AFTD Auto-Formalizing Theoretical Domains

GS.joinWoman_worse_right

theoremverifiedformalizationimported Lean

Dual of joinWoman_worse_left with the roles of μ, ν swapped.

Statement

set_option autoImplicit true in
set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in
open GS in
variable {n : ℕ} (w m : Preferences n) in
variable {w m} in
variable (μ ν : Matching (Fin n) (Fin n))
  (hμ : Matching.IsStable (MatchingMarket.ofEquivData w m) μ)
  (hν : Matching.IsStable (MatchingMarket.ofEquivData w m) ν) in
lemma GS.joinWoman_worse_right {j i : Fin n}
    (hji : joinWoman μ ν hμ hν j = i) (hνji : mPartner ν hν i = j) :
    (w.prefs i).idxOf (mPartner μ hμ i) ≤ (w.prefs i).idxOf j
Formalizes
EconCSLib, `GS.joinWoman_worse_right`
Lean proof
By xbei (from the file's git history), from github.com/gametheoryinlean/EconCSLib at 1a88f809b538 (Copyright (c) 2026 EconCSLib contributors. All rights reserved, Apache-2.0). Compiled here against leanprover/lean4:v4.33.1, Mathlib v4.33.1; written for leanprover/lean4:v4.30.0.
Verified
08 Oct 2026
Axioms
Classical.choiceQuot.soundpropext
Built on 12
  • GS.mPartnerThe man partnered to woman i under a stable matching μ.
  • Matching.IsStableA matching is stable if it has no blocking pair. [MSZ 22.5]
  • MatchingA matching is a partial bijection between M and W. matchM i is the partner of i ∈ M (or none if unmatched). matchW j is the…
  • GS.matchM_mPartnerGS.matchM_mPartner
  • instCoeFunPrefForallForallPropinstCoeFunPrefForallForallProp
  • GS.matchW_wPartnerGS.matchW_wPartner
  • GS.opposed_preferencesOpposed preferences. Let μ be a stable matching. If man j is matched to woman wj under another matching ν and **strictly…
  • GS.wPartnerThe woman partnered to man j under a stable matching μ (total, since a stable matching of the balanced market is perfect).
  • GS.wPartner_eq_iffThe man-of and woman-of partner maps are inverse to each other.
  • GS.PreferencesList-based preferences: prefs i is a full permutation of Fin n, ordered from most to least preferred.
  • MatchingMarket.ofEquivDataBuild a MatchingMarket (Fin n) (Fin n) from list-based preference data. some j ≻ some k iff j appears earlier in the list; none is…
  • GS.joinWomanMan j's more-preferred partner across stable matchings μ and ν.
Used by 1

Lean source view module on GitHub

set_option autoImplicit true inset_option relaxedAutoImplicit true inopen GS invariable {n : ℕ} (w m : Preferences n) invariable {w m} invariable (μ ν : Matching (Fin n) (Fin n))  (hμ : Matching.IsStable (MatchingMarket.ofEquivData w m) μ)  (hν : Matching.IsStable (MatchingMarket.ofEquivData w m) ν) in/-- Dual of `joinWoman_worse_left` with the roles of `μ`, `ν` swapped. -/lemma GS.joinWoman_worse_right {j i : Fin n}    (hji : joinWoman μ ν hμ hν j = i) (hνji : mPartner ν hν i = j) :    (w.prefs i).idxOf (mPartner μ hμ i) ≤ (w.prefs i).idxOf j := by  have hνw : wPartner ν hν j = i := (wPartner_eq_iff ν hν).mpr hνji  by_cases heq : wPartner μ hμ j = i  · have : mPartner μ hμ i = j := (wPartner_eq_iff μ hμ).mp heq    rw [this]  · have hbranch : joinWoman μ ν hμ hν j = wPartner ν hν j := by rw [hji, hνw]    have hlt0 : (m.prefs j).idxOf (wPartner ν hν j) < (m.prefs j).idxOf (wPartner μ hμ j) := by      by_contra hge      push_neg at hge      unfold joinWoman at hbranch      rw [if_pos hge] at hbranch      exact heq (hbranch.trans hνw)    rw [hνw] at hlt0    have hlt : (m.prefs j).idxOf i < (m.prefs j).idxOf (wPartner μ hμ j) := hlt0    have := opposed_preferences w m μ hμ (wj := i) (wj' := wPartner μ hμ j)      (m' := mPartner μ hμ i) (matchW_wPartner μ hμ j) hlt (matchM_mPartner μ hμ i)    omega
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