BayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingMechanism
defimported Lean
The virtual-surplus allocation rule paired with its Myerson payment.
Statement
set_option autoImplicit true in set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in open BayesianSingleItemAuction in open scoped BigOperators in open MeasureTheory in variable {I : Type*} in noncomputable def BayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingMechanism [Fintype I] [Nontrivial I] [DecidableEq I] [LinearOrder I] (A : BayesianSingleItemAuction I) : SingleParameterMechanism I ℝ
- Defined in
- EconCSLib, `BayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingMechanism`
- Lean proof
- By xbei (from the file's git history), from github.com/gametheoryinlean/EconCSLib at
1a88f809b538(Copyright (c) 2026 EconCSLib contributors. All rights reserved, Apache-2.0). Compiled here against leanprover/lean4:v4.33.1, Mathlib v4.33.1; written for leanprover/lean4:v4.30.0.BayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingMechanism← BayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingMechanism (EconCSLib/MechanismDesign/Auction/OptimalSingleItem.lean:240): verbatim
- Verified
- 08 Oct 2026
- Axioms
- none listed
- Built on 18
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingAllocationRuleAllocates to the highest positive virtual value, otherwise withholds the item.
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.productPrior_isProbabilityMeasureBayesianSingleItemAuction.productPrior_isProbabilityMeasure
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.opponentProductPrior_isProbabilityMeasureBayesianSingleItemAuction.opponentProductPrior_isProbabilityMeasure
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.instCoeDirectBayesianMechanismWithTransfersRealForallBayesianSingleItemAuction.instCoeDirectBayesianMechanismWithTransfersRealForall
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.profileSplitMeasurableEquiv_apply_sndBayesianSingleItemAuction.profileSplitMeasurableEquiv_apply_snd
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.profileSplitMeasurableEquiv_symm_applyBayesianSingleItemAuction.profileSplitMeasurableEquiv_symm_apply
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.expectedSellerRevenueInEnvironment_selfBayesianSingleItemAuction.expectedSellerRevenueInEnvironment_self
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.profileSplitMeasurableEquiv_apply_fstBayesianSingleItemAuction.profileSplitMeasurableEquiv_apply_fst
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingPaymentRuleMyerson payment for
virtualSurplusMaximizingAllocationRule. - BayesianSingleItemAuctionA direct Bayesian single-item auction with scalar private types and probabilistic allocation. The allocation rule returns a function…
- SingleParameterMechanismA single-parameter mechanism. Each agent
ihas a single private typeθ_i : R(their "value per unit"). The allocation gives each agent… - MechanismWithTransfersA mechanism with monetary transfers. -
I— agents -T— report/type space of each agent -A— allocation space -P— payment space… - BayesianSingleItemAuction.profileInsert_selfThe inserted coordinate is the inserted value.
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.profileInsert_of_neOther coordinates come from the opponent profile.
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.reportProfile_selfThe inserted coordinate is
zᵢ. - BayesianSingleItemAuction.reportProfile_of_neOther coordinates come from the opponent profile.
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.update_reportProfile_selfUpdating coordinate
ireplaces the inserted report. - BayesianSingleItemAuction.instIsProbabilityMeasureOpponentTypeProfileOpponentPriorBayesianSingleItemAuction.instIsProbabilityMeasureOpponentTypeProfileOpponentPrior
- Used by 15
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingAuction_toSingleParameterMechanismBayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingAuction_toSingleParameterMechanism
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingMechanism_isAllocFeasibleThe virtual-surplus-maximizing mechanism is allocation-feasible.
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingAuction_isFeasibleThe constructed auction is feasible.
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingAuction_toDirectBayesianMechanismWithTransfersBayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingAuction_toDirectBayesianMechanismWithTransfers
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingAuction_interimPaymentIntegrand_boundFor each fixed report, the constructed Myerson payment integrand is bounded uniformly over opponent profiles.
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingMechanism_eq_withMyersonPaymentBayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingMechanism_eq_withMyersonPayment
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingMechanism_paymentRuleBayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingMechanism_paymentRule
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingAuction_hasIntegrableInterimObjects_of_aestronglyMeasurableOnce the constructed allocation and payment integrands are measurable, boundedness gives interim integrability for the constructed auction.
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.aestronglyMeasurable_virtualSurplusMaximizingAuction_interimAllocationIntegrandBayesianSingleItemAuction.aestronglyMeasurable_virtualSurplusMaximizingAuction_interimAllocationIntegrand
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingMechanism_allocationRuleBayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingMechanism_allocationRule
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingAuction_isZeroNormalizedBayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingAuction_isZeroNormalized
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingAuctionThe Bayesian auction using the virtual-surplus mechanism and the original priors.
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingMechanism_allocationRule_isVirtualSurplusOptimalThe allocation rule of the Myerson-payment mechanism is virtual-surplus optimal. This exposes the optimal-allocation content at the…
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.expectedVirtualSurplus_le_virtualSurplusMaximizingAuction_allocationRuleThe allocation rule of the constructed Bayesian auction is ex-ante virtual-surplus optimal under the same explicit integrability…
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingAuction_allocationRule_isVirtualSurplusOptimalThe allocation rule of the constructed Bayesian single-item auction is virtual-surplus optimal.
Lean source view module on GitHub
set_option autoImplicit true in set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in open BayesianSingleItemAuction in open scoped BigOperators in open MeasureTheory in variable {I : Type*} in /-- The virtual-surplus allocation rule paired with its Myerson payment. -/ noncomputable def BayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingMechanism [Fintype I] [Nontrivial I] [DecidableEq I] [LinearOrder I] (A : BayesianSingleItemAuction I) : SingleParameterMechanism I ℝ where allocationRule := A.virtualSurplusMaximizingAllocationRule paymentRule := A.virtualSurplusMaximizingPaymentRule