SocialChoice.Voting.unanimous_strict_pref_not_chosen
theoremverifiedformalizationimported Lean
If every voter strictly prefers a to b, then a unanimous monotonic resolute voting rule cannot choose b. This is the set-valued strict-profile form of [MSZ 21.32].
Statement
set_option autoImplicit true in set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in variable {N A : Type*} in theorem SocialChoice.Voting.unanimous_strict_pref_not_chosen [Fintype N] [Nonempty N] [Fintype A] (f : VotingRule N A) (hU : Unanimity f) (_hM : Monotonicity f) (P : Profile N A) {a b : A} (hab : ∀ i : N, Prefers P i a b) : b ∉ f P
- Formalizes
- EconCSLib, `SocialChoice.Voting.unanimous_strict_pref_not_chosen`
- Lean proof
- By xbei (from the file's git history), from github.com/gametheoryinlean/EconCSLib at
1a88f809b538(Copyright (c) 2026 EconCSLib contributors. All rights reserved, Apache-2.0). Compiled here against leanprover/lean4:v4.33.1, Mathlib v4.33.1; written for leanprover/lean4:v4.30.0.SocialChoice.Voting.unanimous_strict_pref_not_chosen← SocialChoice.Voting.unanimous_strict_pref_not_chosen (EconCSLib/SocialChoice/Voting/GibbardSatterthwaite.lean:184): verbatim
- Verified
- 08 Oct 2026
- Axioms
Classical.choiceQuot.soundpropext- Built on 6
- SocialChoice.Voting.BallotPrefers_ballotFromInjectiveSocialChoice.Voting.BallotPrefers_ballotFromInjective
- SocialChoice.Voting.PrefersVoter
istrictly prefersatobin profileP. - SocialChoice.Voting.MonotonicityMonotonicity: raising a selected alternative cannot make it unselected.
- SocialChoice.Voting.ProfileA voting profile assigns each voter a strict linear order over alternatives.
- SocialChoice.Voting.UnanimityUnanimity/Pareto for set-valued voting rules: no unanimously dominated alternative is selected.
- SocialChoice.Voting.VotingRuleA set-valued voting rule on fixed finite voter and candidate types.
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set_option autoImplicit true inset_option relaxedAutoImplicit true invariable {N A : Type*} in/-- If every voter strictly prefers `a` to `b`, then a unanimous monotonic resolute voting rule cannot choose `b`. This is the set-valued strict-profile form of [MSZ 21.32]. -/theorem SocialChoice.Voting.unanimous_strict_pref_not_chosen [Fintype N] [Nonempty N] [Fintype A] (f : VotingRule N A) (hU : Unanimity f) (_hM : Monotonicity f) (P : Profile N A) {a b : A} (hab : ∀ i : N, Prefers P i a b) : b ∉ f P := by exact hU P a b hab