SingleParameterMechanism.isMonotone_of_isDSIC
theoremverifiedformalizationimported Lean
Myerson Lemma, Property 1: every DSIC single-parameter mechanism has a monotone allocation rule.
Statement
set_option autoImplicit true in set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in open SingleParameterMechanism in variable {I : Type*} in theorem SingleParameterMechanism.isMonotone_of_isDSIC [DecidableEq I] {M : SingleParameterMechanism I ℝ} (hdsic : M.IsDSIC) : M.IsMonotone
- Formalizes
- EconCSLib, `SingleParameterMechanism.isMonotone_of_isDSIC`
- Lean proof
- By xbei (from the file's git history), from github.com/gametheoryinlean/EconCSLib at
1a88f809b538(Copyright (c) 2026 EconCSLib contributors. All rights reserved, Apache-2.0). Compiled here against leanprover/lean4:v4.33.1, Mathlib v4.33.1; written for leanprover/lean4:v4.30.0.SingleParameterMechanism.isMonotone_of_isDSIC← SingleParameterMechanism.isMonotone_of_isDSIC (EconCSLib/MechanismDesign/Auction/Myerson.lean:82): verbatim
- Verified
- 08 Oct 2026
- Axioms
Classical.choiceQuot.soundpropext- Built on 15
- SingleParameterMechanism.IsDSICDominant-strategy incentive compatibility in the single-parameter, quasi-linear setting. Truthful reporting
θᵢis weakly dominant for… - MechanismWithTransfers.isDSICDSIC for a mechanism with transfers, relative to an externally supplied utility rule.
- SingleParameterMechanismA single-parameter mechanism. Each agent
ihas a single private typeθ_i : R(their "value per unit"). The allocation gives each agent… - SingleParameterMechanism.IsMonotoneMonotonicity of the allocation rule. Agent
i's allocation is non-decreasing ini's reported type, holding all other reports fixed.… - MechanismWithTransfersA mechanism with monetary transfers. -
I— agents -T— report/type space of each agent -A— allocation space -P— payment space… - SingleParameterMechanism.paymentThe payment vector induced by a bid profile in a single-parameter mechanism. This is just the inherited…
- EconCSLib.StrategicGameA strategic game (normal-form game) with players
Nand utilities inU. The structure records only the bare data: strategy spaces and a… - MechanismWithTransfers.toStrategicGameThe strategic game induced by a transfer mechanism and an external utility rule. Utility is supplied as a function of: - allocation -…
- EconCSLib.StrategicGame.deviateUnilateral deviation in a game-bound profile: player
iswitches tos', while all other players keep their current strategies. - EconCSLib.StrategicGame.ProfileThe type of strategy profiles for game
G: each player picks a strategy. This is a dependent function∀ i, G.strategy i. The profile… - IsWeaklyDominantStrategy
sis weakly dominant for playeri. - WeaklyDominatesStrategy
sweakly dominates strategys'for playeri. - EconCSLib.StrategicGame.Profile.deviate_selfDeviating to the same strategy is the identity.
- EconCSLib.StrategicGame.Profile.deviate_sameAt the deviated player, the updated profile returns the new strategy.
- EconCSLib.StrategicGame.Profile.deviate_of_neAt every other player, the updated profile is unchanged.
- SingleParameterMechanism.IsDSICDominant-strategy incentive compatibility in the single-parameter, quasi-linear setting. Truthful reporting
- Used by 2
- SingleParameterMechanism.payment_formula_of_isDSIC_of_zeroNormalizedExplicit payment identity used in Myerson's Lemma: for a DSIC single-parameter mechanism with zero-normalized payments, the payment rule…
- SingleParameterMechanism.isImplementable_iff_isMonotoneMyerson Lemma
(a): an allocation rule is implementable if and only if it is monotone.
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set_option autoImplicit true inset_option relaxedAutoImplicit true inopen SingleParameterMechanism invariable {I : Type*} in/-- Myerson Lemma, Property 1: every DSIC single-parameter mechanism has a monotone allocation rule. -/theorem SingleParameterMechanism.isMonotone_of_isDSIC [DecidableEq I] {M : SingleParameterMechanism I ℝ} (hdsic : M.IsDSIC) : M.IsMonotone := by intro i θ θ' hθ b by_cases hEq : θ = θ' · simp [hEq] have hlt : θ < θ' := lt_of_le_of_ne hθ hEq let v : I → ℝ := Function.update b i θ let v' : I → ℝ := Function.update b i θ' have h1 : θ * M.allocationRule (Function.update b i θ') i - M.payment (Function.update b i θ') i ≤ θ * M.allocationRule (Function.update b i θ) i - M.payment (Function.update b i θ) i := by have := hdsic v i θ' b simpa [SingleParameterMechanism.IsDSIC, MechanismWithTransfers.isDSIC, MechanismWithTransfers.toStrategicGame, IsWeaklyDominant, WeaklyDominates, SingleParameterMechanism.payment, v] using this have h2 : θ' * M.allocationRule (Function.update b i θ) i - M.payment (Function.update b i θ) i ≤ θ' * M.allocationRule (Function.update b i θ') i - M.payment (Function.update b i θ') i := by have := hdsic v' i θ b simpa [SingleParameterMechanism.IsDSIC, MechanismWithTransfers.isDSIC, MechanismWithTransfers.toStrategicGame, IsWeaklyDominant, WeaklyDominates, SingleParameterMechanism.payment, v'] using this nlinarith