GS.joinWoman_mem_men
theoremverifiedformalizationimported Lean
If i is man j's join-partner then j is one of i's two men.
Statement
set_option autoImplicit true in set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in open GS in variable {n : ℕ} (w m : Preferences n) in variable {w m} in variable (μ ν : Matching (Fin n) (Fin n)) (hμ : Matching.IsStable (MatchingMarket.ofEquivData w m) μ) (hν : Matching.IsStable (MatchingMarket.ofEquivData w m) ν) in lemma GS.joinWoman_mem_men {j i : Fin n} (h : joinWoman μ ν hμ hν j = i) : mPartner μ hμ i = j ∨ mPartner ν hν i = j
- Formalizes
- EconCSLib, `GS.joinWoman_mem_men`
- Lean proof
- By xbei (from the file's git history), from github.com/gametheoryinlean/EconCSLib at
1a88f809b538(Copyright (c) 2026 EconCSLib contributors. All rights reserved, Apache-2.0). Compiled here against leanprover/lean4:v4.33.1, Mathlib v4.33.1; written for leanprover/lean4:v4.30.0.GS.joinWoman_mem_men← GS.joinWoman_mem_men (EconCSLib/MarketDesign/Matching/Lattice.lean:135): verbatim
- Verified
- 08 Oct 2026
- Axioms
Classical.choiceQuot.soundpropext- Built on 12
- GS.mPartnerThe man partnered to woman
iunder a stable matchingμ. - Matching.IsStableA matching is stable if it has no blocking pair. [MSZ 22.5]
- MatchingA matching is a partial bijection between
MandW.matchM iis the partner ofi ∈ M(ornoneif unmatched).matchW jis the… - GS.matchM_mPartnerGS.matchM_mPartner
- instCoeFunPrefForallForallPropinstCoeFunPrefForallForallProp
- GS.matchW_wPartnerGS.matchW_wPartner
- GS.wPartnerThe woman partnered to man
junder a stable matchingμ(total, since a stable matching of the balanced market is perfect). - GS.wPartner_eq_iffThe man-of and woman-of partner maps are inverse to each other.
- GS.PreferencesList-based preferences:
prefs iis a full permutation ofFin n, ordered from most to least preferred. - GS.joinWoman_eq_orGS.joinWoman_eq_or
- MatchingMarket.ofEquivDataBuild a
MatchingMarket (Fin n) (Fin n)from list-based preference data.some j ≻ some kiffjappears earlier in the list;noneis… - GS.joinWomanMan
j's more-preferred partner across stable matchingsμandν.
- GS.mPartnerThe man partnered to woman
- Used by 2
- GS.joinWoman_injectiveThe join woman-assignment is injective.
- GS.stableJoin_isStableThe join of two stable matchings is stable.
Lean source view module on GitHub
Choose a tactic — a marked line — to see the goals Lean had before and after it, as in Lean’s infoview. Step with ← → or j k.
set_option autoImplicit true inset_option relaxedAutoImplicit true inopen GS invariable {n : ℕ} (w m : Preferences n) invariable {w m} invariable (μ ν : Matching (Fin n) (Fin n)) (hμ : Matching.IsStable (MatchingMarket.ofEquivData w m) μ) (hν : Matching.IsStable (MatchingMarket.ofEquivData w m) ν) in/-- If `i` is man `j`'s join-partner then `j` is one of `i`'s two men. -/lemma GS.joinWoman_mem_men {j i : Fin n} (h : joinWoman μ ν hμ hν j = i) : mPartner μ hμ i = j ∨ mPartner ν hν i = j := by rcases joinWoman_eq_or μ ν hμ hν j with he | he · exact Or.inl ((wPartner_eq_iff μ hμ).mp (he ▸ h)) · exact Or.inr ((wPartner_eq_iff ν hν).mp (he ▸ h))