GS.wPartner_eq_iff
theoremverifiedformalizationimported Lean
The man-of and woman-of partner maps are inverse to each other.
Statement
set_option autoImplicit true in set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in open GS in variable {n : ℕ} (w m : Preferences n) in variable {w m} in lemma GS.wPartner_eq_iff (μ : Matching (Fin n) (Fin n)) (hμ : Matching.IsStable (MatchingMarket.ofEquivData w m) μ) {i j : Fin n} : wPartner μ hμ j = i ↔ mPartner μ hμ i = j
- Formalizes
- EconCSLib, `GS.wPartner_eq_iff`
- Lean proof
- By xbei (from the file's git history), from github.com/gametheoryinlean/EconCSLib at
1a88f809b538(Copyright (c) 2026 EconCSLib contributors. All rights reserved, Apache-2.0). Compiled here against leanprover/lean4:v4.33.1, Mathlib v4.33.1; written for leanprover/lean4:v4.30.0.GS.wPartner_eq_iff← GS.wPartner_eq_iff (EconCSLib/MarketDesign/Matching/Lattice.lean:102): verbatim
- Verified
- 08 Oct 2026
- Axioms
Classical.choiceQuot.soundpropext- Built on 9
- GS.mPartnerThe man partnered to woman
iunder a stable matchingμ. - Matching.IsStableA matching is stable if it has no blocking pair. [MSZ 22.5]
- MatchingA matching is a partial bijection between
MandW.matchM iis the partner ofi ∈ M(ornoneif unmatched).matchW jis the… - GS.matchM_mPartnerGS.matchM_mPartner
- instCoeFunPrefForallForallPropinstCoeFunPrefForallForallProp
- GS.matchW_wPartnerGS.matchW_wPartner
- GS.wPartnerThe woman partnered to man
junder a stable matchingμ(total, since a stable matching of the balanced market is perfect). - GS.PreferencesList-based preferences:
prefs iis a full permutation ofFin n, ordered from most to least preferred. - MatchingMarket.ofEquivDataBuild a
MatchingMarket (Fin n) (Fin n)from list-based preference data.some j ≻ some kiffjappears earlier in the list;noneis…
- GS.mPartnerThe man partnered to woman
- Used by 6
- GS.joinWoman_mem_menIf
iis manj's join-partner thenjis one ofi's two men. - GS.joinWoman_worse_rightDual of
joinWoman_worse_leftwith the roles ofμ,νswapped. - GS.meetMan_mem_womenGS.meetMan_mem_women
- GS.meetMan_worse_rightGS.meetMan_worse_right
- GS.meetMan_worse_leftGS.meetMan_worse_left
- GS.joinWoman_worse_leftIf
iis the join-partner of herμ-manj, theniweakly prefers herν-man toj(sojis her worse man).
- GS.joinWoman_mem_menIf
Lean source view module on GitHub
Choose a tactic — a marked line — to see the goals Lean had before and after it, as in Lean’s infoview. Step with ← → or j k.
set_option autoImplicit true inset_option relaxedAutoImplicit true inopen GS invariable {n : ℕ} (w m : Preferences n) invariable {w m} in/-- The man-of and woman-of partner maps are inverse to each other. -/lemma GS.wPartner_eq_iff (μ : Matching (Fin n) (Fin n)) (hμ : Matching.IsStable (MatchingMarket.ofEquivData w m) μ) {i j : Fin n} : wPartner μ hμ j = i ↔ mPartner μ hμ i = j := by constructor · intro h have h1 : μ.matchW j = some i := by rw [matchW_wPartner μ hμ j, h] have h2 : μ.matchM i = some j := (μ.consistent i j).mpr h1 rw [matchM_mPartner μ hμ i] at h2 exact Option.some.inj h2 · intro h have h1 : μ.matchM i = some j := by rw [matchM_mPartner μ hμ i, h] have h2 : μ.matchW j = some i := (μ.consistent i j).mp h1 rw [matchW_wPartner μ hμ j] at h2 exact Option.some.inj h2