AFTD Auto-Formalizing Theoretical Domains

SocialChoice.Voting.unanimous_strict_pref_not_chosen

theoremverifiedformalizationimported Lean

If every voter strictly prefers a to b, then a unanimous monotonic resolute voting rule cannot choose b. This is the set-valued strict-profile form of [MSZ 21.32].

Statement

set_option autoImplicit true in
set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in
variable {N A : Type*} in
theorem SocialChoice.Voting.unanimous_strict_pref_not_chosen [Fintype N] [Nonempty N] [Fintype A]
    (f : VotingRule N A) (hU : Unanimity f) (_hM : Monotonicity f)
    (P : Profile N A) {a b : A}
    (hab : ∀ i : N, Prefers P i a b) :
    b ∉ f P
Formalizes
EconCSLib, `SocialChoice.Voting.unanimous_strict_pref_not_chosen`
Lean proof
By xbei (from the file's git history), from github.com/gametheoryinlean/EconCSLib at 1a88f809b538 (Copyright (c) 2026 EconCSLib contributors. All rights reserved, Apache-2.0). Compiled here against leanprover/lean4:v4.33.1, Mathlib v4.33.1; written for leanprover/lean4:v4.30.0.
Verified
08 Oct 2026
Axioms
Classical.choiceQuot.soundpropext
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set_option autoImplicit true inset_option relaxedAutoImplicit true invariable {N A : Type*} in/-- If every voter strictly prefers `a` to `b`, then a unanimous monotonic resolute voting rule cannot choose `b`. This is the set-valued strict-profile form of [MSZ 21.32]. -/theorem SocialChoice.Voting.unanimous_strict_pref_not_chosen [Fintype N] [Nonempty N] [Fintype A]    (f : VotingRule N A) (hU : Unanimity f) (_hM : Monotonicity f)    (P : Profile N A) {a b : A}    (hab : ∀ i : N, Prefers P i a b) :    b ∉ f P := by  exact hU P a b hab
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