AFTD Auto-Formalizing Theoretical Domains

GS.wPartner_eq_iff

theoremverifiedformalizationimported Lean

The man-of and woman-of partner maps are inverse to each other.

Statement

set_option autoImplicit true in
set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in
open GS in
variable {n : ℕ} (w m : Preferences n) in
variable {w m} in
lemma GS.wPartner_eq_iff (μ : Matching (Fin n) (Fin n))
    (hμ : Matching.IsStable (MatchingMarket.ofEquivData w m) μ) {i j : Fin n} :
    wPartner μ hμ j = i ↔ mPartner μ hμ i = j
Formalizes
EconCSLib, `GS.wPartner_eq_iff`
Lean proof
By xbei (from the file's git history), from github.com/gametheoryinlean/EconCSLib at 1a88f809b538 (Copyright (c) 2026 EconCSLib contributors. All rights reserved, Apache-2.0). Compiled here against leanprover/lean4:v4.33.1, Mathlib v4.33.1; written for leanprover/lean4:v4.30.0.
Verified
08 Oct 2026
Axioms
Classical.choiceQuot.soundpropext
Built on 9
  • GS.mPartnerThe man partnered to woman i under a stable matching μ.
  • Matching.IsStableA matching is stable if it has no blocking pair. [MSZ 22.5]
  • MatchingA matching is a partial bijection between M and W. matchM i is the partner of i ∈ M (or none if unmatched). matchW j is the…
  • GS.matchM_mPartnerGS.matchM_mPartner
  • instCoeFunPrefForallForallPropinstCoeFunPrefForallForallProp
  • GS.matchW_wPartnerGS.matchW_wPartner
  • GS.wPartnerThe woman partnered to man j under a stable matching μ (total, since a stable matching of the balanced market is perfect).
  • GS.PreferencesList-based preferences: prefs i is a full permutation of Fin n, ordered from most to least preferred.
  • MatchingMarket.ofEquivDataBuild a MatchingMarket (Fin n) (Fin n) from list-based preference data. some j ≻ some k iff j appears earlier in the list; none is…
Used by 6

Lean source view module on GitHub

set_option autoImplicit true inset_option relaxedAutoImplicit true inopen GS invariable {n : ℕ} (w m : Preferences n) invariable {w m} in/-- The man-of and woman-of partner maps are inverse to each other. -/lemma GS.wPartner_eq_iff (μ : Matching (Fin n) (Fin n))    (hμ : Matching.IsStable (MatchingMarket.ofEquivData w m) μ) {i j : Fin n} :    wPartner μ hμ j = i ↔ mPartner μ hμ i = j := by  constructor  · intro h    have h1 : μ.matchW j = some i := by rw [matchW_wPartner μ hμ j, h]    have h2 : μ.matchM i = some j := (μ.consistent i j).mpr h1    rw [matchM_mPartner μ hμ i] at h2    exact Option.some.inj h2  · intro h    have h1 : μ.matchM i = some j := by rw [matchM_mPartner μ hμ i, h]    have h2 : μ.matchW j = some i := (μ.consistent i j).mp h1    rw [matchW_wPartner μ hμ j] at h2    exact Option.some.inj h2
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