BayesianSingleItemAuction.hasInterimEnvelopeFormula_of_isIncentiveCompatible
theoremverifiedformalizationimported Lean
[MSZ 12.49] Payoff envelope from IC.
Statement
set_option autoImplicit true in set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in open BayesianSingleItemAuction in open MeasureTheory in variable {I : Type*} in theorem BayesianSingleItemAuction.hasInterimEnvelopeFormula_of_isIncentiveCompatible (A : BayesianSingleItemAuction I) (hIC : A.IsIncentiveCompatible) : A.HasInterimEnvelopeFormula
- Formalizes
- EconCSLib, `BayesianSingleItemAuction.hasInterimEnvelopeFormula_of_isIncentiveCompatible`
- Lean proof
- By xbei (from the file's git history), from github.com/gametheoryinlean/EconCSLib at
1a88f809b538(Copyright (c) 2026 EconCSLib contributors. All rights reserved, Apache-2.0). Compiled here against leanprover/lean4:v4.33.1, Mathlib v4.33.1; written for leanprover/lean4:v4.30.0.BayesianSingleItemAuction.hasInterimEnvelopeFormula_of_isIncentiveCompatible← BayesianSingleItemAuction.hasInterimEnvelopeFormula_of_isIncentiveCompatible (EconCSLib/MechanismDesign/Auction/BayesianSingleItem.lean:1302): verbatim
- Verified
- 08 Oct 2026
- Axioms
Classical.choiceQuot.soundpropext- Built on 20
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.equilibriumPayoffTruthful interim payoff
U_i(t_i). - BayesianSingleItemAuction.productPrior_isProbabilityMeasureBayesianSingleItemAuction.productPrior_isProbabilityMeasure
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.interimAllocProbInterim allocation probability
q_i(z_i). - BayesianSingleItemAuction.opponentProductPrior_isProbabilityMeasureBayesianSingleItemAuction.opponentProductPrior_isProbabilityMeasure
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.instCoeDirectBayesianMechanismWithTransfersRealForallBayesianSingleItemAuction.instCoeDirectBayesianMechanismWithTransfersRealForall
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.profileSplitMeasurableEquiv_apply_sndBayesianSingleItemAuction.profileSplitMeasurableEquiv_apply_snd
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.profileSplitMeasurableEquiv_symm_applyBayesianSingleItemAuction.profileSplitMeasurableEquiv_symm_apply
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.expectedSellerRevenueInEnvironment_selfBayesianSingleItemAuction.expectedSellerRevenueInEnvironment_self
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.HasInterimEnvelopeFormula[MSZ 12.49] Payoff envelope.
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.IsIncentiveCompatibleInterim incentive compatibility.
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.deriv_equilibriumPayoff_eq_interimAllocProb_of_isIncentiveCompatibleAt differentiable types,
U_i' = q_i. - BayesianSingleItemAuction.equilibriumPayoff_convexOn_of_isIncentiveCompatibleIC makes truthful payoff convex.
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.profileSplitMeasurableEquiv_apply_fstBayesianSingleItemAuction.profileSplitMeasurableEquiv_apply_fst
- BayesianSingleItemAuctionA direct Bayesian single-item auction with scalar private types and probabilistic allocation. The allocation rule returns a function…
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.profileInsert_selfThe inserted coordinate is the inserted value.
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.profileInsert_of_neOther coordinates come from the opponent profile.
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.reportProfile_selfThe inserted coordinate is
zᵢ. - BayesianSingleItemAuction.reportProfile_of_neOther coordinates come from the opponent profile.
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.update_reportProfile_selfUpdating coordinate
ireplaces the inserted report. - BayesianSingleItemAuction.instIsProbabilityMeasureOpponentTypeProfileOpponentPriorBayesianSingleItemAuction.instIsProbabilityMeasureOpponentTypeProfileOpponentPrior
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.equilibriumPayoffTruthful interim payoff
- Used by 2
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.hasInterimPaymentFormula_of_isIncentiveCompatible[MSZ 12.147] Payment identity from IC.
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.interimEnvelopeFormula_and_paymentFormula_of_isIncentiveCompatible[MSZ 12.49] Envelope and payment identities from IC.
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set_option autoImplicit true inset_option relaxedAutoImplicit true inopen BayesianSingleItemAuction inopen MeasureTheory invariable {I : Type*} in/-- [MSZ 12.49] Payoff envelope from IC. -/theorem BayesianSingleItemAuction.hasInterimEnvelopeFormula_of_isIncentiveCompatible (A : BayesianSingleItemAuction I) (hIC : A.IsIncentiveCompatible) : A.HasInterimEnvelopeFormula := by intro i v_i let W : ℝ → ℝ := A.equilibriumPayoff i let Q : ℝ → ℝ := A.interimAllocProb i change W v_i = W 0 + ∫ z in 0..v_i, Q z have hconv : ConvexOn ℝ Set.univ W := by simpa [W] using A.equilibriumPayoff_convexOn_of_isIncentiveCompatible hIC i have hll : LocallyLipschitz W := hconv.locallyLipschitz have hll_on : LocallyLipschitzOn (Set.uIcc 0 v_i) W := hll.locallyLipschitzOn obtain ⟨K, hK⟩ := LocallyLipschitzOn.exists_lipschitzOnWith_of_compact isCompact_uIcc hll_on have hAC : AbsolutelyContinuousOnInterval W 0 v_i := hK.absolutelyContinuousOnInterval have hFTC : ∫ z in 0..v_i, deriv W z = W v_i - W 0 := hAC.integral_deriv_eq_sub have hae_deriv_eq : ∀ᵐ z ∂volume, z ∈ Set.uIoc 0 v_i → deriv W z = Q z := by filter_upwards [hAC.ae_differentiableAt] with z hdiff hz have hdiff_z : DifferentiableAt ℝ W z := hdiff (Set.uIoc_subset_uIcc hz) simpa [W, Q] using A.deriv_equilibriumPayoff_eq_interimAllocProb_of_isIncentiveCompatible hIC (i := i) (v_i := z) hdiff_z have hcongr : ∫ z in 0..v_i, deriv W z = ∫ z in 0..v_i, Q z := intervalIntegral.integral_congr_ae hae_deriv_eq calc W v_i = W 0 + ∫ z in 0..v_i, deriv W z := by linarith _ = W 0 + ∫ z in 0..v_i, Q z := by rw [hcongr]