BayesianSingleItemAuction.equilibriumPayoff_convexOn_of_isIncentiveCompatible
theoremverifiedformalizationimported Lean
IC makes truthful payoff convex.
Statement
set_option autoImplicit true in set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in open BayesianSingleItemAuction in open MeasureTheory in variable {I : Type*} in theorem BayesianSingleItemAuction.equilibriumPayoff_convexOn_of_isIncentiveCompatible (A : BayesianSingleItemAuction I) (hIC : A.IsIncentiveCompatible) (i : I) : ConvexOn ℝ Set.univ (A.equilibriumPayoff i)
- Formalizes
- EconCSLib, `BayesianSingleItemAuction.equilibriumPayoff_convexOn_of_isIncentiveCompatible`
- Lean proof
- By xbei (from the file's git history), from github.com/gametheoryinlean/EconCSLib at
1a88f809b538(Copyright (c) 2026 EconCSLib contributors. All rights reserved, Apache-2.0). Compiled here against leanprover/lean4:v4.33.1, Mathlib v4.33.1; written for leanprover/lean4:v4.30.0.BayesianSingleItemAuction.equilibriumPayoff_convexOn_of_isIncentiveCompatible← BayesianSingleItemAuction.equilibriumPayoff_convexOn_of_isIncentiveCompatible (EconCSLib/MechanismDesign/Auction/BayesianSingleItem.lean:1168): verbatim
- Verified
- 08 Oct 2026
- Axioms
Classical.choiceQuot.soundpropext- Built on 18
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.equilibriumPayoffTruthful interim payoff
U_i(t_i). - BayesianSingleItemAuction.productPrior_isProbabilityMeasureBayesianSingleItemAuction.productPrior_isProbabilityMeasure
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.interimAllocProbInterim allocation probability
q_i(z_i). - BayesianSingleItemAuction.opponentProductPrior_isProbabilityMeasureBayesianSingleItemAuction.opponentProductPrior_isProbabilityMeasure
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.instCoeDirectBayesianMechanismWithTransfersRealForallBayesianSingleItemAuction.instCoeDirectBayesianMechanismWithTransfersRealForall
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.profileSplitMeasurableEquiv_apply_sndBayesianSingleItemAuction.profileSplitMeasurableEquiv_apply_snd
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.profileSplitMeasurableEquiv_symm_applyBayesianSingleItemAuction.profileSplitMeasurableEquiv_symm_apply
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.expectedSellerRevenueInEnvironment_selfBayesianSingleItemAuction.expectedSellerRevenueInEnvironment_self
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.IsIncentiveCompatibleInterim incentive compatibility.
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.profileSplitMeasurableEquiv_apply_fstBayesianSingleItemAuction.profileSplitMeasurableEquiv_apply_fst
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.isIncentiveCompatible_iff_equilibriumPayoff_ge[MSZ 12.48] IC iff the one-dimensional payoff inequality.
- BayesianSingleItemAuctionA direct Bayesian single-item auction with scalar private types and probabilistic allocation. The allocation rule returns a function…
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.profileInsert_selfThe inserted coordinate is the inserted value.
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.profileInsert_of_neOther coordinates come from the opponent profile.
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.reportProfile_selfThe inserted coordinate is
zᵢ. - BayesianSingleItemAuction.reportProfile_of_neOther coordinates come from the opponent profile.
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.update_reportProfile_selfUpdating coordinate
ireplaces the inserted report. - BayesianSingleItemAuction.instIsProbabilityMeasureOpponentTypeProfileOpponentPriorBayesianSingleItemAuction.instIsProbabilityMeasureOpponentTypeProfileOpponentPrior
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.equilibriumPayoffTruthful interim payoff
- Used by 1
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.hasInterimEnvelopeFormula_of_isIncentiveCompatible[MSZ 12.49] Payoff envelope from IC.
Lean source view module on GitHub
Choose a tactic — a marked line — to see the goals Lean had before and after it, as in Lean’s infoview. Step with ← → or j k.
set_option autoImplicit true inset_option relaxedAutoImplicit true inopen BayesianSingleItemAuction inopen MeasureTheory invariable {I : Type*} in/-- IC makes truthful payoff convex. -/theorem BayesianSingleItemAuction.equilibriumPayoff_convexOn_of_isIncentiveCompatible (A : BayesianSingleItemAuction I) (hIC : A.IsIncentiveCompatible) (i : I) : ConvexOn ℝ Set.univ (A.equilibriumPayoff i) := by constructor · exact convex_univ · intro x _hx y _hy a b ha hb hab simp only [smul_eq_mul] let m := a * x + b * y let Wm := A.equilibriumPayoff i m let Qm := A.interimAllocProb i m change Wm ≤ a * A.equilibriumPayoff i x + b * A.equilibriumPayoff i y have hineq := A.isIncentiveCompatible_iff_equilibriumPayoff_ge.mp hIC have hxineq : Wm + Qm * (x - m) ≤ A.equilibriumPayoff i x := by simpa [Wm, Qm, m] using hineq i x m have hyineq : Wm + Qm * (y - m) ≤ A.equilibriumPayoff i y := by simpa [Wm, Qm, m] using hineq i y m have hxscaled := mul_le_mul_of_nonneg_left hxineq ha have hyscaled := mul_le_mul_of_nonneg_left hyineq hb have hsum := add_le_add hxscaled hyscaled have hcombo : a * (x - m) + b * (y - m) = 0 := by have hm : a * x + b * y = m := rfl calc a * (x - m) + b * (y - m) = (a * x + b * y) - (a + b) * m := by ring _ = m - 1 * m := by rw [hm, hab] _ = 0 := by ring have hleft : a * (Wm + Qm * (x - m)) + b * (Wm + Qm * (y - m)) = Wm := by calc a * (Wm + Qm * (x - m)) + b * (Wm + Qm * (y - m)) = (a + b) * Wm + Qm * (a * (x - m) + b * (y - m)) := by ring _ = Wm := by rw [hab, hcombo] ring nlinarith