AFTD Auto-Formalizing Theoretical Domains

GS.prefM_strict

theoremverifiedformalizationimported Lean

GS.prefM_strict

Statement

set_option autoImplicit true in
set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in
open GS in
variable {n : ℕ} (w m : Preferences n) in
variable {w m} in
variable (μ ν : Matching (Fin n) (Fin n))
  (hμ : Matching.IsStable (MatchingMarket.ofEquivData w m) μ)
  (hν : Matching.IsStable (MatchingMarket.ofEquivData w m) ν) in
lemma GS.prefM_strict {i a b : Fin n} :
    strict ((MatchingMarket.ofEquivData w m).prefM i).rel (some a) (some b) ↔
      (w.prefs i).idxOf a < (w.prefs i).idxOf b
Formalizes
EconCSLib, `GS.prefM_strict`
Lean proof
By xbei (from the file's git history), from github.com/gametheoryinlean/EconCSLib at 1a88f809b538 (Copyright (c) 2026 EconCSLib contributors. All rights reserved, Apache-2.0). Compiled here against leanprover/lean4:v4.33.1, Mathlib v4.33.1; written for leanprover/lean4:v4.30.0.
Verified
08 Oct 2026
Axioms
Quot.soundpropext
Built on 10
  • Matching.IsStableA matching is stable if it has no blocking pair. [MSZ 22.5]
  • strictStrict preference derived from a weak preference relation.
  • MatchingA matching is a partial bijection between M and W. matchM i is the partner of i ∈ M (or none if unmatched). matchW j is the…
  • GS.matchM_mPartnerGS.matchM_mPartner
  • instCoeFunPrefForallForallPropinstCoeFunPrefForallForallProp
  • GS.matchW_wPartnerGS.matchW_wPartner
  • GS.PreferencesList-based preferences: prefs i is a full permutation of Fin n, ordered from most to least preferred.
  • MatchingMarketA two-sided matching market. M and W are the two sides (e.g., men and women, hospitals and residents). Each agent has a preference…
  • MatchingMarket.ofEquivDataBuild a MatchingMarket (Fin n) (Fin n) from list-based preference data. some j ≻ some k iff j appears earlier in the list; none is…
  • PrefA bundled weak preference relation. Use this interface when several agents may rank the same outcome type differently. Use…
Used by 2

Lean source view module on GitHub

set_option autoImplicit true inset_option relaxedAutoImplicit true inopen GS invariable {n : ℕ} (w m : Preferences n) invariable {w m} invariable (μ ν : Matching (Fin n) (Fin n))  (hμ : Matching.IsStable (MatchingMarket.ofEquivData w m) μ)  (hν : Matching.IsStable (MatchingMarket.ofEquivData w m) ν) inlemma GS.prefM_strict {i a b : Fin n} :    strict ((MatchingMarket.ofEquivData w m).prefM i).rel (some a) (some b) ↔      (w.prefs i).idxOf a < (w.prefs i).idxOf b := by  constructor  · rintro ⟨h1, h2⟩    have e1 : (w.prefs i).idxOf a ≤ (w.prefs i).idxOf b := h1    have e2 : ¬ (w.prefs i).idxOf b ≤ (w.prefs i).idxOf a := h2    omega  · intro h    exact ⟨show (w.prefs i).idxOf a ≤ (w.prefs i).idxOf b by omega,           show ¬ (w.prefs i).idxOf b ≤ (w.prefs i).idxOf a by omega⟩
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