SingleParameterMechanism.IsMonotone
defimported Lean
Monotonicity of the allocation rule. Agent i's allocation is non-decreasing in i's reported type, holding all other reports fixed. This is Myerson's necessary and sufficient condition for DSIC in the single-parameter setting (with quasi-linear utility and the appropriate payment formula). [Myerson 1981; AGT Thm 9.36]
Statement
set_option autoImplicit true in set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in variable {I : Type*} [DecidableEq I] {R : Type*} in variable (M : SingleParameterMechanism I R) in def SingleParameterMechanism.IsMonotone [Preorder R] : Prop
- Defined in
- EconCSLib, `SingleParameterMechanism.IsMonotone`
- Lean proof
- By xbei (from the file's git history), from github.com/gametheoryinlean/EconCSLib at
1a88f809b538(Copyright (c) 2026 EconCSLib contributors. All rights reserved, Apache-2.0). Compiled here against leanprover/lean4:v4.33.1, Mathlib v4.33.1; written for leanprover/lean4:v4.30.0.SingleParameterMechanism.IsMonotone← SingleParameterMechanism.IsMonotone (EconCSLib/MechanismDesign/Auction/Transfer.lean:185): verbatim
- Verified
- 08 Oct 2026
- Axioms
- none listed
- Built on 2
- SingleParameterMechanismA single-parameter mechanism. Each agent
ihas a single private typeθ_i : R(their "value per unit"). The allocation gives each agent… - MechanismWithTransfersA mechanism with monetary transfers. -
I— agents -T— report/type space of each agent -A— allocation space -P— payment space…
- SingleParameterMechanismA single-parameter mechanism. Each agent
- Used by 8
- SingleParameterMechanism.withMyersonPayment_isDSIC_of_isMonotoneMyerson Lemma, Property 2: a monotone allocation rule is DSIC when paired with the canonical Myerson payment rule.
- KnapsackAuction.welfareMaximizingAllocationRule_isMonotoneKnapsackAuction.welfareMaximizingAllocationRule_isMonotone
- SingleParameterMechanism.existsUnique_zeroNormalized_payment_of_isMonotoneMyerson Lemma
(b): ifxis monotone, then there is a unique zero-normalized payment rule making(x, p)DSIC. - SingleParameterMechanism.isMonotone_of_isDSICMyerson Lemma, Property 1: every DSIC single-parameter mechanism has a monotone allocation rule.
- SingleParameterMechanism.payment_formula_of_isDSIC_of_zeroNormalizedExplicit payment identity used in Myerson's Lemma: for a DSIC single-parameter mechanism with zero-normalized payments, the payment rule…
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingAllocationRule_isMonotone_of_isRegularUnder regularity, the deterministic virtual-surplus-maximizing allocation rule is monotone in the sense required by…
- SingleParameterMechanism.isImplementable_of_isMonotoneMyerson Lemma, Property 2, reformulated: an allocation rule is implementable if it is monotone.
- SingleParameterMechanism.isImplementable_iff_isMonotoneMyerson Lemma
(a): an allocation rule is implementable if and only if it is monotone.
Lean source view module on GitHub
set_option autoImplicit true in set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in variable {I : Type*} [DecidableEq I] {R : Type*} in variable (M : SingleParameterMechanism I R) in /-- Monotonicity of the allocation rule. Agent `i`'s allocation is non-decreasing in `i`'s reported type, holding all other reports fixed. This is Myerson's necessary and sufficient condition for DSIC in the single-parameter setting (with quasi-linear utility and the appropriate payment formula). [Myerson 1981; AGT Thm 9.36] -/ def SingleParameterMechanism.IsMonotone [Preorder R] : Prop := ∀ (i : I) (θ θ' : R), θ ≤ θ' → ∀ (b : I → R), M.allocationRule (Function.update b i θ) i ≤ M.allocationRule (Function.update b i θ') i