BayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingAllocationRule_isMonotone_of_isRegular
theoremverifiedformalizationimported Lean
Under regularity, the deterministic virtual-surplus-maximizing allocation rule is monotone in the sense required by SingleParameterMechanism.
Statement
set_option autoImplicit true in set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in open BayesianSingleItemAuction in open scoped BigOperators in open MeasureTheory in variable {I : Type*} in theorem BayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingAllocationRule_isMonotone_of_isRegular [Fintype I] [Nontrivial I] [DecidableEq I] [LinearOrder I] (A : BayesianSingleItemAuction I) (hA : A.IsRegular) : SingleParameterMechanism.IsMonotone ({ allocationRule := A.virtualSurplusMaximizingAllocationRule paymentRule := A.virtualSurplusMaximizingPaymentRule } : SingleParameterMechanism I ℝ)
- Formalizes
- EconCSLib, `BayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingAllocationRule_isMonotone_of_isRegular`
- Lean proof
- By xbei (from the file's git history), from github.com/gametheoryinlean/EconCSLib at
1a88f809b538(Copyright (c) 2026 EconCSLib contributors. All rights reserved, Apache-2.0). Compiled here against leanprover/lean4:v4.33.1, Mathlib v4.33.1; written for leanprover/lean4:v4.30.0.BayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingAllocationRule_isMonotone_of_isRegular← BayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingAllocationRule_isMonotone_of_isRegular (EconCSLib/MechanismDesign/Auction/OptimalSingleItem.lean:1171): verbatim
- Verified
- 08 Oct 2026
- Axioms
Classical.choiceQuot.soundpropext- Built on 38
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingAuction_toSingleParameterMechanismBayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingAuction_toSingleParameterMechanism
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingAllocationRuleAllocates to the highest positive virtual value, otherwise withholds the item.
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.productPrior_isProbabilityMeasureBayesianSingleItemAuction.productPrior_isProbabilityMeasure
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.IsRegularRegularity: every bidder's virtual value is monotone.
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.winningVirtualValueThe virtual value attained by the selected virtual-value winner.
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingAuction_paymentRuleBayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingAuction_paymentRule
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingWinnerThe virtual-value winner with deterministic tie-breaking.
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingAuction_toDirectBayesianMechanismWithTransfersBayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingAuction_toDirectBayesianMechanismWithTransfers
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingMechanism_paymentRuleBayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingMechanism_paymentRule
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingAllocationRule_eq_zero_of_ne_winnerBayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingAllocationRule_eq_zero_of_ne_winner
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingAuction_allocationRuleBayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingAuction_allocationRule
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.opponentProductPrior_isProbabilityMeasureBayesianSingleItemAuction.opponentProductPrior_isProbabilityMeasure
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.instCoeDirectBayesianMechanismWithTransfersRealForallBayesianSingleItemAuction.instCoeDirectBayesianMechanismWithTransfersRealForall
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingAllocationRule_nonnegBayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingAllocationRule_nonneg
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingAllocationRule_eq_zero_of_not_posBayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingAllocationRule_eq_zero_of_not_pos
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.profileSplitMeasurableEquiv_apply_sndBayesianSingleItemAuction.profileSplitMeasurableEquiv_apply_snd
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.profileSplitMeasurableEquiv_symm_applyBayesianSingleItemAuction.profileSplitMeasurableEquiv_symm_apply
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingWinner_update_self_of_winnerBayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingWinner_update_self_of_winner
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.expectedSellerRevenueInEnvironment_selfBayesianSingleItemAuction.expectedSellerRevenueInEnvironment_self
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingMechanism_allocationRuleBayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingMechanism_allocationRule
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingAuction_opponentPriorBayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingAuction_opponentPrior
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualValueMyerson virtual value
v - (1 - F_i(v)) / f_i(v)for bidderi. - BayesianSingleItemAuction.profileSplitMeasurableEquiv_apply_fstBayesianSingleItemAuction.profileSplitMeasurableEquiv_apply_fst
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingAuction_priorBayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingAuction_prior
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.winningVirtualValue_update_self_pos_iff_of_winnerBayesianSingleItemAuction.winningVirtualValue_update_self_pos_iff_of_winner
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingAllocationRule_eq_one_of_winner_of_winning_posBayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingAllocationRule_eq_one_of_winner_of_winning_pos
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingPaymentRuleMyerson payment for
virtualSurplusMaximizingAllocationRule. - BayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingAuction_typeDataBayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingAuction_typeData
- BayesianSingleItemAuctionA direct Bayesian single-item auction with scalar private types and probabilistic allocation. The allocation rule returns a function…
- SingleParameterMechanism.IsMonotoneMonotonicity of the allocation rule. Agent
i's allocation is non-decreasing ini's reported type, holding all other reports fixed.… - SingleParameterMechanismA single-parameter mechanism. Each agent
ihas a single private typeθ_i : R(their "value per unit"). The allocation gives each agent… - MechanismWithTransfersA mechanism with monetary transfers. -
I— agents -T— report/type space of each agent -A— allocation space -P— payment space… - BayesianSingleItemAuction.profileInsert_selfThe inserted coordinate is the inserted value.
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.profileInsert_of_neOther coordinates come from the opponent profile.
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.reportProfile_selfThe inserted coordinate is
zᵢ. - BayesianSingleItemAuction.reportProfile_of_neOther coordinates come from the opponent profile.
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.update_reportProfile_selfUpdating coordinate
ireplaces the inserted report. - BayesianSingleItemAuction.instIsProbabilityMeasureOpponentTypeProfileOpponentPriorBayesianSingleItemAuction.instIsProbabilityMeasureOpponentTypeProfileOpponentPrior
- Used by 2
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.existsUnique_zeroNormalized_paymentRule_for_virtualSurplusMaximizingAllocationRuleBayesianSingleItemAuction.existsUnique_zeroNormalized_paymentRule_for_virtualSurplusMaximizingAllocationRule
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingAllocationRule_isImplementable_of_isRegularBayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingAllocationRule_isImplementable_of_isRegular
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set_option autoImplicit true inset_option relaxedAutoImplicit true inopen BayesianSingleItemAuction inopen scoped BigOperators inopen MeasureTheory invariable {I : Type*} in/-- Under regularity, the deterministic virtual-surplus-maximizing allocation rule is monotone in the sense required by `SingleParameterMechanism`. -/theorem BayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingAllocationRule_isMonotone_of_isRegular [Fintype I] [Nontrivial I] [DecidableEq I] [LinearOrder I] (A : BayesianSingleItemAuction I) (hA : A.IsRegular) : SingleParameterMechanism.IsMonotone ({ allocationRule := A.virtualSurplusMaximizingAllocationRule paymentRule := A.virtualSurplusMaximizingPaymentRule } : SingleParameterMechanism I ℝ) := by classical intro i r s hrs b change A.virtualSurplusMaximizingAllocationRule (Function.update b i r) i ≤ A.virtualSurplusMaximizingAllocationRule (Function.update b i s) i by_cases hwin_lo : A.virtualSurplusMaximizingWinner (Function.update b i r) = i · have hwin_hi : A.virtualSurplusMaximizingWinner (Function.update b i s) = i := A.virtualSurplusMaximizingWinner_update_self_of_winner hA b i hrs hwin_lo by_cases hpos_lo : 0 < A.virtualValue i r · have hpos_hi : 0 < A.virtualValue i s := lt_of_lt_of_le hpos_lo (hA i hrs) have hpos_lo' : 0 < A.winningVirtualValue (Function.update b i r) := (A.winningVirtualValue_update_self_pos_iff_of_winner b i r hwin_lo).2 hpos_lo have hpos_hi' : 0 < A.winningVirtualValue (Function.update b i s) := (A.winningVirtualValue_update_self_pos_iff_of_winner b i s hwin_hi).2 hpos_hi rw [A.virtualSurplusMaximizingAllocationRule_eq_one_of_winner_of_winning_pos hwin_lo hpos_lo', A.virtualSurplusMaximizingAllocationRule_eq_one_of_winner_of_winning_pos hwin_hi hpos_hi'] · have hnotpos_lo : ¬ 0 < A.winningVirtualValue (Function.update b i r) := mt (A.winningVirtualValue_update_self_pos_iff_of_winner b i r hwin_lo).1 hpos_lo rw [A.virtualSurplusMaximizingAllocationRule_eq_zero_of_not_pos (Function.update b i r) hnotpos_lo] exact A.virtualSurplusMaximizingAllocationRule_nonneg (Function.update b i s) i · have hi_ne : i ≠ A.virtualSurplusMaximizingWinner (Function.update b i r) := fun hi => hwin_lo hi.symm rw [A.virtualSurplusMaximizingAllocationRule_eq_zero_of_ne_winner hi_ne] exact A.virtualSurplusMaximizingAllocationRule_nonneg (Function.update b i s) i