GS.prefW_strict
theoremverifiedformalizationimported Lean
GS.prefW_strict
Statement
set_option autoImplicit true in set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in open GS in variable {n : ℕ} (w m : Preferences n) in variable {w m} in variable (μ ν : Matching (Fin n) (Fin n)) (hμ : Matching.IsStable (MatchingMarket.ofEquivData w m) μ) (hν : Matching.IsStable (MatchingMarket.ofEquivData w m) ν) in lemma GS.prefW_strict {j a b : Fin n} : strict ((MatchingMarket.ofEquivData w m).prefW j).rel (some a) (some b) ↔ (m.prefs j).idxOf a < (m.prefs j).idxOf b
- Formalizes
- EconCSLib, `GS.prefW_strict`
- Lean proof
- By xbei (from the file's git history), from github.com/gametheoryinlean/EconCSLib at
1a88f809b538(Copyright (c) 2026 EconCSLib contributors. All rights reserved, Apache-2.0). Compiled here against leanprover/lean4:v4.33.1, Mathlib v4.33.1; written for leanprover/lean4:v4.30.0.GS.prefW_strict← GS.prefW_strict (EconCSLib/MarketDesign/Matching/Lattice.lean:224): verbatim
- Verified
- 08 Oct 2026
- Axioms
Quot.soundpropext- Built on 10
- Matching.IsStableA matching is stable if it has no blocking pair. [MSZ 22.5]
- strictStrict preference derived from a weak preference relation.
- MatchingA matching is a partial bijection between
MandW.matchM iis the partner ofi ∈ M(ornoneif unmatched).matchW jis the… - GS.matchM_mPartnerGS.matchM_mPartner
- instCoeFunPrefForallForallPropinstCoeFunPrefForallForallProp
- GS.matchW_wPartnerGS.matchW_wPartner
- GS.PreferencesList-based preferences:
prefs iis a full permutation ofFin n, ordered from most to least preferred. - MatchingMarketA two-sided matching market.
MandWare the two sides (e.g., men and women, hospitals and residents). Each agent has a preference… - MatchingMarket.ofEquivDataBuild a
MatchingMarket (Fin n) (Fin n)from list-based preference data.some j ≻ some kiffjappears earlier in the list;noneis… - PrefA bundled weak preference relation. Use this interface when several agents may rank the same outcome type differently. Use…
- Used by 2
- GS.stableMeet_isStableThe meet of two stable matchings is stable.
- GS.stableJoin_isStableThe join of two stable matchings is stable.
Lean source view module on GitHub
Choose a tactic — a marked line — to see the goals Lean had before and after it, as in Lean’s infoview. Step with ← → or j k.
set_option autoImplicit true inset_option relaxedAutoImplicit true inopen GS invariable {n : ℕ} (w m : Preferences n) invariable {w m} invariable (μ ν : Matching (Fin n) (Fin n)) (hμ : Matching.IsStable (MatchingMarket.ofEquivData w m) μ) (hν : Matching.IsStable (MatchingMarket.ofEquivData w m) ν) inlemma GS.prefW_strict {j a b : Fin n} : strict ((MatchingMarket.ofEquivData w m).prefW j).rel (some a) (some b) ↔ (m.prefs j).idxOf a < (m.prefs j).idxOf b := by constructor · rintro ⟨h1, h2⟩ have e1 : (m.prefs j).idxOf a ≤ (m.prefs j).idxOf b := h1 have e2 : ¬ (m.prefs j).idxOf b ≤ (m.prefs j).idxOf a := h2 omega · intro h exact ⟨show (m.prefs j).idxOf a ≤ (m.prefs j).idxOf b by omega, show ¬ (m.prefs j).idxOf b ≤ (m.prefs j).idxOf a by omega⟩