GS.joinWoman_worse_right
theoremverifiedformalizationimported Lean
Dual of joinWoman_worse_left with the roles of μ, ν swapped.
Statement
set_option autoImplicit true in set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in open GS in variable {n : ℕ} (w m : Preferences n) in variable {w m} in variable (μ ν : Matching (Fin n) (Fin n)) (hμ : Matching.IsStable (MatchingMarket.ofEquivData w m) μ) (hν : Matching.IsStable (MatchingMarket.ofEquivData w m) ν) in lemma GS.joinWoman_worse_right {j i : Fin n} (hji : joinWoman μ ν hμ hν j = i) (hνji : mPartner ν hν i = j) : (w.prefs i).idxOf (mPartner μ hμ i) ≤ (w.prefs i).idxOf j
- Formalizes
- EconCSLib, `GS.joinWoman_worse_right`
- Lean proof
- By xbei (from the file's git history), from github.com/gametheoryinlean/EconCSLib at
1a88f809b538(Copyright (c) 2026 EconCSLib contributors. All rights reserved, Apache-2.0). Compiled here against leanprover/lean4:v4.33.1, Mathlib v4.33.1; written for leanprover/lean4:v4.30.0.GS.joinWoman_worse_right← GS.joinWoman_worse_right (EconCSLib/MarketDesign/Matching/Lattice.lean:167): verbatim
- Verified
- 08 Oct 2026
- Axioms
Classical.choiceQuot.soundpropext- Built on 12
- GS.mPartnerThe man partnered to woman
iunder a stable matchingμ. - Matching.IsStableA matching is stable if it has no blocking pair. [MSZ 22.5]
- MatchingA matching is a partial bijection between
MandW.matchM iis the partner ofi ∈ M(ornoneif unmatched).matchW jis the… - GS.matchM_mPartnerGS.matchM_mPartner
- instCoeFunPrefForallForallPropinstCoeFunPrefForallForallProp
- GS.matchW_wPartnerGS.matchW_wPartner
- GS.opposed_preferencesOpposed preferences. Let
μbe a stable matching. If manjis matched to womanwjunder another matchingνand **strictly… - GS.wPartnerThe woman partnered to man
junder a stable matchingμ(total, since a stable matching of the balanced market is perfect). - GS.wPartner_eq_iffThe man-of and woman-of partner maps are inverse to each other.
- GS.PreferencesList-based preferences:
prefs iis a full permutation ofFin n, ordered from most to least preferred. - MatchingMarket.ofEquivDataBuild a
MatchingMarket (Fin n) (Fin n)from list-based preference data.some j ≻ some kiffjappears earlier in the list;noneis… - GS.joinWomanMan
j's more-preferred partner across stable matchingsμandν.
- GS.mPartnerThe man partnered to woman
- Used by 1
- GS.joinWoman_injectiveThe join woman-assignment is injective.
Lean source view module on GitHub
Choose a tactic — a marked line — to see the goals Lean had before and after it, as in Lean’s infoview. Step with ← → or j k.
set_option autoImplicit true inset_option relaxedAutoImplicit true inopen GS invariable {n : ℕ} (w m : Preferences n) invariable {w m} invariable (μ ν : Matching (Fin n) (Fin n)) (hμ : Matching.IsStable (MatchingMarket.ofEquivData w m) μ) (hν : Matching.IsStable (MatchingMarket.ofEquivData w m) ν) in/-- Dual of `joinWoman_worse_left` with the roles of `μ`, `ν` swapped. -/lemma GS.joinWoman_worse_right {j i : Fin n} (hji : joinWoman μ ν hμ hν j = i) (hνji : mPartner ν hν i = j) : (w.prefs i).idxOf (mPartner μ hμ i) ≤ (w.prefs i).idxOf j := by have hνw : wPartner ν hν j = i := (wPartner_eq_iff ν hν).mpr hνji by_cases heq : wPartner μ hμ j = i · have : mPartner μ hμ i = j := (wPartner_eq_iff μ hμ).mp heq rw [this] · have hbranch : joinWoman μ ν hμ hν j = wPartner ν hν j := by rw [hji, hνw] have hlt0 : (m.prefs j).idxOf (wPartner ν hν j) < (m.prefs j).idxOf (wPartner μ hμ j) := by by_contra hge push_neg at hge unfold joinWoman at hbranch rw [if_pos hge] at hbranch exact heq (hbranch.trans hνw) rw [hνw] at hlt0 have hlt : (m.prefs j).idxOf i < (m.prefs j).idxOf (wPartner μ hμ j) := hlt0 have := opposed_preferences w m μ hμ (wj := i) (wj' := wPartner μ hμ j) (m' := mPartner μ hμ i) (matchW_wPartner μ hμ j) hlt (matchM_mPartner μ hμ i) omega