GS.joinWoman_worse_left
theoremverifiedformalizationimported Lean
If i is the join-partner of her μ-man j, then i weakly prefers her ν-man to j (so j is her worse man).
Statement
set_option autoImplicit true in set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in open GS in variable {n : ℕ} (w m : Preferences n) in variable {w m} in variable (μ ν : Matching (Fin n) (Fin n)) (hμ : Matching.IsStable (MatchingMarket.ofEquivData w m) μ) (hν : Matching.IsStable (MatchingMarket.ofEquivData w m) ν) in lemma GS.joinWoman_worse_left {j i : Fin n} (hji : joinWoman μ ν hμ hν j = i) (hμji : mPartner μ hμ i = j) : (w.prefs i).idxOf (mPartner ν hν i) ≤ (w.prefs i).idxOf j
- Formalizes
- EconCSLib, `GS.joinWoman_worse_left`
- Lean proof
- By xbei (from the file's git history), from github.com/gametheoryinlean/EconCSLib at
1a88f809b538(Copyright (c) 2026 EconCSLib contributors. All rights reserved, Apache-2.0). Compiled here against leanprover/lean4:v4.33.1, Mathlib v4.33.1; written for leanprover/lean4:v4.30.0.GS.joinWoman_worse_left← GS.joinWoman_worse_left (EconCSLib/MarketDesign/Matching/Lattice.lean:143): verbatim
- Verified
- 08 Oct 2026
- Axioms
Classical.choiceQuot.soundpropext- Built on 13
- GS.mPartnerThe man partnered to woman
iunder a stable matchingμ. - Matching.IsStableA matching is stable if it has no blocking pair. [MSZ 22.5]
- MatchingA matching is a partial bijection between
MandW.matchM iis the partner ofi ∈ M(ornoneif unmatched).matchW jis the… - GS.matchM_mPartnerGS.matchM_mPartner
- instCoeFunPrefForallForallPropinstCoeFunPrefForallForallProp
- GS.matchW_wPartnerGS.matchW_wPartner
- GS.opposed_preferencesOpposed preferences. Let
μbe a stable matching. If manjis matched to womanwjunder another matchingνand **strictly… - GS.wPartnerThe woman partnered to man
junder a stable matchingμ(total, since a stable matching of the balanced market is perfect). - GS.wPartner_eq_iffThe man-of and woman-of partner maps are inverse to each other.
- GS.PreferencesList-based preferences:
prefs iis a full permutation ofFin n, ordered from most to least preferred. - MatchingMarket.ofEquivDataBuild a
MatchingMarket (Fin n) (Fin n)from list-based preference data.some j ≻ some kiffjappears earlier in the list;noneis… - GS.joinWomanMan
j's more-preferred partner across stable matchingsμandν. - GS.pref_list_memEvery element of
Fin nappears in a full-permutation list.
- GS.mPartnerThe man partnered to woman
- Used by 1
- GS.joinWoman_injectiveThe join woman-assignment is injective.
Lean source view module on GitHub
Choose a tactic — a marked line — to see the goals Lean had before and after it, as in Lean’s infoview. Step with ← → or j k.
set_option autoImplicit true inset_option relaxedAutoImplicit true inopen GS invariable {n : ℕ} (w m : Preferences n) invariable {w m} invariable (μ ν : Matching (Fin n) (Fin n)) (hμ : Matching.IsStable (MatchingMarket.ofEquivData w m) μ) (hν : Matching.IsStable (MatchingMarket.ofEquivData w m) ν) in/-- If `i` is the join-partner of her `μ`-man `j`, then `i` weakly prefers her `ν`-man to `j` (so `j` is her worse man). -/lemma GS.joinWoman_worse_left {j i : Fin n} (hji : joinWoman μ ν hμ hν j = i) (hμji : mPartner μ hμ i = j) : (w.prefs i).idxOf (mPartner ν hν i) ≤ (w.prefs i).idxOf j := by have hμw : wPartner μ hμ j = i := (wPartner_eq_iff μ hμ).mpr hμji by_cases heq : wPartner ν hν j = i · -- `i` is also `j`'s ν-woman, so `mPartner ν i = j`. have : mPartner ν hν i = j := (wPartner_eq_iff ν hν).mp heq rw [this] · -- `j` strictly prefers `i` (his μ-woman) over his ν-woman; opposed prefs. have hbranch : joinWoman μ ν hμ hν j = wPartner μ hμ j := by rw [hji, hμw] have hle : (m.prefs j).idxOf (wPartner μ hμ j) ≤ (m.prefs j).idxOf (wPartner ν hν j) := by by_contra hgt unfold joinWoman at hbranch rw [if_neg hgt] at hbranch exact heq (hbranch.trans hμw) rw [hμw] at hle have hlt : (m.prefs j).idxOf i < (m.prefs j).idxOf (wPartner ν hν j) := by refine lt_of_le_of_ne hle (fun e => heq ?_) exact ((List.idxOf_inj (pref_list_mem _ (m.valid j).1 (m.valid j).2 i)).mp e).symm have := opposed_preferences w m ν hν (wj := i) (wj' := wPartner ν hν j) (m' := mPartner ν hν i) (matchW_wPartner ν hν j) hlt (matchM_mPartner ν hν i) omega