GS.mPartner
defimported Lean
The man partnered to woman i under a stable matching μ.
Statement
set_option autoImplicit true in set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in open GS in variable {n : ℕ} (w m : Preferences n) in variable {w m} in noncomputable def GS.mPartner (μ : Matching (Fin n) (Fin n)) (hμ : Matching.IsStable (MatchingMarket.ofEquivData w m) μ) (i : Fin n) : Fin n
- Defined in
- EconCSLib, `GS.mPartner`
- Lean proof
- By xbei (from the file's git history), from github.com/gametheoryinlean/EconCSLib at
1a88f809b538(Copyright (c) 2026 EconCSLib contributors. All rights reserved, Apache-2.0). Compiled here against leanprover/lean4:v4.33.1, Mathlib v4.33.1; written for leanprover/lean4:v4.30.0.GS.mPartner← GS.mPartner (EconCSLib/MarketDesign/Matching/Lattice.lean:89): verbatim
- Verified
- 08 Oct 2026
- Axioms
- none listed
- Built on 6
- Matching.IsStableA matching is stable if it has no blocking pair. [MSZ 22.5]
- MatchingA matching is a partial bijection between
MandW.matchM iis the partner ofi ∈ M(ornoneif unmatched).matchW jis the… - instCoeFunPrefForallForallPropinstCoeFunPrefForallForallProp
- GS.PreferencesList-based preferences:
prefs iis a full permutation ofFin n, ordered from most to least preferred. - MatchingMarket.ofEquivDataBuild a
MatchingMarket (Fin n) (Fin n)from list-based preference data.some j ≻ some kiffjappears earlier in the list;noneis… - GS.stable_matching_perfectIn the balanced full-preference one-to-one market, every stable matching is perfect: every woman and every man is matched. This is the…
- Used by 15
- GS.joinWoman_mem_menIf
iis manj's join-partner thenjis one ofi's two men. - GS.meetMan_eq_orGS.meetMan_eq_or
- GS.stableMeet_isStableThe meet of two stable matchings is stable.
- GS.meetMan_le_leftGS.meetMan_le_left
- GS.joinWoman_injectiveThe join woman-assignment is injective.
- GS.matchM_mPartnerGS.matchM_mPartner
- GS.joinWoman_worse_rightDual of
joinWoman_worse_leftwith the roles ofμ,νswapped. - GS.meetMan_mem_womenGS.meetMan_mem_women
- GS.meetManWoman
i's more-preferred man acrossμandν. - GS.stableJoin_isStableThe join of two stable matchings is stable.
- GS.wPartner_eq_iffThe man-of and woman-of partner maps are inverse to each other.
- GS.meetMan_worse_rightGS.meetMan_worse_right
- GS.meetMan_worse_leftGS.meetMan_worse_left
- GS.joinWoman_worse_leftIf
iis the join-partner of herμ-manj, theniweakly prefers herν-man toj(sojis her worse man). - GS.meetMan_le_rightGS.meetMan_le_right
- GS.joinWoman_mem_menIf
Lean source view module on GitHub
set_option autoImplicit true in set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in open GS in variable {n : ℕ} (w m : Preferences n) in variable {w m} in /-- The man partnered to woman `i` under a stable matching `μ`. -/ noncomputable def GS.mPartner (μ : Matching (Fin n) (Fin n)) (hμ : Matching.IsStable (MatchingMarket.ofEquivData w m) μ) (i : Fin n) : Fin n := (μ.matchM i).get ((stable_matching_perfect w m μ hμ).1 i)