AFTD Auto-Formalizing Theoretical Domains

SingleParameterMechanism.isMonotone_of_isDSIC

theoremverifiedformalizationimported Lean

Myerson Lemma, Property 1: every DSIC single-parameter mechanism has a monotone allocation rule.

Statement

set_option autoImplicit true in
set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in
open SingleParameterMechanism in
variable {I : Type*} in
theorem SingleParameterMechanism.isMonotone_of_isDSIC [DecidableEq I] {M : SingleParameterMechanism I ℝ}
    (hdsic : M.IsDSIC) :
    M.IsMonotone
Formalizes
EconCSLib, `SingleParameterMechanism.isMonotone_of_isDSIC`
Lean proof
By xbei (from the file's git history), from github.com/gametheoryinlean/EconCSLib at 1a88f809b538 (Copyright (c) 2026 EconCSLib contributors. All rights reserved, Apache-2.0). Compiled here against leanprover/lean4:v4.33.1, Mathlib v4.33.1; written for leanprover/lean4:v4.30.0.
Verified
08 Oct 2026
Axioms
Classical.choiceQuot.soundpropext
Built on 15
Used by 2

Lean source view module on GitHub

set_option autoImplicit true inset_option relaxedAutoImplicit true inopen SingleParameterMechanism invariable {I : Type*} in/-- Myerson Lemma, Property 1: every DSIC single-parameter mechanism has a monotone allocation rule. -/theorem SingleParameterMechanism.isMonotone_of_isDSIC [DecidableEq I] {M : SingleParameterMechanism I ℝ}    (hdsic : M.IsDSIC) :    M.IsMonotone := by  intro i θ θ' hθ b  by_cases hEq : θ = θ'  · simp [hEq]  have hlt : θ < θ' := lt_of_le_of_ne hθ hEq  let v : I → ℝ := Function.update b i θ  let v' : I → ℝ := Function.update b i θ'  have h1 : θ * M.allocationRule (Function.update b i θ') i -      M.payment (Function.update b i θ') i ≤      θ * M.allocationRule (Function.update b i θ) i -      M.payment (Function.update b i θ) i := by    have := hdsic v i θ' b    simpa [SingleParameterMechanism.IsDSIC, MechanismWithTransfers.isDSIC,      MechanismWithTransfers.toStrategicGame, IsWeaklyDominant, WeaklyDominates,      SingleParameterMechanism.payment, v]      using this  have h2 : θ' * M.allocationRule (Function.update b i θ) i -      M.payment (Function.update b i θ) i ≤      θ' * M.allocationRule (Function.update b i θ') i -      M.payment (Function.update b i θ') i := by    have := hdsic v' i θ b    simpa [SingleParameterMechanism.IsDSIC, MechanismWithTransfers.isDSIC,      MechanismWithTransfers.toStrategicGame, IsWeaklyDominant, WeaklyDominates,      SingleParameterMechanism.payment, v']      using this  nlinarith
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