GS.joinWoman_injective
theoremverifiedformalizationimported Lean
The join woman-assignment is injective.
Statement
set_option autoImplicit true in set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in open GS in variable {n : ℕ} (w m : Preferences n) in variable {w m} in variable (μ ν : Matching (Fin n) (Fin n)) (hμ : Matching.IsStable (MatchingMarket.ofEquivData w m) μ) (hν : Matching.IsStable (MatchingMarket.ofEquivData w m) ν) in lemma GS.joinWoman_injective : Function.Injective (joinWoman μ ν hμ hν)
- Formalizes
- EconCSLib, `GS.joinWoman_injective`
- Lean proof
- By xbei (from the file's git history), from github.com/gametheoryinlean/EconCSLib at
1a88f809b538(Copyright (c) 2026 EconCSLib contributors. All rights reserved, Apache-2.0). Compiled here against leanprover/lean4:v4.33.1, Mathlib v4.33.1; written for leanprover/lean4:v4.30.0.GS.joinWoman_injective← GS.joinWoman_injective (EconCSLib/MarketDesign/Matching/Lattice.lean:188): verbatim
- Verified
- 08 Oct 2026
- Axioms
Classical.choiceQuot.soundpropext- Built on 13
- GS.joinWoman_mem_menIf
iis manj's join-partner thenjis one ofi's two men. - GS.mPartnerThe man partnered to woman
iunder a stable matchingμ. - Matching.IsStableA matching is stable if it has no blocking pair. [MSZ 22.5]
- MatchingA matching is a partial bijection between
MandW.matchM iis the partner ofi ∈ M(ornoneif unmatched).matchW jis the… - GS.matchM_mPartnerGS.matchM_mPartner
- instCoeFunPrefForallForallPropinstCoeFunPrefForallForallProp
- GS.joinWoman_worse_rightDual of
joinWoman_worse_leftwith the roles ofμ,νswapped. - GS.matchW_wPartnerGS.matchW_wPartner
- GS.PreferencesList-based preferences:
prefs iis a full permutation ofFin n, ordered from most to least preferred. - GS.joinWoman_worse_leftIf
iis the join-partner of herμ-manj, theniweakly prefers herν-man toj(sojis her worse man). - MatchingMarket.ofEquivDataBuild a
MatchingMarket (Fin n) (Fin n)from list-based preference data.some j ≻ some kiffjappears earlier in the list;noneis… - GS.joinWomanMan
j's more-preferred partner across stable matchingsμandν. - GS.pref_list_memEvery element of
Fin nappears in a full-permutation list.
- GS.joinWoman_mem_menIf
- Used by 1
- GS.joinEquivThe join woman-assignment packaged as an equivalence (injective on the finite
Fin n, hence bijective).
- GS.joinEquivThe join woman-assignment packaged as an equivalence (injective on the finite
Lean source view module on GitHub
Choose a tactic — a marked line — to see the goals Lean had before and after it, as in Lean’s infoview. Step with ← → or j k.
set_option autoImplicit true inset_option relaxedAutoImplicit true inopen GS invariable {n : ℕ} (w m : Preferences n) invariable {w m} invariable (μ ν : Matching (Fin n) (Fin n)) (hμ : Matching.IsStable (MatchingMarket.ofEquivData w m) μ) (hν : Matching.IsStable (MatchingMarket.ofEquivData w m) ν) in/-- The join woman-assignment is injective. -/lemma GS.joinWoman_injective : Function.Injective (joinWoman μ ν hμ hν) := by intro j1 j2 he set i := joinWoman μ ν hμ hν j1 with hidef have h1 : joinWoman μ ν hμ hν j1 = i := hidef.symm have h2 : joinWoman μ ν hμ hν j2 = i := he.symm.trans hidef.symm rcases joinWoman_mem_men μ ν hμ hν h1 with hm1 | hn1 <;> rcases joinWoman_mem_men μ ν hμ hν h2 with hm2 | hn2 · exact hm1.symm.trans hm2 -- both μ-men of i · -- j1 = μ-man, j2 = ν-man have a := joinWoman_worse_left μ ν hμ hν h1 hm1 -- idxOf (mPartner ν i) ≤ idxOf j1 have b := joinWoman_worse_right μ ν hμ hν h2 hn2 -- idxOf (mPartner μ i) ≤ idxOf j2 rw [hn2] at a; rw [hm1] at b exact (List.idxOf_inj (pref_list_mem _ (w.valid i).1 (w.valid i).2 j1)).mp (le_antisymm b a) · -- j1 = ν-man, j2 = μ-man have a := joinWoman_worse_right μ ν hμ hν h1 hn1 -- idxOf (mPartner μ i) ≤ idxOf j1 have b := joinWoman_worse_left μ ν hμ hν h2 hm2 -- idxOf (mPartner ν i) ≤ idxOf j2 rw [hm2] at a; rw [hn1] at b exact (List.idxOf_inj (pref_list_mem _ (w.valid i).1 (w.valid i).2 j1)).mp (le_antisymm b a) · exact hn1.symm.trans hn2 -- both ν-men of i