BayesianSingleItemAuction.deriv_equilibriumPayoff_eq_interimAllocProb_of_isIncentiveCompatible
theoremverifiedformalizationimported Lean
At differentiable types, U_i' = q_i.
Statement
set_option autoImplicit true in set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in open BayesianSingleItemAuction in open MeasureTheory in variable {I : Type*} in theorem BayesianSingleItemAuction.deriv_equilibriumPayoff_eq_interimAllocProb_of_isIncentiveCompatible (A : BayesianSingleItemAuction I) (hIC : A.IsIncentiveCompatible) {i : I} {v_i : ℝ} (hdiff : DifferentiableAt ℝ (A.equilibriumPayoff i) v_i) : deriv (A.equilibriumPayoff i) v_i = A.interimAllocProb i v_i
- Formalizes
- EconCSLib, `BayesianSingleItemAuction.deriv_equilibriumPayoff_eq_interimAllocProb_of_isIncentiveCompatible`
- Lean proof
- By xbei (from the file's git history), from github.com/gametheoryinlean/EconCSLib at
1a88f809b538(Copyright (c) 2026 EconCSLib contributors. All rights reserved, Apache-2.0). Compiled here against leanprover/lean4:v4.33.1, Mathlib v4.33.1; written for leanprover/lean4:v4.30.0.BayesianSingleItemAuction.deriv_equilibriumPayoff_eq_interimAllocProb_of_isIncentiveCompatible← BayesianSingleItemAuction.deriv_equilibriumPayoff_eq_interimAllocProb_of_isIncentiveCompatible (EconCSLib/MechanismDesign/Auction/BayesianSingleItem.lean:1209): verbatim
- Verified
- 08 Oct 2026
- Axioms
Classical.choiceQuot.soundpropext- Built on 18
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.equilibriumPayoffTruthful interim payoff
U_i(t_i). - BayesianSingleItemAuction.productPrior_isProbabilityMeasureBayesianSingleItemAuction.productPrior_isProbabilityMeasure
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.interimAllocProbInterim allocation probability
q_i(z_i). - BayesianSingleItemAuction.opponentProductPrior_isProbabilityMeasureBayesianSingleItemAuction.opponentProductPrior_isProbabilityMeasure
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.instCoeDirectBayesianMechanismWithTransfersRealForallBayesianSingleItemAuction.instCoeDirectBayesianMechanismWithTransfersRealForall
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.profileSplitMeasurableEquiv_apply_sndBayesianSingleItemAuction.profileSplitMeasurableEquiv_apply_snd
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.profileSplitMeasurableEquiv_symm_applyBayesianSingleItemAuction.profileSplitMeasurableEquiv_symm_apply
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.expectedSellerRevenueInEnvironment_selfBayesianSingleItemAuction.expectedSellerRevenueInEnvironment_self
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.IsIncentiveCompatibleInterim incentive compatibility.
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.profileSplitMeasurableEquiv_apply_fstBayesianSingleItemAuction.profileSplitMeasurableEquiv_apply_fst
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.isIncentiveCompatible_iff_equilibriumPayoff_ge[MSZ 12.48] IC iff the one-dimensional payoff inequality.
- BayesianSingleItemAuctionA direct Bayesian single-item auction with scalar private types and probabilistic allocation. The allocation rule returns a function…
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.profileInsert_selfThe inserted coordinate is the inserted value.
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.profileInsert_of_neOther coordinates come from the opponent profile.
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.reportProfile_selfThe inserted coordinate is
zᵢ. - BayesianSingleItemAuction.reportProfile_of_neOther coordinates come from the opponent profile.
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.update_reportProfile_selfUpdating coordinate
ireplaces the inserted report. - BayesianSingleItemAuction.instIsProbabilityMeasureOpponentTypeProfileOpponentPriorBayesianSingleItemAuction.instIsProbabilityMeasureOpponentTypeProfileOpponentPrior
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.equilibriumPayoffTruthful interim payoff
- Used by 2
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.hasInterimEnvelopeFormula_of_isIncentiveCompatible[MSZ 12.49] Payoff envelope from IC.
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.hasInterimEnvelopeDerivative_of_isIncentiveCompatible_of_equilibriumPayoff_differentiableIC and differentiability give the envelope derivative.
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set_option autoImplicit true inset_option relaxedAutoImplicit true inopen BayesianSingleItemAuction inopen MeasureTheory invariable {I : Type*} in/-- At differentiable types, `U_i' = q_i`. -/theorem BayesianSingleItemAuction.deriv_equilibriumPayoff_eq_interimAllocProb_of_isIncentiveCompatible (A : BayesianSingleItemAuction I) (hIC : A.IsIncentiveCompatible) {i : I} {v_i : ℝ} (hdiff : DifferentiableAt ℝ (A.equilibriumPayoff i) v_i) : deriv (A.equilibriumPayoff i) v_i = A.interimAllocProb i v_i := by let q := A.interimAllocProb i v_i have hineq := A.isIncentiveCompatible_iff_equilibriumPayoff_ge.mp hIC have hmin : IsMinOn (fun x : ℝ => A.equilibriumPayoff i x - q * x) Set.univ v_i := by rw [isMinOn_univ_iff] intro x have hxineq : A.equilibriumPayoff i x ≥ A.equilibriumPayoff i v_i + q * (x - v_i) := by simpa [q] using hineq i x v_i nlinarith have hlocal : IsLocalMin (fun x : ℝ => A.equilibriumPayoff i x - q * x) v_i := hmin.isLocalMin (by simp) have hderiv : HasDerivAt (fun x : ℝ => A.equilibriumPayoff i x - q * x) (deriv (A.equilibriumPayoff i) v_i - q) v_i := by exact hdiff.hasDerivAt.sub (hasDerivAt_const_mul (x := v_i) q) have hzero : deriv (A.equilibriumPayoff i) v_i - q = 0 := hlocal.hasDerivAt_eq_zero hderiv simpa [q] using sub_eq_zero.mp hzero