AFTD Auto-Formalizing Theoretical Domains

GS.opposed_preferences

theoremverifiedformalizationimported Lean

Opposed preferences. Let μ be a stable matching. If man j is matched to woman wj under another matching ν and strictly prefers wj to his μ-partner wj', then wj strictly prefers her μ-partner m' to j. Intuition: the two sides' interests are opposed across stable matchings — when a man trades up, the woman he gains trades down. Proof: otherwise (wj, j) would be a blocking pair for μ (he prefers her to his μ-partner by hypothesis; she would prefer him to her μ-partner m'), contradicting stability. Only μ need be stable.

Statement

set_option autoImplicit true in
set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in
open GS in
variable {n : ℕ} (w m : Preferences n) in
theorem GS.opposed_preferences
    (μ : Matching (Fin n) (Fin n))
    (hμ : Matching.IsStable (MatchingMarket.ofEquivData w m) μ)
    {j wj wj' m' : Fin n}
    (hμ_j : μ.matchW j = some wj')
    (hpref : (m.prefs j).idxOf wj < (m.prefs j).idxOf wj')
    (hμ_w : μ.matchM wj = some m') :
    (w.prefs wj).idxOf m' < (w.prefs wj).idxOf j
Formalizes
EconCSLib, `GS.opposed_preferences`
Lean proof
By xbei (from the file's git history), from github.com/gametheoryinlean/EconCSLib at 1a88f809b538 (Copyright (c) 2026 EconCSLib contributors. All rights reserved, Apache-2.0). Compiled here against leanprover/lean4:v4.33.1, Mathlib v4.33.1; written for leanprover/lean4:v4.30.0.
Verified
08 Oct 2026
Axioms
Classical.choiceQuot.soundpropext
Built on 9
  • Matching.IsStableA matching is stable if it has no blocking pair. [MSZ 22.5]
  • strictStrict preference derived from a weak preference relation.
  • MatchingA matching is a partial bijection between M and W. matchM i is the partner of i ∈ M (or none if unmatched). matchW j is the…
  • instCoeFunPrefForallForallPropinstCoeFunPrefForallForallProp
  • GS.PreferencesList-based preferences: prefs i is a full permutation of Fin n, ordered from most to least preferred.
  • MatchingMarketA two-sided matching market. M and W are the two sides (e.g., men and women, hospitals and residents). Each agent has a preference…
  • MatchingMarket.ofEquivDataBuild a MatchingMarket (Fin n) (Fin n) from list-based preference data. some j ≻ some k iff j appears earlier in the list; none is…
  • GS.pref_list_memEvery element of Fin n appears in a full-permutation list.
  • PrefA bundled weak preference relation. Use this interface when several agents may rank the same outcome type differently. Use…
Used by 2

Lean source view module on GitHub

set_option autoImplicit true inset_option relaxedAutoImplicit true inopen GS invariable {n : ℕ} (w m : Preferences n) in/-- **Opposed preferences.** Let `μ` be a stable matching. If man `j` is matched to woman `wj` under another matching `ν` and **strictly prefers** `wj` to his `μ`-partner `wj'`, then `wj` strictly prefers her `μ`-partner `m'` to `j`. Intuition: the two sides' interests are opposed across stable matchings — when a man trades up, the woman he gains trades down. Proof: otherwise `(wj, j)` would be a blocking pair for `μ` (he prefers her to his `μ`-partner by hypothesis; she would prefer him to her `μ`-partner `m'`), contradicting stability. Only `μ` need be stable. -/theorem GS.opposed_preferences    (μ : Matching (Fin n) (Fin n))    (hμ : Matching.IsStable (MatchingMarket.ofEquivData w m) μ)    {j wj wj' m' : Fin n}    (hμ_j : μ.matchW j = some wj')    (hpref : (m.prefs j).idxOf wj < (m.prefs j).idxOf wj')    (hμ_w : μ.matchM wj = some m') :    (w.prefs wj).idxOf m' < (w.prefs wj).idxOf j := by  -- `wj ≠ wj'` since `j` strictly prefers `wj` over `wj'`.  have hwj_ne : wj ≠ wj' := by    intro he; rw [he] at hpref; exact (lt_irrefl _ hpref)  -- `j ≠ m'`: else `μ` would match `wj` to `j`, contradicting `μ.matchW j = some wj'`.  have hj_ne : j ≠ m' := by    intro he; subst he    have : μ.matchW j = some wj := (μ.consistent wj j).mp hμ_w    rw [hμ_j] at this    exact hwj_ne (Option.some.inj this).symm  -- Suppose `wj` does NOT strictly prefer `m'` to `j`; derive a blocking pair.  by_contra hle  push_neg at hle  -- (w.prefs wj).idxOf j ≤ (w.prefs wj).idxOf m'  -- `wj` then strictly prefers `j` to `m'` (strictness from `j ≠ m'`).  have hlt : (w.prefs wj).idxOf j < (w.prefs wj).idxOf m' := by    refine lt_of_le_of_ne hle (fun e => hj_ne ?_)    exact (List.idxOf_inj (pref_list_mem _ (w.valid wj).1 (w.valid wj).2 j)).mp e  -- `(wj, j)` blocks `μ`.  exact hμ wj j    ⟨by rw [hμ_w]; exact ⟨by show (w.prefs wj).idxOf j ≤ (w.prefs wj).idxOf m'; omega,                          by show ¬ (w.prefs wj).idxOf m' ≤ (w.prefs wj).idxOf j; omega⟩,     by rw [hμ_j]; exact ⟨by show (m.prefs j).idxOf wj ≤ (m.prefs j).idxOf wj'; omega,                          by show ¬ (m.prefs j).idxOf wj' ≤ (m.prefs j).idxOf wj; omega⟩⟩
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