForallBayesianSingleItemAuction.instCoeDirectBayesianMechanismWithTransfersRealForall
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.expectedInterimVirtualSurplusEx-ante virtual surplus through interim allocation probabilities.
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.profileSplitMeasurableEquiv_apply_sndBayesianSingleItemAuction.profileSplitMeasurableEquiv_apply_snd
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.profileSplitMeasurableEquiv_symm_applyBayesianSingleItemAuction.profileSplitMeasurableEquiv_symm_apply
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.expectedSellerRevenueInEnvironment_selfBayesianSingleItemAuction.expectedSellerRevenueInEnvironment_self
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingMechanism_allocationRuleBayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingMechanism_allocationRule
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingAuction_opponentPriorBayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingAuction_opponentPrior
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualValueMyerson virtual value
v - (1 - F_i(v)) / f_i(v)for bidderi. - BayesianSingleItemAuction.expectedInterimPaymentRevenueEx-ante revenue through interim expected payments.
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.profileSplitMeasurableEquiv_apply_fstBayesianSingleItemAuction.profileSplitMeasurableEquiv_apply_fst
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.HasExpectedRevenueVirtualSurplusIdentityExpected revenue equals expected virtual surplus.
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingAuction_priorBayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingAuction_prior
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.typeDensityAgent
i's one-dimensional density, defined as the derivative of the stored CDFFᵢ. - BayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingAuction_hasSameSellingEnvironmentBayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingAuction_hasSameSellingEnvironment
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingAuction_typeDataBayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingAuction_typeData
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.interimExpectedPaymentInterim expected payment
m_i(z_i). - BayesianSingleItemAuctionA direct Bayesian single-item auction with scalar private types and probabilistic allocation. The allocation rule returns a function…
- ContinuousTypeProfileAgent-specific continuous private-value data.
- MechanismWithTransfersA mechanism with monetary transfers. -
I— agents -T— report/type space of each agent -A— allocation space -P— payment space… - SingleParameterMechanismA single-parameter mechanism. Each agent
ihas a single private typeθ_i : R(their "value per unit"). The allocation gives each agent… - BayesianSingleItemAuction.profileInsert_selfThe inserted coordinate is the inserted value.
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.profileInsert_of_neOther coordinates come from the opponent profile.
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.reportProfile_selfThe inserted coordinate is
zᵢ. - BayesianSingleItemAuction.reportProfile_of_neOther coordinates come from the opponent profile.
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.update_reportProfile_selfUpdating coordinate
ireplaces the inserted report. - BayesianSingleItemAuction.instIsProbabilityMeasureOpponentTypeProfileOpponentPriorBayesianSingleItemAuction.instIsProbabilityMeasureOpponentTypeProfileOpponentPrior
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set_option autoImplicit true inset_option relaxedAutoImplicit true inopen BayesianSingleItemAuction inopen scoped BigOperators inopen MeasureTheory invariable {I : Type*} intheorem BayesianSingleItemAuction.hasExpectedRevenueVirtualSurplusIdentity_of_interim_identities [Fintype I] (A B : BayesianSingleItemAuction I) (hrev : A.HasExpectedRevenueInterimPaymentIdentity B) (hvs : A.HasExpectedVirtualSurplusInterimIdentity B) (hid : ∀ i : I, (∫ v in 0..A.typeData.omega i, B.interimExpectedPayment i v * A.typeDensity i v) = ∫ v in 0..A.typeData.omega i, B.interimAllocProb i v * A.virtualValue i v * A.typeDensity i v) : A.HasExpectedRevenueVirtualSurplusIdentity B := by dsimp [ HasExpectedRevenueVirtualSurplusIdentity, HasExpectedRevenueInterimPaymentIdentity, HasExpectedVirtualSurplusInterimIdentity, expectedInterimPaymentRevenue, expectedInterimVirtualSurplus] at * rw [hrev, hvs] exact Finset.sum_congr rfl fun i _ => hid i