GS.StableMatching.gsStable
defimported Lean
The men-proposing Gale–Shapley output, as an element of the lattice of stable matchings.
Statement
set_option autoImplicit true in set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in open GS in open GS in variable {n : ℕ} (w m : Preferences n) in variable {w m} in variable (μ ν : Matching (Fin n) (Fin n)) (hμ : Matching.IsStable (MatchingMarket.ofEquivData w m) μ) (hν : Matching.IsStable (MatchingMarket.ofEquivData w m) ν) in noncomputable def GS.StableMatching.gsStable (w' m' : Preferences n) [NeZero n] : StableMatching w' m'
- Defined in
- EconCSLib, `GS.StableMatching.gsStable`
- Lean proof
- By xbei (from the file's git history), from github.com/gametheoryinlean/EconCSLib at
1a88f809b538(Copyright (c) 2026 EconCSLib contributors. All rights reserved, Apache-2.0). Compiled here against leanprover/lean4:v4.33.1, Mathlib v4.33.1; written for leanprover/lean4:v4.30.0.GS.StableMatching.gsStable← GS.StableMatching.gsStable (EconCSLib/MarketDesign/Matching/Lattice.lean:561): verbatim
- Verified
- 08 Oct 2026
- Axioms
- none listed
- Built on 15
- galeShapley_isStableGale-Shapley stability: the DA output has no blocking pair. The statement is in the *market* frame (
IsBlocking … (i : M) (j : W)).… - gs_bijective
gs w mis a bijection onFin n. - GS.PreferencesList-based preferences:
prefs iis a full permutation ofFin n, ordered from most to least preferred. - GS.StableMatchingThe type of stable matchings of a one-to-one market.
- MatchingA matching is a partial bijection between
MandW.matchM iis the partner ofi ∈ M(ornoneif unmatched).matchW jis the… - Matching.IsStableA matching is stable if it has no blocking pair. [MSZ 22.5]
- MatchingMarket.ofEquivDataBuild a
MatchingMarket (Fin n) (Fin n)from list-based preference data.some j ≻ some kiffjappears earlier in the list;noneis… - Matching.ofGSCoerce a bijective
f : Fin n → Fin nintoMatching (Fin n) (Fin n). - GS.gsThe Gale-Shapley function: woman
j's partner at termination. - GS.matchW_wPartnerGS.matchW_wPartner
- GS.matchM_mPartnerGS.matchM_mPartner
- instCoeFunPrefForallForallPropinstCoeFunPrefForallForallProp
- GS.StableMatching.instPartialOrderMen-preference order:
μ ≤ νiff every man weakly prefers hisν-partner to hisμ-partner (smalleridxOf= more preferred). - GS.StableMatching.instLatticeConway–Knuth lattice. The stable matchings of a one-to-one market form a lattice under the men-preference order: the join gives every…
- MatchingMarketA two-sided matching market.
MandWare the two sides (e.g., men and women, hospitals and residents). Each agent has a preference…
- galeShapley_isStableGale-Shapley stability: the DA output has no blocking pair. The statement is in the *market* frame (
- Used by 2
- GS.StableMatching.gsStable_greatestThe GS output is the greatest stable matching in the men-preference order: every man weakly prefers his GS partner to his partner in…
- GS.StableMatching.gsStable_isGreatest
gsStableis the greatest element of the stable-matching lattice.
Lean source view module on GitHub
set_option autoImplicit true in set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in open GS in open GS in variable {n : ℕ} (w m : Preferences n) in variable {w m} in variable (μ ν : Matching (Fin n) (Fin n)) (hμ : Matching.IsStable (MatchingMarket.ofEquivData w m) μ) (hν : Matching.IsStable (MatchingMarket.ofEquivData w m) ν) in /-- The men-proposing Gale–Shapley output, as an element of the lattice of stable matchings. -/ noncomputable def GS.StableMatching.gsStable (w' m' : Preferences n) [NeZero n] : StableMatching w' m' := ⟨Matching.ofGS (gs w' m') (gs_bijective w' m'), galeShapley_isStable w' m'⟩