AFTD Auto-Formalizing Theoretical Domains

GS.joinWoman_worse_left

theoremverifiedformalizationimported Lean

If i is the join-partner of her μ-man j, then i weakly prefers her ν-man to j (so j is her worse man).

Statement

set_option autoImplicit true in
set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in
open GS in
variable {n : ℕ} (w m : Preferences n) in
variable {w m} in
variable (μ ν : Matching (Fin n) (Fin n))
  (hμ : Matching.IsStable (MatchingMarket.ofEquivData w m) μ)
  (hν : Matching.IsStable (MatchingMarket.ofEquivData w m) ν) in
lemma GS.joinWoman_worse_left {j i : Fin n}
    (hji : joinWoman μ ν hμ hν j = i) (hμji : mPartner μ hμ i = j) :
    (w.prefs i).idxOf (mPartner ν hν i) ≤ (w.prefs i).idxOf j
Formalizes
EconCSLib, `GS.joinWoman_worse_left`
Lean proof
By xbei (from the file's git history), from github.com/gametheoryinlean/EconCSLib at 1a88f809b538 (Copyright (c) 2026 EconCSLib contributors. All rights reserved, Apache-2.0). Compiled here against leanprover/lean4:v4.33.1, Mathlib v4.33.1; written for leanprover/lean4:v4.30.0.
Verified
08 Oct 2026
Axioms
Classical.choiceQuot.soundpropext
Built on 13
  • GS.mPartnerThe man partnered to woman i under a stable matching μ.
  • Matching.IsStableA matching is stable if it has no blocking pair. [MSZ 22.5]
  • MatchingA matching is a partial bijection between M and W. matchM i is the partner of i ∈ M (or none if unmatched). matchW j is the…
  • GS.matchM_mPartnerGS.matchM_mPartner
  • instCoeFunPrefForallForallPropinstCoeFunPrefForallForallProp
  • GS.matchW_wPartnerGS.matchW_wPartner
  • GS.opposed_preferencesOpposed preferences. Let μ be a stable matching. If man j is matched to woman wj under another matching ν and **strictly…
  • GS.wPartnerThe woman partnered to man j under a stable matching μ (total, since a stable matching of the balanced market is perfect).
  • GS.wPartner_eq_iffThe man-of and woman-of partner maps are inverse to each other.
  • GS.PreferencesList-based preferences: prefs i is a full permutation of Fin n, ordered from most to least preferred.
  • MatchingMarket.ofEquivDataBuild a MatchingMarket (Fin n) (Fin n) from list-based preference data. some j ≻ some k iff j appears earlier in the list; none is…
  • GS.joinWomanMan j's more-preferred partner across stable matchings μ and ν.
  • GS.pref_list_memEvery element of Fin n appears in a full-permutation list.
Used by 1

Lean source view module on GitHub

set_option autoImplicit true inset_option relaxedAutoImplicit true inopen GS invariable {n : ℕ} (w m : Preferences n) invariable {w m} invariable (μ ν : Matching (Fin n) (Fin n))  (hμ : Matching.IsStable (MatchingMarket.ofEquivData w m) μ)  (hν : Matching.IsStable (MatchingMarket.ofEquivData w m) ν) in/-- If `i` is the join-partner of her `μ`-man `j`, then `i` weakly prefers her `ν`-man to `j` (so `j` is her worse man). -/lemma GS.joinWoman_worse_left {j i : Fin n}    (hji : joinWoman μ ν hμ hν j = i) (hμji : mPartner μ hμ i = j) :    (w.prefs i).idxOf (mPartner ν hν i) ≤ (w.prefs i).idxOf j := by  have hμw : wPartner μ hμ j = i := (wPartner_eq_iff μ hμ).mpr hμji  by_cases heq : wPartner ν hν j = i  · -- `i` is also `j`'s ν-woman, so `mPartner ν i = j`.    have : mPartner ν hν i = j := (wPartner_eq_iff ν hν).mp heq    rw [this]  · -- `j` strictly prefers `i` (his μ-woman) over his ν-woman; opposed prefs.    have hbranch : joinWoman μ ν hμ hν j = wPartner μ hμ j := by rw [hji, hμw]    have hle : (m.prefs j).idxOf (wPartner μ hμ j) ≤ (m.prefs j).idxOf (wPartner ν hν j) := by      by_contra hgt      unfold joinWoman at hbranch      rw [if_neg hgt] at hbranch      exact heq (hbranch.trans hμw)    rw [hμw] at hle    have hlt : (m.prefs j).idxOf i < (m.prefs j).idxOf (wPartner ν hν j) := by      refine lt_of_le_of_ne hle (fun e => heq ?_)      exact ((List.idxOf_inj (pref_list_mem _ (m.valid j).1 (m.valid j).2 i)).mp e).symm    have := opposed_preferences w m ν hν (wj := i) (wj' := wPartner ν hν j)      (m' := mPartner ν hν i) (matchW_wPartner ν hν j) hlt (matchM_mPartner ν hν i)    omega
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