AFTD Auto-Formalizing Theoretical Domains

GS.opposed_preferences_women

theoremverifiedformalizationimported Lean

Dual of opposed_preferences: if woman i strictly prefers man mi to her candidate-man mi', then mi strictly prefers his candidate-woman to i.

Statement

set_option autoImplicit true in
set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in
open GS in
variable {n : ℕ} (w m : Preferences n) in
variable {w m} in
variable (μ ν : Matching (Fin n) (Fin n))
  (hμ : Matching.IsStable (MatchingMarket.ofEquivData w m) μ)
  (hν : Matching.IsStable (MatchingMarket.ofEquivData w m) ν) in
theorem GS.opposed_preferences_women
    (candidate : Matching (Fin n) (Fin n))
    (hcandidate : Matching.IsStable (MatchingMarket.ofEquivData w m) candidate)
    {i mi mi' j' : Fin n}
    (hcandidate_i : candidate.matchM i = some mi')
    (hpref : (w.prefs i).idxOf mi < (w.prefs i).idxOf mi')
    (hcandidate_m : candidate.matchW mi = some j') :
    (m.prefs mi).idxOf j' < (m.prefs mi).idxOf i
Formalizes
EconCSLib, `GS.opposed_preferences_women`
Lean proof
By xbei (from the file's git history), from github.com/gametheoryinlean/EconCSLib at 1a88f809b538 (Copyright (c) 2026 EconCSLib contributors. All rights reserved, Apache-2.0). Compiled here against leanprover/lean4:v4.33.1, Mathlib v4.33.1; written for leanprover/lean4:v4.30.0.
Verified
08 Oct 2026
Axioms
Classical.choiceQuot.soundpropext
Built on 11
  • Matching.IsStableA matching is stable if it has no blocking pair. [MSZ 22.5]
  • strictStrict preference derived from a weak preference relation.
  • MatchingA matching is a partial bijection between M and W. matchM i is the partner of i ∈ M (or none if unmatched). matchW j is the…
  • GS.matchM_mPartnerGS.matchM_mPartner
  • instCoeFunPrefForallForallPropinstCoeFunPrefForallForallProp
  • GS.matchW_wPartnerGS.matchW_wPartner
  • GS.PreferencesList-based preferences: prefs i is a full permutation of Fin n, ordered from most to least preferred.
  • MatchingMarketA two-sided matching market. M and W are the two sides (e.g., men and women, hospitals and residents). Each agent has a preference…
  • MatchingMarket.ofEquivDataBuild a MatchingMarket (Fin n) (Fin n) from list-based preference data. some j ≻ some k iff j appears earlier in the list; none is…
  • GS.pref_list_memEvery element of Fin n appears in a full-permutation list.
  • PrefA bundled weak preference relation. Use this interface when several agents may rank the same outcome type differently. Use…
Used by 2

Lean source view module on GitHub

set_option autoImplicit true inset_option relaxedAutoImplicit true inopen GS invariable {n : ℕ} (w m : Preferences n) invariable {w m} invariable (μ ν : Matching (Fin n) (Fin n))  (hμ : Matching.IsStable (MatchingMarket.ofEquivData w m) μ)  (hν : Matching.IsStable (MatchingMarket.ofEquivData w m) ν) in/-- Dual of `opposed_preferences`: if woman `i` strictly prefers man `mi` to her `candidate`-man `mi'`, then `mi` strictly prefers his `candidate`-woman to `i`. -/theorem GS.opposed_preferences_women    (candidate : Matching (Fin n) (Fin n))    (hcandidate : Matching.IsStable (MatchingMarket.ofEquivData w m) candidate)    {i mi mi' j' : Fin n}    (hcandidate_i : candidate.matchM i = some mi')    (hpref : (w.prefs i).idxOf mi < (w.prefs i).idxOf mi')    (hcandidate_m : candidate.matchW mi = some j') :    (m.prefs mi).idxOf j' < (m.prefs mi).idxOf i := by  have hmi_ne : mi ≠ mi' := by    intro he; rw [he] at hpref; exact (lt_irrefl _ hpref)  have hi_ne : i ≠ j' := by    intro he; subst he    have : candidate.matchM i = some mi := (candidate.consistent i mi).mpr hcandidate_m    rw [hcandidate_i] at this    exact hmi_ne (Option.some.inj this).symm  by_contra hle  push_neg at hle  have hlt : (m.prefs mi).idxOf i < (m.prefs mi).idxOf j' := by    refine lt_of_le_of_ne hle (fun e => hi_ne ?_)    exact (List.idxOf_inj (pref_list_mem _ (m.valid mi).1 (m.valid mi).2 i)).mp e  exact hcandidate i mi    ⟨by rw [hcandidate_i]; exact ⟨by show (w.prefs i).idxOf mi ≤ (w.prefs i).idxOf mi'; omega,                          by show ¬ (w.prefs i).idxOf mi' ≤ (w.prefs i).idxOf mi; omega⟩,     by rw [hcandidate_m]; exact ⟨by show (m.prefs mi).idxOf i ≤ (m.prefs mi).idxOf j'; omega,                          by show ¬ (m.prefs mi).idxOf j' ≤ (m.prefs mi).idxOf i; omega⟩⟩
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