GS.StableMatching.gsStable_isGreatest
theoremverifiedformalizationimported Lean
gsStable is the greatest element of the stable-matching lattice.
Statement
set_option autoImplicit true in set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in open GS GS.StableMatching in open GS in variable {n : ℕ} (w m : Preferences n) in variable {w m} in variable (μ ν : Matching (Fin n) (Fin n)) (hμ : Matching.IsStable (MatchingMarket.ofEquivData w m) μ) (hν : Matching.IsStable (MatchingMarket.ofEquivData w m) ν) in theorem GS.StableMatching.gsStable_isGreatest [NeZero n] : IsGreatest (Set.univ : Set (StableMatching w m)) (gsStable w m)
- Formalizes
- EconCSLib, `GS.StableMatching.gsStable_isGreatest`
- Lean proof
- By xbei (from the file's git history), from github.com/gametheoryinlean/EconCSLib at
1a88f809b538(Copyright (c) 2026 EconCSLib contributors. All rights reserved, Apache-2.0). Compiled here against leanprover/lean4:v4.33.1, Mathlib v4.33.1; written for leanprover/lean4:v4.30.0.GS.StableMatching.gsStable_isGreatest← GS.StableMatching.gsStable_isGreatest (EconCSLib/MarketDesign/Matching/Lattice.lean:577): verbatim
- Verified
- 08 Oct 2026
- Axioms
Classical.choiceQuot.soundpropext- Built on 13
- GS.StableMatching.gsStable_greatestThe GS output is the greatest stable matching in the men-preference order: every man weakly prefers his GS partner to his partner in…
- GS.PreferencesList-based preferences:
prefs iis a full permutation ofFin n, ordered from most to least preferred. - GS.StableMatchingThe type of stable matchings of a one-to-one market.
- GS.StableMatching.instPartialOrderMen-preference order:
μ ≤ νiff every man weakly prefers hisν-partner to hisμ-partner (smalleridxOf= more preferred). - GS.StableMatching.gsStableThe men-proposing Gale–Shapley output, as an element of the lattice of stable matchings.
- MatchingA matching is a partial bijection between
MandW.matchM iis the partner ofi ∈ M(ornoneif unmatched).matchW jis the… - Matching.IsStableA matching is stable if it has no blocking pair. [MSZ 22.5]
- MatchingMarket.ofEquivDataBuild a
MatchingMarket (Fin n) (Fin n)from list-based preference data.some j ≻ some kiffjappears earlier in the list;noneis… - GS.matchW_wPartnerGS.matchW_wPartner
- GS.matchM_mPartnerGS.matchM_mPartner
- instCoeFunPrefForallForallPropinstCoeFunPrefForallForallProp
- GS.StableMatching.instLatticeConway–Knuth lattice. The stable matchings of a one-to-one market form a lattice under the men-preference order: the join gives every…
- MatchingMarketA two-sided matching market.
MandWare the two sides (e.g., men and women, hospitals and residents). Each agent has a preference…
Lean source view module on GitHub
set_option autoImplicit true in set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in open GS GS.StableMatching in open GS in variable {n : ℕ} (w m : Preferences n) in variable {w m} in variable (μ ν : Matching (Fin n) (Fin n)) (hμ : Matching.IsStable (MatchingMarket.ofEquivData w m) μ) (hν : Matching.IsStable (MatchingMarket.ofEquivData w m) ν) in /-- `gsStable` is the greatest element of the stable-matching lattice. -/ theorem GS.StableMatching.gsStable_isGreatest [NeZero n] : IsGreatest (Set.univ : Set (StableMatching w m)) (gsStable w m) := ⟨Set.mem_univ _, fun μ _ => gsStable_greatest μ⟩