AFTD Auto-Formalizing Theoretical Domains

GS.StableMatching.gsStable

defimported Lean

The men-proposing Gale–Shapley output, as an element of the lattice of stable matchings.

Statement

set_option autoImplicit true in
set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in
open GS in
open GS in
variable {n : ℕ} (w m : Preferences n) in
variable {w m} in
variable (μ ν : Matching (Fin n) (Fin n))
  (hμ : Matching.IsStable (MatchingMarket.ofEquivData w m) μ)
  (hν : Matching.IsStable (MatchingMarket.ofEquivData w m) ν) in
noncomputable def GS.StableMatching.gsStable (w' m' : Preferences n) [NeZero n] : StableMatching w' m'
Defined in
EconCSLib, `GS.StableMatching.gsStable`
Lean proof
By xbei (from the file's git history), from github.com/gametheoryinlean/EconCSLib at 1a88f809b538 (Copyright (c) 2026 EconCSLib contributors. All rights reserved, Apache-2.0). Compiled here against leanprover/lean4:v4.33.1, Mathlib v4.33.1; written for leanprover/lean4:v4.30.0.
Verified
08 Oct 2026
Axioms
none listed
Built on 15
  • galeShapley_isStableGale-Shapley stability: the DA output has no blocking pair. The statement is in the *market* frame (IsBlocking … (i : M) (j : W)).…
  • gs_bijectivegs w m is a bijection on Fin n.
  • GS.PreferencesList-based preferences: prefs i is a full permutation of Fin n, ordered from most to least preferred.
  • GS.StableMatchingThe type of stable matchings of a one-to-one market.
  • MatchingA matching is a partial bijection between M and W. matchM i is the partner of i ∈ M (or none if unmatched). matchW j is the…
  • Matching.IsStableA matching is stable if it has no blocking pair. [MSZ 22.5]
  • MatchingMarket.ofEquivDataBuild a MatchingMarket (Fin n) (Fin n) from list-based preference data. some j ≻ some k iff j appears earlier in the list; none is…
  • Matching.ofGSCoerce a bijective f : Fin n → Fin n into Matching (Fin n) (Fin n).
  • GS.gsThe Gale-Shapley function: woman j's partner at termination.
  • GS.matchW_wPartnerGS.matchW_wPartner
  • GS.matchM_mPartnerGS.matchM_mPartner
  • instCoeFunPrefForallForallPropinstCoeFunPrefForallForallProp
  • GS.StableMatching.instPartialOrderMen-preference order: μ ≤ ν iff every man weakly prefers his ν-partner to his μ-partner (smaller idxOf = more preferred).
  • GS.StableMatching.instLatticeConway–Knuth lattice. The stable matchings of a one-to-one market form a lattice under the men-preference order: the join gives every…
  • MatchingMarketA two-sided matching market. M and W are the two sides (e.g., men and women, hospitals and residents). Each agent has a preference…
Used by 2

Lean source view module on GitHub

set_option autoImplicit true in
set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in
open GS in
open GS in
variable {n : ℕ} (w m : Preferences n) in
variable {w m} in
variable (μ ν : Matching (Fin n) (Fin n))
  (hμ : Matching.IsStable (MatchingMarket.ofEquivData w m) μ)
  (hν : Matching.IsStable (MatchingMarket.ofEquivData w m) ν) in
/-- The men-proposing Gale–Shapley output, as an element of the lattice of stable matchings. -/
noncomputable def GS.StableMatching.gsStable (w' m' : Preferences n) [NeZero n] : StableMatching w' m' :=
  ⟨Matching.ofGS (gs w' m') (gs_bijective w' m'), galeShapley_isStable w' m'⟩
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